SPEECH ACT IN TERMS OF SPEECH ACT THEORY
Кирилл Игошев
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Abstract
The article investigates the terminological apparatus of Speech Act Theory, in particular its central concept - the speech act. The author considers theoretical principles of Speech Act Theory, relying on the works of the founders of this linguistic theory and their followers. In the first part of this article definitions are provided of the components of the speech act: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, as well as concepts such as performative, illocutionary force, direct and indirect speech act. By means of an analytic review of sources on the problems of the Speech Act Theory the author clarifies and complements the above-mentioned debatable concepts of Speech Act Theory. In the second part of this article the three main classifications of speech acts of the British linguist John Austin, American linguist George Searle and Russian linguists Yuri Apresyan and Ivan Shatunovsky are described. It is noted that although the above-mentioned classifications of speech acts are based on their different features, but they still only consider their illocutionary force, which is not always obvious in indirect speech acts. Therefore, the drawback of all these classifications is that they can only be used for the classification of direct speech acts. In conclusion, the author points out the necessity of further study of indirect speech acts and methods of identifying them for the future development of the Speech Act Theory and understanding of the principles of language work. Key-words: Speech Act Theory, Speech Act, locutionary act, illocutionary act, perlocutionary act, performative, illocutionary force.
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One of the most powerful theoretical conceptions behind current research in pragmatics 1 is the idea that a theory of linguistic communication is really only a special case of a general theory of human action. According to this view, the various linguistic subdisciplines such as phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics should be regarded as the studies of different abstract aspects of underlying communicative actions. Explanation of variation within each subdiscipline should preferably be functional, i.e. it should relate the properties of the phenomenon being examined to the function of a communicative action as a whole. If this task could be accomplished, the functionalist claim is that linguistic theory would simultaneously achieve both increased exhaustiveness and greater internal coherence and simplicity.
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The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach, the main tenet of which is that performing illocutionary acts consists in making conventional moves in accordance with patterns of social interaction. It is claimed that, first, each of the discussed approaches presupposes a different account of the nature and structure of illocutionary acts, and, second, all those approaches result from one-sided interpretations of Austin’s conception of verbal action. The first part of the paper reconstructs Austin's views on the functions and effects of felicitous illocutionary acts. The second part reconstructs and considers three different research developments in the post-Austinian speech act theory—the intentionalist approach, the institutionalist approach, and the interactionalist approach.
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This paper examines J.L. Austin's theory regarding speech acts, or how we do things with words. It starts by reviewing the birth and foundation of speech act theory as it appeared in the 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard before going into what Austin's theory is and how it can be applied to the real world. The theory is explained and analysed both in regards to its faults and advantages. Proposals for the improvement of the theory are then developed, using the ideas of other scholars and theorists along with the ideas of the author. The taxonomy in this essay is vast and various concepts and conditions are introduced and applied to the theory in order for it to work. Those conditions range from being conditions of appropriateness through to general principles of communication. In this essay utterances are examined by their propositional content, the intention of the utterance, and its outcome. By studying how utterances are formed and issued, along with looking into utterance circumstances and sincerity, one can garner a clear glimpse into what constitutes a performative speech act and what does not. By applying the ideas of multiple thinkers in unison it becomes clear that a) any one single theory does not satisfyingly explain all the intricacies of the theory and b) most utterances which are not in the past tense can be considered to be either performative or as having some performative force.
Speech Act Theory The Force of an Utterance
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One of the most important theories in early Pragmatics is that of Austin's Speech Act Theory. In How to do things with words (1962), which was published posthumously, Austin uncovers the power of language in getting things done. Calling this power the FORCE of a speech act, Austin situates language within a larger enterprise of human actions. Speech Act Theory is the level of analysis that goes beyond naming entities or judging linguistic structures. By focusing on the nonliteral meaning that arises in language in use, Speech Act Theory fosters a third level of analysis to language in use. This article attempts to trace the main claims of Austin' Speech Act Theory, with much focus on the difference between constatives and performatives. A major distinction states that while the former are either true or false, the latter are either happy or unhappy.
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