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Basic research or fundamental research is distinct from both pure and applied research, in that it is pure research with expected useful results. The existence of basic or fundamental research is problematic, at least for both inductivists and instrumentalists, but also for Popper. Assuming scientific research to be the search for explanatory conjectures and for refutations, and assuming technology to be the search of conjectures and some corroborations, we can easily place basic or fundamental research between science and technology as a part of their overlap. As a bonus, the present view of basic or fundamental research as an overlap explains the specific hardship basic research workers encounter.
Sociological Inquiry, 1986
Contemporary views on the nature of science and technology describe them as symmetrically interdependent subcultures, in contrast to the older view of technology as applied science. O n closer inspection, however, these accounts provide two distinct descriptions. The first, that of "distinct subcultures," sees science and technology as distinguishable based on their products, sectoral locations, or objectives. The second, that of a "holistic research system," denies that any single dimension delivers the ideal typical constructs that have long been used to characterize science and technology. On balance, social studies of the research process would do well to dispense with the terms, except insofar as their use constitutes an explanatory project.
EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science, 2009
Funding policies for science are usually directed at supporting technological innovations. The impact and success of such policies depend crucially on how science and technology are connected to each other. I propose an "interactive view" of the relationship between basic science and technology development which comprises the following four claims: First, technological change derives from science but only in part. The local models used in accounting for technologically relevant phenomena contain theoretical and non-theoretical elements alike. Second, existing technologies and rules of experience constitute another major repository of technological inventions. Third, technology dynamics is only weakly coupled to progress in basic science but it is closely related to science. There is a dependence of technological change on a more fundamental understanding, to be sure, but it is of an indirect and long-term character. Fourth, progress in basic research is sometimes the effect (rather than the cause) of technological change. Technological change sometimes brings about increased theoretical understanding (application innovation).
Technology and Society studies, 2006
Technology is frequently considered in terms of its impact on entities outside its essential nature: as the impact of technology on the environment and society, but also the impact of human values and needs on technology. By taking particular social implications of technology into account, the Science-Technology relationship can be extended to the field of Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies. STS studies are grounded in socio-technological understanding, that is, systematic knowledge of the mutual relationship between technical objects, the natural environment and social practice. Because technology is a key element of STS, it is expected that the philosophy of technology will have implications for STS studies. The dynamic nature of technology as such leaves its own philosophy in a tentative or flexible state. However, the implications of the philosophy of technology, being in a development phase at the moment with changes in emphasis occuring, for STS studies ought to be determined continuously. The aim of the article is to identify and discuss possible implications of the the philosophy of technology for STS. In order to deduce these implications, the relevant theoretical framework underpinning the article will be discussed in broad outlines. Seeing that the philosophy of technology is such a wide field a delineation of the field needs to be done. Mitcham's proposed preliminary framework is taken as point of departure for the article. Technology as knowledge (epistemology/theory of knowledge) and technology as activity (design methodology) will be discussed as two key aspects of the modern philosophy of technology which could provide implications for STS. A theory of knowledge usually includes methodology, but seeing that Mitcham classified methodology as one of the modes in which technology is manifested, it is dealt with separately. The epistemology and methodology of technology will each be discussed from a philosophical, historical and practicebased methodological perspective. Some implications of the philosophy for STS are identified and discussed.
IAR Consortium, 2023
Regarding the topic "philosophy of science and technology" there are of course various debates and contributions for more than half a century regarding the different approaches in the philosophy of science. Beside some urgently pressing problems of responsibility, technocracy and of the now so-called New Technologies pose an important methodological question, namely whether or notand if, how-variants of philosophy of science or of "Verstehen" (understanding in the hermeneutical sense) would apply to science technology and engineering disciplines and to what Don Ihde as the initiating author labeled "Technoscience". Indeed, in the last decades there have been quite a few new accents in the philosophy of technology and philosophy of science amounting, e. g., to the socalled schools of the "New Experimentalism", "New Instrumentalism" and just recently "New Mechanism". Especially Ihde, Hacking, Giere, and a number of sociologists and historians of "technoscience" emphasized the impact of instruments, experiments, dynamics and "mechanisms". They all would study respective technologies and conducive potentialities opened up by the progress and development of ever-improving measuring instruments & procedures, experimentation etc. In addition to these extant and very important practiceoriented approaches it would to my mind also be necessary to accentuate and analyze the process-and action-orientation including practical and methodological problems of "scheme-interpretation" as well as complex dynamic systems models from an epistemological perspective. It really seems that more and more scheme dynamics and interpretation patterns pave the ways in understanding science and technology. For example, do the engineering sciences exist as autonomous disciplines? Can they be separated from the natural sciences? Apparently not really. And how have they to be embedded systemstheoretical perspectives in social science and/or even in an action-theory of technology and technological activity. The necessity of multidisciplinary mutual influences was already time and again stressed regarding the theoretical and applied philosophy of science.
2014
It is the purpose of this special issue to acknowledge the shifting definitions and uses of the conceptual and empirical in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), and to explore the constructive potential of this condition. In this introductory essay we point to four formulations in STS for the relation between the conceptual and the empirical which do not figure them as binaries or opposites: (1) the empirical as a path to the conceptual, (2) the conceptual as practical and empirical, (3) the empirical as an instantiation of the conceptual (and the dangers of that view), and (4) a conceptual minimalism. We then point to some inspirations in contemporary thought for engaging creatively with the conceptual and empirical, and conclude by summarizing the contributions to this issue.
The Role of Technology in Science: Philosophical Perspectives, 2015
The relationship(s) between science and technology can be conceived in different ways depending on how each of the two concepts is defined. This chapter traces them both back to the medieval tradition of knowledge classification and its notions of science and mechanical arts. Science can be defined either in the limited sense of the English language or in a broader sense that includes the humanities. It is argued that the latter approach provides a more adequate delimitation from an epistemological point of view. The word "technology" can refer either to knowledge about practical activities with tools and machines (a common sense in German and many other languages) or to these activities, tools, and machines themselves (the common sense of the word in English). Based on conceptual clarifications of the two concepts, four classes of philosophically interesting questions about sciencetechnology relationships are outlined: (1) the relation between science in general and technological science, (2) the role of science in technological practice, (3) the role of technological practice in science, and (4) the relationship between science and the Aristotelian notion of productive arts (that is more general than the notion of technological practice).
Social Epistemology, 2003
Sometime in the 1970s, Mertonian sociology of science came under strident and sustained critique. Led largely by British scholars, the work of Robert K. Merton, his colleagues and ex-students was vigorously criticized for promoting a 'traditional', normative understanding of science (Barnes
2014
In 1970's and 1980's G.H. von Wright introduced the question of what science is all about in, but then in Finland the positivistic and post-Marxist mainstream bowed politely and drove him back. Now the question is topical again. Here is an introduction to the core issues of the problem, the scientific method. Since Eino Kaila, philosophy in the University of Helsinki had been dominated by analytical philosophy. However, in the early 1970’s G.H. von Wright opened a debate on practical reason in a critical spirit. At the same time the post-1968 current of Marxism gained a lot of still influenting support among students in several faculties of the university, but not so much in philosophy. One of the reasons was that von Wright’s thinking encouraged students to follow a third way complementaristic view. According to it, both the causalistic galilean tradition and intentionalistic aristotelian tradition are needed as the foundation of the social sciences — and of practical life. However, the positivistic and post-Marxist currents took over in the Finnish faculties, which then got today's "anything goes" reaction.
Science & Education, 2005
The current consideration of technology as 'applied science', this is to say, as something that comes 'after' science, justifies the lack of attention paid to technology in science education. In our paper we question this simplistic view of the science-technology relationship, historically rooted in the unequal appreciation of intellectual and manual work, and we try to show how the absence of the technological dimension in science education contributes to a na€ ve and distorted view of science which deeply affects the necessary scientific and technological literacy of all citizens.
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