In Defense of Eating Vegan

2016

In this essay, we argue for dietary veganism. 1 Our case has two steps. First, we argue that, in most circumstances, it is morally wrong to raise animals to produce meat, dairy products, most eggs (a possible exception we discuss is eggs from pet chickens) and most other animal food products. Turning animals into food, and using them for their byproducts, causes serious harms to animals that are morally unjustified: that is, the reasons given to justify causing these kinds of harmsgoods or alleged goods that result from animal farming and slaughterare inadequate to justify the bad done to animals. This is true for both conventional 'factory farming' methods of raising and killing animals and small-scale, boutique animal farming and slaughter: so-called 'humane' farming is actually inhumane and is wrong. Some will conclude from this argument that each individual has a moral obligation to be vegan because they are morally obligated to not support wrongdoing. Our second step supports that reasoning. It is often morally wrong to support those who act wrongly. So, when it is wrong to produce a particular product, it can be wrong to purchase or use that product or otherwise encourage the product's production. We develop a plausible general moral principle concerning when consumers are obligated not to purchase a product. This principle justifies a moral obligation to not support the wrongful treatment of animals by purchasing or consuming animal food products. Thus, it's wrong to not be a vegan. We discuss a variety of attempts to explain why these harms to animals are morally justified, that is, alleged good reasons to justify treating animals badly. Focusing on some of the most philosophically challenging justifications, we argue that none succeed: no defense points to goods that justify the serious harms done to animals, and so these harms are unjustified. Arguments for veganism often appeal to many other considerations, such as personal and public health, environmental protection, and world hunger, but our arguments do not appeal to them. Some of these concerns support steps toward veganism but, unlike harm-based concerns, 1 While the focus of our essay is on our dietary obligations, we believe our arguments can be extended to 'lifestyle veganism,' e.g., not buying and wearing leather and not buying and using personal care products tested on animals. Unlike arguments for veganism that appeal to 'equality' for animals, animal 'rights' or the 'moral status' or 'standing' of animals, 4 this argument depends on an uncontroversial moral principle that most people already accept: it is wrong to cause serious harms that are morally unjustified. 5,6 We use the concept of 'harm' in a regular, everyday sense. To harm someone is to make them worse off in some way. 7 Harms are bad for someone, at least when the harms are considered in themselves. We focus on harms because of their explanatory power in ethics. Imagine some of the worst ways that individuals can be treated. Why are these actions wrong? What is it about these actions that made them wrong? One fundamental answer is that the individuals affected by the action are harmed by them, it is bad for them to be treated those ways. 8 When we add that these harms lack justificationeither there was no benefit from the action, or too little of a benefit to justify the harm, or a benefit or good that otherwise does not

This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.

2018

Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.

Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 1995

Archives of animal and poultry sciences, 2024

Rearing and killing animals for meat poses a number of ethical questions. Sentientism holds that a being has moral status if and only if it is sentient. The philosopher Peter Singer considers that the suffering of a sentient being should count equally with the like suffering of any other being and thus prioritising human interests over those of non-human animals amounts to an unjustifiable speciesism. I argue that sentientism is false and that suffering and sentience are separate considerations. Prioritising human interests may be justifiable on the basis of species relativism but, a fortiori, I argue that we have ample reasons for endorsing and embracing speciesism. I present the case for conscientious omnivorism and compassionate speciesism.

A Critique of the Moral Defense of Vegetarianism, 2016

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Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2013

Winners of the rst prize of the 2012 essay competition for students sponsored by the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) in cooperation with the Grazer Philosophische Studien* Summary e purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and su ering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal su ering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters. "When we lift our forks, we hang our hats somewhere" (Foer, 2009, 132) " e question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they su er?" (Bentham, 1789, chapter XVII) * e question of the 2012 competition was: "Are we allowed to eat animals?" From the 53 submissions that conformed to the rules of the competition, the jury selected three, one each for the rst, second, and third prize. e authors of the prizewinning essays were permitted to slightly revise and expand their submission for publication. uncorrected proof nicht korrigierte Fahne 258 In what follows, Mechoui, a meat eater, and Kardamon, a vegetarian, discuss the question of eating animals from a moral point of view. Mechoui: ese cheeseburgers are really delicious; are you sure you do not want one? Kardamon: I am sure they taste good; but I am also quite sure that eating animals is morally problematic, to say the least. Mechoui: And apparently you even think that it is bad. How would you defend this position? Kardamon: We could start from the generally accepted idea that su ering is bad (i.e. has a negative moral value) and that well-being is good (i.e. has a positive moral value). On that basis, we could characterise a good behaviour as one which improves the state of someone (towards more well-being or less su ering), and a bad behaviour as one that worsens the state of someone (towards less well-being or more su ering). Mechoui: You are talking about individuals su ering, but some of the individuals that are relevant to our moral question are animals (more precisely, non-human animals). It is not obvious that animals su er in the same way as humans, or even that they su er at all (see e.g. Descartes 1637, part V; Nagel 1974; Wittgenstein 1953, 174). Kardamon: Animal su ering is indeed a controversial issue. Let us rst consider the claim that animals do not su er at all. It seems that a necessary and su cient condition for being able to su er is to be a sentient being, and that a necessary and su cient condition for being a sentient being is to be equipped with a sufciently developed nervous system. us, since at least some animals meet this condition, at least some animals can su er. Mechoui: What you are saying suggests not only that at least certain animals can su er, but also that other individuals, like plants, cannot su er. Kardamon: Exactly. And this is why, for instance, it is not incoherent to choose not to eat animals on ethical grounds, while still eating vegetables. Let us now consider the claim that animals can su er, but not in the same way as we do. People who endorse this position seem to suggest that there is

Between the Species, 2008

My approach will be to set out and defend that animals are conscious creatures that have the capacity to suffer, and therefore should not suffer or be killed unjustly. I set out to establish that animals have this vital characteristic, the capacity to suffer, which gives the animal the right to equal consideration of interests, as described by Peter Singer. I will also defend that the ethical question of whether one should live a vegetarian lifestyle should be decided on the context of the living circumstances of the human.

Animals, 2019

Simple Summary: Psychologists have used the term "meat paradox" to explain why people may emphasize their concern for animal welfare and yet eat meat, the production of which has caused suffering to nonhuman creatures. This paper explores the meat paradox through the philosophical concept "akrasia". Akrasia refers to a situation, where one believes in a fact or value x, and yet acts against that fact or value. The paper uses the term "omnivore's akrasia" to denote a state where one believes in the value of animal wellbeing and nonetheless consumes products which have caused animal suffering. The claim of the paper is that understanding of the meat paradox can be significantly broadened with the use of philosophical takes on akrasia, which underline notions such as moral reason and virtue. Another claim is that it is through enhancing one's moral ability that both the meat paradox and omnivore's akrasia may be reduced. Specific factors included in such enhancement are introduced and compared with "nudging". In the conflicting era when the meat industry is rapidly growing on a global scale whilst attitudes toward other animals are becoming increasingly positive, exploring the phenomenon of both eating and caring for animals is of clear societal, political, and moral significance. Abstract: Western cultures have witnessed an intriguing phenomenon in recent years: People are both more concerned for animal wellbeing and consume more animal products than ever before. This contradiction has been explored in psychology under the term "meat paradox". However, what has been omitted from the explorations is the age-old philosophical notion of "akrasia", within which one both knows "the good" and acts against it. The paper seeks to address this omission by comparing psychological research on the meat paradox with philosophy of akrasia. Applying Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Spinoza, I investigate the underlying factors of and solutions to what is here called "omnivore's akrasia". Whilst contemporary research on the meat paradox focuses on various descriptive cognitive errors (such as cognitive dissonance), philosophy of akrasia has tended to focus more prescriptively on moral reason and virtue. After discussing "nudging" as an implication of the descriptive approach, the paper supports the prescriptive perspective and "the cultivation argument". The claim is that contemporary research on the contradictions concerning attitudes toward other animals would greatly benefit from paying more attention to the value-laden mental factors underlying moral agency.