The Crucial "Corrupt Intent" Element in Federal Bribery Laws

University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1995

A decade ago, I concluded an article on political bribery with the thought that corruption is an" 'essentially contested concept,' that is, a concept containing a descriptive core on which users of the concept can agree roughly, but so unbounded and so intertwined with controversial normative ideas that general agreement on the features of the concept is impossible." 1 I went on: I do not believe, however, that we should provide our political scientists and theorists with such a convenient escape hatch just yet. Even if the problem of political bribery will not be solved in the end, there is value in the attempt. We need to think more about the concrete situations in which actors in our political system characteristically find themselves, and what we reasonably can ask of them in order to have the kind of system and the kind of results we would like. Intermediate political theory will no more solve our problems than other varieties of political theory, but it may help us disagree more intelligently. 2 In the present Symposium, Professors David A. Strauss and Bruce E. Cain-both scholars of the first rank-take up the challenge, by theorizing about whether it is corrupt for elected officials and pressure groups to exchange favorable official actions, such as legislative votes, for campaign contributions. 3 The fact

Journal of Economic Policy Reform , 2017

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.

Revue internationale de droit pénal, 2002

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Law Culture And Humanities, 2021

Citizens United has stimulated a cottage industry of legal scholarship on corruption. A prominent stream of this literature is self-consciously atheoretical and suggests that the current state of corruption jurisprudence suffers from a misconceived reliance on liberal political theories and a rejection of the public good. We argue that it is impossible to understand specific acts of corruption without a political theory explaining why such actions are wrong. We show that the current jurisprudence relies on a mistaken intellectual history of the public good and a political theory of American constitutionalism that commodifies citizenship and treats political participation as a market good. Pace Teachout, we cannot draw the bright lines many legal scholars desire without a better political theory of the primary goods we want to protect.

This Article develops an economic approach to the ascertainment of the requisite intent for bribery, unlawful gratuity, and honest-services frauds. Given the crimes’ inherently transactional and private nature, courts should elicit the parties’ intent from the economics of their exchange. When the exchange yields both sides a benefit not available on the market, it constitutes bribery, unlawful gratuity, or honest-services fraud. Based on this simple insight, I criticize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of criminal corruption.

Robert W. McGee, The Ethics of Bribery: An Introduction. In Robert W. McGee & Serkan Benk (Eds.), The Ethics of Bribery: Theoretical and Empirical Studies. (pp. xxx-xxx). Switzerland: Springer, forthcoming, 2023

This chapter introduces the reader to the chapters in the book, The Ethics of Bribery: Theoretical and Empirical Studies, and also briefly discusses the other publications in the ethics of bribery and ethics of tax evasion series.

American Business Law Journal, 2012

This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption at both the macro-and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the macrolevel the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and economies. Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the micro-level can be discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay bribes. Firms that pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs of distortions of internal resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on existing relationships within the firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally, the article examines potential criminal and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes. The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm.

2012

Abstract: This Essay develops an economic understanding of bribery, unlawful gratuity, and honest-services fraud offenses. Given the inherently transactional and private nature of these offenses, courts should elicit the parties' intent from the economics of their exchange. When the exchange yields the parties a benefit not available on the open market, then-depending on the exchange's particulars-it constitutes bribery, unlawful gratuity, or honest-services fraud.