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From change blindness to choice blindness

Profile image of Petter JohanssonPetter JohanssonProfile image of Lars HallLars HallProfile image of Sverker SikströmSverker Sikström

2008, Psychologia

Abstract

The phenomenon of change blindness has received a great deal of attention during the last decade, but very few experiments have examined the effects of the subjective importance of the visual stimuli under study. We have addressed this question in a series of studies by introducing choice as a critical variable in change detection (see . In the present study, participants were asked to choose which of two pictures they found more attractive. For stimuli we used both pairs of abstract patterns and female faces. Sometimes the pictures were switched during to choice procedure, leading to a reversal of the initial choice of the participants. Surprisingly, the subjects seldom noticed the switch, and in a post-test memory task, they also often remembered the manipulated choice as being their own. In combination with our previous findings, this result indicates that we often fail to notice changes in the world even if they have later consequences for our own actions.

Figures (4)
choice, or by showing signs of confusion and surprise), or if they later in post-experiment interviews claimed to have detected a switch or sensed that something went wrong. For participants that did not show any concurrent signs of detection, a series of increasingly specific questions were asked to make sure their responses were not misclassified as non-detected: “What did you think about the experiment?”, “Did you find anything odd with the experiment?” and “Did you notice anything strange with the stimuli presented in the experiment?”. At this point, if the participants still revealed no sign of having noticed anything odd with the experiment, they were told that we planned a follow-up study in which the patterns presented sometimes would switch place in mid-trial (i.e. an actual description of the current experiment), and asked if they believed that they would have noticed such a switch. Finally, participants were asked if they had noticed anything in the current experiment resembling the hypothetical switches that we had just described. If they answered no to this question, we concluded that they did not consciously notice any of the manipulations made during the experiment.
choice, or by showing signs of confusion and surprise), or if they later in post-experiment interviews claimed to have detected a switch or sensed that something went wrong. For participants that did not show any concurrent signs of detection, a series of increasingly specific questions were asked to make sure their responses were not misclassified as non-detected: “What did you think about the experiment?”, “Did you find anything odd with the experiment?” and “Did you notice anything strange with the stimuli presented in the experiment?”. At this point, if the participants still revealed no sign of having noticed anything odd with the experiment, they were told that we planned a follow-up study in which the patterns presented sometimes would switch place in mid-trial (i.e. an actual description of the current experiment), and asked if they believed that they would have noticed such a switch. Finally, participants were asked if they had noticed anything in the current experiment resembling the hypothetical switches that we had just described. If they answered no to this question, we concluded that they did not consciously notice any of the manipulations made during the experiment.
Figure 3). This detection rate does not differ statistically from Experiment 1. Two participants detected two of the switches, two participants detected one switch, and 16 of the participants did not detect any of the switches. Of the 16 participants that did not detect any of the switches, 14 believed themselves to be able to do so, had any manipulations been made. The participants remembered their choices in 87% of the trials in the post-test memory task. For the manipulated trials, the participants indicated theit “original” choice as being what they chose for 76% of the trials (see Figure 4). This number does not differ significantly from the results of the non-manipulated trials.
Figure 3). This detection rate does not differ statistically from Experiment 1. Two participants detected two of the switches, two participants detected one switch, and 16 of the participants did not detect any of the switches. Of the 16 participants that did not detect any of the switches, 14 believed themselves to be able to do so, had any manipulations been made. The participants remembered their choices in 87% of the trials in the post-test memory task. For the manipulated trials, the participants indicated theit “original” choice as being what they chose for 76% of the trials (see Figure 4). This number does not differ significantly from the results of the non-manipulated trials.
Fig. 3. Detection frequency in the three experiments. FROM CHANGE BLINDNESS TO CHOICE BLINDNESS
Fig. 3. Detection frequency in the three experiments. FROM CHANGE BLINDNESS TO CHOICE BLINDNESS
Four participants detected all of the switches, two participants detected two of the switches, three participants detected one switch, and 11 of the participant did not detect any of the switches. Of the 11 participants that did not detect any of the switches, 9 believed themselves to be able to do so, had any manipulations been made.
Four participants detected all of the switches, two participants detected two of the switches, three participants detected one switch, and 11 of the participant did not detect any of the switches. Of the 11 participants that did not detect any of the switches, 9 believed themselves to be able to do so, had any manipulations been made.

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