Fenomeni normativi. Un'indagine non filosofica

Ital Heart J, 2001

Esaminiamo ora [...] il problema della non-contraddittorietà degli assiomi. Si tratta, evidentemente, di un problema di somma importanza poiché la presenza di una contraddizione in una teoria pregiudica ovviamente la consistenza dell'intera teoria 1 .

Liber amicorum per Bruno Troisi, a cura di C. Cicero e G. Perlingieri, 2017

Itinera

Keywords: monsters, anomalous, norm, Einverleibung, values, new form, different same, monstrum, Canguilhem, Nietzsche, Deleuze What does it really mean to contemplate the “anomalous”, the “malformed”, the “anatomical- monster”? Why and how is it so disturbing? And what is the proper norm and status of the monster? The monster is what shocks, the weird, the eerie. The monster is the uncanny, the “unhomely”, das Unheimliche, to borrow from Freud’s famous expression. It’s the irruption of the improper that threatens the stability of life, as it indicates how the commonness of life itself is a precarious yet contingent state. The monster upsets us because it shows us the contingency of the norm. Based upon this assumption, we shall also touch upon other concepts. These might be: the transvaluation of values, the Einverleibung, the Great Health and the theory of the hopeful monster. It is, in the end, a new form of the same: the individual subtracts itself, therefore, from the individuality of the species, but it does so as to affirm a different same that is absolutely contingent. To borrow again from Deleuze, we might say: a "prodigious", unexpected turn of the becoming.

Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 2015

In this paper, I try to distinguish judgments from norms from a phenomenological point of view. I argue that nomothetic acts are irreducible to thetic acts, departing from a well-known thesis Husserl explains in his Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Based on a Husserlian inspired analyses of the quality and intentional matter of nomothetic acts, I develop a theory of ductive force as the quality proper to them. Meanwhile, I criticize sharply the idea that norms are regulated by a supposed non-equivocal "ought".

L'Ircocervo, 2022

Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a nonnormative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, "norms", "commitments", and "obligations" are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in a disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the normativist idea that the normative does not reduce to the causal: he claims that social science succeeds in the reduction. This claim is presented as a major challenge to philosophical normativism. In what follows, I try to discuss some aspects of Turner's challenge by focusing on certain features of belief and belief-change that prima facie promote a normativist view: this is the basis to focus on some problems concerning the scope of Turner's argument.

(testo draft per Piccole conferenze, a cura di Aljs Vignudelli, ed. Muchi) 1. Per iniziare: esistono "fatti normativi"?