Armenia: Some Features of Internal (In)Stability

In the military dimension, the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh (2–5 April 2016) changed little in the conflict zone. It has, however, had a significant impact on the situation in Armenia. The country was shocked out of the political malaise that had been the dominant mood in the last few years, and the Karabakh question, which used to animate political life in the late 1980s and early 1990s, once again became a driving force behind developments. In the internal dimension, the renewed fighting galvanised the political scene, triggered a rise in nationalist sentiments, mobilised the public and consolidated it around the Karabakh question, overshadowing the frustrations caused by the country’s difficult economic situation. In the external dimension, the war, which was viewed as Moscow-endorsed Azerbaijani aggression, undermined people’s trust in Russia and the Armenian-Russian alliance. It also made it clear for Armenians how uncertain the Russian security guarantees were and exacerbated their feelings of vulnerability and isolation on the international stage. One of the main consequences the events of recent weeks has had is that Armenia has adopted a more rigid position on the Karabakh conflict; it is now a much more distant prospect that a compromise resolution will be reached and the military scenario is more likely to come to pass than it was in previous years. The new dynamics of political life in Armenia may be seen as a kind of comeback of politics and may, in turn, give new momentum to the country’s internal political processes and Armenia’s activities on the international level—in both cases this will be in a nationalist spirit. As a result, developments in Armenia in the coming months may be unpredictable and may trigger certain geopolitical processes in the Caucasus region and the entire post-Soviet area.

Ararat Institute for Near Eastern Studies , 2021

November 9th, 2020 was not only the end of the active stage of hostilities between Armenian and Azerbaijani-Turkish armed forces on Artsakh's territory but also the end of Armenia's third republic, something that the present government doesn't appear to realize. Presently, Armenia's government doesn't have the same public support that it had a few years ago and symbolizes Armenia's defeat not only on the battlefield but also in the diplomatic arena. Armenia's present political and geopolitical situation is similar to a drowning person with hands handcuffed behind his back on his way to hit the bottom of the pool. Attempting to break the handcuffs at this point and try to swim up to the surface will do more harm than good and become the cause of his eventual drowning. The solution to the present situation is to wait until it hits the bottom and then spring up towards the surface while breaking the handcuffs in the process. To accomplish that, the Armenian people must take their future into their own hands and through grassroots efforts, rebuild Armenia from the bottom up, shaking away its upper echelons of power who no longer represent the Armenian people and pursue foreign and false agendas to the detriment of Armenian people and the security of the Armenian state. The sooner Armenian people wake up, the more time they will have to change its present trajectory leading the country and the nation to its final demise. The defeat in Forty-Four Day War provided Armenia and the Armenians around the world the opportunity to reflect and reevaluate their previous beliefs, thoughts, and actions, put aside false impressions about its ally and the world community at large, understand its limited capabilities and the geopolitical volatility that surrounds the fundamentals of Armenian statehood, and focus on self-improvement not only on an individual level but also as a country and a nation at large. To recover from the present knockdown, Armenia must become relevant again within the regional and global contexts. For that purpose, it must have something of great value to offer its regional and international partners. Another goal that Armenia must accomplish is to reimagine its future, formulate a new vision and mission that will strengthen Armenia's military capabilities, and propel its economic development towards sustainable growth. Armenia must reevaluate its priorities and develop a dynamic foreign and domestic policy that will strengthen Armenia's national sovereignty, unify its people and restore public trust in government institutions. Armenian people must believe in themselves once again. Otherwise, its end will be near. For Armenia to survive and prosper, it must unify itself not only territorially but also unite its people because its power lies within its unity.

Nationalities Papers

Despite its early promise, Armenia's transition to democracy has stalled. The literature on post-Communist transitions ascribes this outcome to the autocratic preferences of its first generation of leaders, and particularly the country's first president Levon Ter-Petrossian. I argue in this article that that literature depicts a profoundly distorted picture of the Armenian politics of the 1990s. The failure of Armenia's transition was primarily due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the political processes it set in motion.

Güvenlik Stratejileri, 2015

The conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh was violent between 1988 and 1994. Nevertheless, Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is regarded as one of the frozen conflicts, which has been witnessed for many years. In order to stop and contain the conflict, other states and international organizations advocated peaceful settlement. However, the problem went through a number of phases and has not reached a final solution despite of many years of negotiation under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this context, the objective of this paper is to understand the main impeding factors that prevent peaceful resolution and establishment of a long-lasting peace for Armenia. As a framework to analyze the case of Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, this paper uses the “constructivist theory”, which explains national histories and identities as fluid, evolving, and formed over time, and which claims that it is mainly social relationships between agents, structures, and institutions that can lead to ethnic conflicts. Contrary to the primordialist approach, which treats ethnic groups as concrete and independent entities that exist inherently, the explanation of intractability within a constructivist framework constitutes the maindifference. In view of this, government policies are also constructed according to interstate perceptions, expectations and the concepts developed towards themselves and others. As a result, rather than only including one-dimensional “ancient hatred” paradigm; “the problem of security”, “image of enemy”, “other countries” involvement with having interests in the region”, and most importantly “internal politics” can be regarded as the contributors to intractability for Armenia.

Caucasus Strategic Perspectives, 2021

The year 2020 was to become a decisive time for the three-decades-long Armenia– Azerbaijan conflict. The 44-day-long war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in the liberation of the Azerbaijani territories that had been under occupation by the armed forces of Armenia for nearly 30 years. The negotiation process, under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group since 1992, did not yield any tangible results in terms of facilitating a final resolution of the conflict. This commentary will focus on the most recent events in the run-up to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that lasted from September 27 to November 10, 2020, and will offer some thoughts on the war itself and the myths and misperceptions associated with the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. The war was brought about by the unconstructive position and denialism of the leadership of Armenia across the entire duration of the peace process, which over the last two years, since the ascension to power of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, acquired a new dimension as he ramped up purposeful political and military provocations against Azerbaijan. The 44-day war undermined many myths and changed perceptions in regard to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, some of which will be highlighted in this work.

Armenia after 2018, 2024

The goal of the volume is to launch a discussion about Armenia and its various challenging realities today. The book addresses Armenia's social, cultural and political environment after the shocks that the country witnessed in the period of three years from 2018 to 2020. The collection of articles is multidisciplinary, it embraces specialists in political science, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy.

Palgrave

For more than a quarter-century, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most important factors influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. On 12 May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement that ended military operations in the conflict zone and has been observed until recently. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been underway within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process a zero-sum game, they have generally accused one another of escalating the conflict and of a lack of willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organizations involved in the negotiations do not share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. Accordingly, the Karabakh conflict could remain unresolved for decades more. The aim of the paper is a general assessment of the current stage and dynamic of this conflict and the impact of new trends and old obstacles on the prospects for further settlement.

Caucasus Strategic Perspectives, 2022

This article explores the changes in Armenia's domestic policy after the Second Karabakh War at the political, social and economic levels, and the impact of such changes on Armenia's foreign policy, especially with regard to its relationship with Azerbaijan. It further examines the perspective of post-conflict Armenian domestic politics and analyses prospects for reforming Armenia's foreign policy with the aim of stabilizing the contested relationship with neighbouring Azerbaijan. After the conflict, Armenia has experienced serious political turmoil that affected not only domestic socioeconomic conditions but also the country's strategic position in the South Caucasus. Armenian dissatisfaction with the trilateral statement signed on 10 November 2020 led the country to a political crisis and early parliamentary elections that have brought new challenges for Armenia's domestic politics. With the balance of power in the region shifting in favour of Azerbaijan, Armenia's foreign policy has been challenged, which brings into focus the need for analysing the interaction of the country's foreign and domestic policies owing to their implicitly intertwined relationship. In the postwar period, Armenia has experienced critical phases that have opened spaces for considerable change and reform in its domestic policy, but these have not, however, brought a significant response from the political leadership or influenced the foreign policy of the country in a substantial way.

In post-Soviet Armenia, political, social and economic activity could only be fully understood in relation to three differing political-economic orders: the constitutional state, the networked, oligarchic state; and the nationalist-expansive state. These were not competing and discrete entities that must supplant one another; rather, understood as ‘state spaces’, produced by political, social and economic activity, they were deeply interlinked and mutually reinforcing.