theory of knowledge.pdf

Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences, 2016

Contemporary philosophy in the west has begun with emphasizing "subjectivism" and the theory of "knowledge". Discussing the nature of knowledge leads inevitably to investigating the nature of "belief". However, it is important to note that knowledge is always something more than mere belief. To demarcate between truthful and untruthful belief we must have certain criteria. In this essay, an analytical approach has been adopted to first present a historical review of the meanings of "knowledge" and then to discuss the three parameters of knowledge (belief, truth, justification) in contemporary epistemology. The main ideas with regard to truthful belief and epistemological justification are investigated within the framework of two approaches: foundationalism and coherentism.

Philosophical Studies, 2006

If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not to mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity to the facts. That 'knowledge' is a factive term is uncontroversial. Regardless of the evidence or reasons that support a person's belief that p, she does not know that p unless 'p' is true. Pat does not know that Phaedippas ran from Marathon to Athens unless 'Phaedippas ran from Marathon to Athens ' is true. Each separate bit of knowledge answers to the facts. Understanding, like knowledge, is a type of cognitive success. Perhaps it is a type of success that we enjoy only when our views about a topic are true. In that case 'understanding' is also factive. Pretty plainly, understanding somehow answers to facts. The question is how it does so. If 'understanding' is factive, all or most of the propositional commitments that comprise a genuine understanding of a topic are true. Many epistemologists believe this. But, I will argue, such a factive conception is too restrictive. It does not reflect our practices in ascribing understanding and it forces us to deny that contemporary science embodies an understanding of the phenomena it bears on.

In this paper I formulate the thesis of the Division of Epistemic Labor as a thesis of epistemic dependence, illustrate several ways in which individual subjects are epistemically dependent on one or more of the members of their community in the process of knowledge acquisition, and draw conclusions about the cognitively distributed nature of some knowledge acquisition.

Philosophy in Review, 2010

An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

IÏ. TI-IE SHVIANTIC CONDIÎION 2.L. The retraction phenomena. 2.2. The adaptive criterion. IïI. TIIE PzuICMATIC C0NDITIONS 3.I, The doxastie vocabulary 3.2. The derived epistenÍe idiom 3.3. The traditional pattern of analysÍs. 3,/+. The necessity of the pragmatic conditions 3.r. Qualitative and quantitative idÍoms 3.6, Inferential normative conditions. fV. A FA\iIILY 0F CRITICISIÍS ¿+,L. Gettier antícipated 4.LL, Moore and good reasons lr.I2, Russell and false prernisses. /r.13. Vloozley and being right about the evidence GettÍer 4.2L. 1.22. re-visited. 0n ful1y grounded doxastic chains.

Analysis (for book symposium on Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism)

This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any interesting role in a story about how knowledge is acquired. After arguing that reflective access to reasons is not a precondition on acquiring knowledge, I look at one motivation for introducing this kind of access requirement. I argue that the argument for the access requirement rests on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between reasons and responsibility. While the target of this critical discussion is a version of epistemological disjunctivism, the criticism applies mutatis mutandis to many traditional internalist views in epistemology.

Disputatio, 2012

Erkenntnis, 2003

A standard account of understanding⎯one that is especially prevalent in the philosophy of science⎯treats understanding as essentially a type of knowledge⎯viz., knowledge of causes. Unfortunately, this proposal is untenable, in that there are cases of genuine understanding where the relevant knowledge is lacking, and cases where the relevant knowledge is present but understanding is lacking. In light of these problems, I propose an alternative view which treats understanding as a kind of cognitive achievement. In recent work, however, Stephen Grimm has argued for an adapted version of the view that understanding is constituted by knowledge of causes, one that appeals to a kind of knowledge of causes which is non-propositional. I argue that Grimm’s proposal, while admittedly ingenious, does not stand up to close scrutiny.