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The paper analyzes the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism and its implications for contemporary political dynamics, particularly the emergence of right-wing populism in Western societies. By employing Gramsci's framework of hegemony, it argues that current political struggles reflect a crisis of neoliberalism, characterized by a rearticulation of class power and a differentiation between deserving and undeserving social groups. The author suggests that insurgent politics must focus on intersecting oppressions and move beyond single-issue activism to effectively challenge authoritarian populist narratives.
Public Lecture – Indore Press Club. Trying my hand at an analysis of authoritarian populism across the North-South axis of the world-system.
Abstract Neoliberal economic policies and its radical conception of society have been a great benefit to economic and political elites but undermined that standard of living of the middle, working-class, and the poor. Neoliberalism, I will be argued undermines democracy and civil society because it prioritizes the free market over all of social life. Neoliberalism recasts the entire social and political field accordance the image of the market. It reconfigures critical institutions to service the needs of the markets. However, neither the neoliberalism economic agenda nor it cultural dominance could have succeeded without the aid and support of the neoliberal state. One of the primary ways the state supports neoliberalism is that it actively works to create markets and protect them from alternative discourses while helping to shape society into the image of the market. Neoliberalism has not only captured our political system, sat the national agenda, but is also what sociologist Loic Wacquant call a new mode of governance. Entailing a shift from the welfare to a carceral state that is less concerned with hyper-incarceration than it is with precarious sectors of marginal populations working outside of the markets brought in-line to become self-regulating, self-responsibilized neoliberal subjects. Finally, I will argue that the hollowing out of democracy has had the effect of unleashing illiberal forces both in the mature democracies of the U.S. and Europe that will have far-reaching consequences for both.
Socialist Register 2019: A World Turned Upside Down?, 2019
What exactly is the nature of neoliberalism that it can simultaneously both rely upon state intervention and deny its efficacy by recourse to political and ideological populism, quite apart from appeals to other (conservative) collectivities – nationalism and racism, in particular – in the context of market individualism? Coherence is not the order of the day, but there is underlying order in the chaos as our argument here, summarized as follows, suggests. First, what occurred in 2008-09 was a severe crisis within neoliberalism, exposing the limits of reliance on finance as the driver of global accumulation. Initially taken by many as a fatal crisis of neoliberalism, especially as the market failed spectacularly in its favoured arena of finance, the crisis proved nothing of the sort. Despite the decline of GDP growth rates and the vast and continuing reverberations of the crisis, neoliberalism remains alive and well in the economic domain and beyond. Indeed, in most respects, neoliberalism has been strengthened during the last decade. Second, the social and institutional changes brought about by neoliberalism, and furthered by the finance-first and fiscal ‘austerity’ policies imposed in the wake of the global crisis, have destabilized the political sphere formed under neoliberalism and steadily sapped the ideological legitimacy of the system of accumulation. These developments have not quelled political activism entirely, but they have severely undermined its traditional forms of expression and created fertile conditions for more extreme politics as new vulnerabilities to livelihoods emerged. Third, while neoliberalism was, previously, typically grounded in increasingly shallow and formal practices of liberal democracy, its current political forms are transitioning towards unstable modalities of which authoritarianism is increasingly common, with ‘spectacular’ leaders driving right-wing exclusionary programmes and the emergence of mass movements of the right both supporting and pushing them forward. We argue that these political shifts are not transitory phenomena ensuing directly from poor economic performance, that will reverse once faster economic growth resumes. Instead, they are the outcome of the degeneration of liberal democracy under neoliberalism. Yet, to understand whether authoritarian neoliberalism is a transitory adjustment phase to the murky post-crisis world or becoming the ‘bestfit’ political arrangement for neoliberalism, the tendencies and countertendencies characterizing the present phase of neoliberalism need to be identified and disentangled. For the fate of authoritarian neoliberalism inevitably hinges on how such tendencies will be resolved – a process which is chaotic, still in flux, and by no means predetermined.
Abstract Neoliberal economic policies and its radical conception of society have been a great benefit to economic and political elites but undermined that standard of living of the middle, working-class, and the poor. Neoliberalism, I will be argued undermines democracy and civil society because it prioritizes the free market over all of social life. Neoliberalism recasts the entire social and political field accordance the image of the market. It reconfigures critical institutions to service the needs of the markets. However, neither the neoliberalism economic agenda nor it cultural dominance could have succeeded without the aid and support of the neoliberal state. One of the primary ways the state supports neoliberalism is that it actively works to create markets and protect them from alternative discourses while helping to shape society into the image of the market. Neoliberalism has not only captured our political system, sat the national agenda, but is also what sociologist Loic Wacquant call a new mode of governance. Entailing a shift from the welfare to a carceral state that is less concerned with hyper-incarceration than it is with precarious sectors of marginal populations working outside of the markets brought in-line to become self-regulating, self-responsibilized neoliberal subjects. Finally, I will argue that the hollowing out of democracy has had the effect of unleashing illiberal forces both in the mature democracies of the U.S. and Europe that will have far-reaching consequences for both.
International Studies Review, 2014
South Atlantic Quarterly, 2019
Neoliberalism is variegated as different types of neoliberalism co-exist in a world market that is organized in the shadow of a neoliberalization process that began with neoliberal regime shifts in the USA and UK. This article provides a periodization of neoliberal regime shifts within this context, starting with their prehistory up to the point of no return and then tracing their roll-back, roll forward, blowback, 'Third Way', moments of financial crisis, and crisis of crisis-management phases. It argues that neoliberal regime shits were associated from their prehistory onwards with intertwined authoritarian populist and authoritarian statist discourses and practices. Nonetheless, the intensification and interaction of crisis-tendencies of different kinds in different phases and changing forms of resistance have led to an increasingly authoritarian statist form of neoliberal regime, characterized by a state of permanent austerity that requires increased surveillance and policing to maintain it. This illustrates Nicos Poulantzas's suggestion in the 1970s that authoritarian statism is becoming the normal form of the capitalist type of state but rests on the intensification of features normally associated with exceptional regimes. This article updates Poulantzas's argument to an era of finance-dominated accumulation and provides a new characterization of authoritarian neoliberal statism.
Critical Social Policy
Journal of Australian Political Economy, 2021
This article builds upon Marx’s sensitivity to capitalist change and its implications for the superstructure to, first, explore the broad types of democracy which accompanied major capitalist transmutations across its world historic stages of development. What is shown in this analysis is that even as the franchise expanded across major democracies, a confluence of economic changes and structuring of electoral systems served to limit popular sovereignty and thwart significant challenges to ruling class interests. In turn, second, it delineates the key economic changes marking the neoliberal era as a period of capitalist decay. Understanding this helps us contextualise the superstructural shifts of the neoliberal era. Third, it then exposes three interrelated anti-democratic tendencies secreted by contemporary neoliberal polities in advanced economies. ‘Legalisation of politics’ entails systemic overriding of electoral efficacy and political decision-making in major democracies by courts and judges, leaving a wasteland of depoliticised mass publics in its wake. What is dubbed the ‘new constitutionalism’ captures the ensnaring of national polities in webs of rules crafted by, or at the behest of, major corporations. This endows them with extraordinary powers which effectively subordinate national polities irrespective of political orientation – social democratic, liberal and so forth. Finally, the ‘state of exception’ devolves from a provision embedded in most democratic constitutions granting unlimited authority to executive branches in times of emergency. As protests to the neoliberal excrescence mount, it is increasingly wielded as a truncheon against them. Particularly insidious here is that, rather than overt impositions of authoritarianism such as dictatorship or fascism, these tendencies envelop neoliberal society under the guise of constitutionality and the rule of law.
2018
A number of empirical surveys, such as Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” or the annual “Democracy Index Report” by the Economist indicate a relative decline of democracy worldwide and in the West, attributed generally to the emergence of “illiberal democracies”, in other words the rise of autocrats in states where elections are held, but rule of law is weakened. This phenomenon is usually associated with populism, an even vaguer term with disputable heuristic value. -According to New York Times the two most prominent populist leaders of our times are considered to be President Trump and Pope Francis!.
Interregnum. Between Biopolitocs and PostHegemony, 2020
European Journal of Sociology, 2016
Most scholars focus on the macro outcomes and characteristics of neoliberalism, such as privatization, financialization, welfare gutting, and decentralization. A scholarly tradition that draws on Foucault's biopolitics lectures has emphasized an arguably more thorough transformation that neoliberalism brings about: the re-making of the individual and all of her qualities in the image of an entrepreneur. Wendy Brown has been one of the leading voices in this scholarship on (what has been called) "neoliberal subjectivity."
This paper situates neoliberalism and authoritarian populism within the longue durée of modernity. I define modernity as the set of processes unfolding in the wake of European expansion, including colonialism, settler colonialism, the Atlantic slave system, capitalism, the Enlightenment, the nation-state (and nationalism), and imperialism. How does our current crisis of global neoliberalism (and American politics) have roots in the deep history leading to the present?
2019
The following paper examines the relationship between Populism and Neoliberalism in the early 21 century in the U.S. Through the lens of a historical-structural analysis, it tests the hypothesis set forth by authors David Harvey, Dawson Barrett, and John B. Judis that the prominence of Populism in the 2016 election cycle could not be explained without the phenomenon of Neoliberalism in the U.S. To accomplish this, it examines the rise of income inequality and Neoliberal globalization and uses statistical and polling data to determine whether these variables were related to Neoliberalism and whether voters reacted to them in 2016. It further examines the issues espoused by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders and looks at polling data to determine the beliefs of their supporters. By categorizing Bernie Sanders as an anti-Capitalist and Donald Trump as an anti-Globalist Populist, it sets up an empirical test to determine whether their supporters were primed for these Populist arguments. In...
Journal of Human Rights and Social Work
Competition & Change, 2018
This article introduces readers to the special issue on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. It charts the origins of the concept and summarizes the central arguments of the individual contributions to the special issue.
The objective of this essay lies in an exploration of the nexus between populism and neoliberalism. More specifically, I will try to explore if the overlapping appearance of the two phenomena is rather a coincidence or if neoliberal rationality produced favourable conditions for populism as it appears since the late 1980s. I will argue that there are at least three common elements of three strands of approach for a definition of populism that each relate and connect with neoliberalism to a certain degree. The argument is thus twofold: First, I argue that, despite considerable disagreement in scholarly research on the definition of populism, there are common elements which are of analytic use. And secondly, I argue that the common elements of conceptualisation of populism that I found all somehow connect to neoliberalism.2 In sum, the argument points to the creation of favourable conditions by neoliberal rationality to the appearance of a new wave of populism.
2022
Populism has been a key concept in recent political theory. Trying to navigate through the multiplicity of theoretical and political connotations and in view of the terms’ different uses, I will try to combine the concept of governmentality with that of populism in order to: a) outline significant differences between the right- and left-wing populism concerning its governmental perspective. b) Construct an alternative way of understanding aspirations, hopes and failures of left-wing populist parties that rose due to the recent anti-austerity political movements (e.g. square movements) and their difficulty coping with a global neoliberal governmental authoritarianism. c) Distinguish neoliberal, anti-democratic governmental techniques from radical democratic popular demands.
Constellations, 2018
Contemporary neoliberal capitalism can be said to be characterized by two significant features. On the one hand, there has been a staggering increase in social and economic inequality since the mid-1970s. For example, since 1977 sixty percent of the increase in US national income has gone to the top ten percent of the population (see Piketty, 2014). Combined with a constellation of forces and tendencies, for example, increasing investment in fixed capital and technical innovation such as intensifying automation, this inequality is only likely to increase in coming years and decades. On the other, in place of a robust, radically democratic challenge to the growth of an inequality so great that it shakes the very foundations of the political order, the rise in support for authoritarian populist political movements throughout Europe and North America proceeds apace. By authoritarian populist movements I mean the movements that purport to embody or represent the will of the people, understood in narrow ethno-national terms, defined in opposition to a power bloc. This was exemplified most dramatically by the breakthrough by the Front National, which came out on top in the first round in the December 2015 regional elections in France-an advance that was halted in the second only by expedient tactical voting by the French Socialists. The USA has witnessed the rise of the so-called alt-right and the election of Donald Trump as president on the basis of an unapologetically racist and profoundly xenophobic agenda that has sought, explicitly, to target Mexican immigration and has proposed a complete ban on Muslims entering the country. How is it possible to account for this strange and profoundly troubling conjunction of deepening socioeconomic inequality and the growing rise of authoritarian populism and ethno-nationalist extremism? From the militant left, commentators such as Stathis Kouvelakis have argued that neo-fascist political parties are anti-systemic movements that, nonetheless, seek to preserve the existing order of property relations. Kouvelakis argues: Nonetheless, it is precisely this aspect of the FN-its capacity to capture and "hegemonise" a form of popular revolt-that means that any "republican front" strategy, whether a partial or a total one, can only feed it, legitimising its discourse of "us against all the rest" and its self-proclaimed status as the only force opposing "the system"-even "radically" so. (Kouvelakis, 2015). According to Kouvelakis, the FN has managed to enjoy this success precisely because they occupy terrain that has been almost entirely vacated by an anti-capitalist left unable to challenge the existing power bloc through a counterhegemonic project of its own that would pose a legitimate alternative to neoliberal capital in general and austerity in particular.
2021
This article reflects on the commonalities of contemporary right-wing populism and neoliberalism. It thereby focuses on how neoliberalism has undone the ontological basis of the modern sovereign people and how this process has generated the conditions for the possibility of neo-populism, which thus appears as the obscene reverse of neoliberalism. Populism and neoliberalism form a ‘perverse alliance’ that leads them to fight the same battle, albeit in different forms, against material equality. Populism fights this battle with two privileged instruments: a ‘war of values’ that deflects interest from the conflict against socio-economic inequality and a ‘war on migrants’ that amplifies xeno-populism while nevertheless sharing with neoliberalism the processes of the hierarchisation of citizenship and social order.
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