Symmetry and the Scope of Scientific Realism
Richard Healey2006, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
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Abstract
HB) ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4875-3 (HB) ISBN-10 1-4020-4876-9 (e-book) ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4876-0 (e-book) Published by Springer,
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A WORTHWHILE REVIEW 648 PAGES TO BE ENJOYED ON A QUIET NIGHT OR TWO The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an outstanding guide to the major themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of science. Fifty-five entries by a team of renowned international contributors are organized into four parts: • Historical and Philosophical Context • Debates • Concepts • Individual Sciences The Companion begins with a critical examination of how philosophy of science has been involved in a mutually fruitful interaction with philosophical theories in areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, and reassesses the major schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. The second part explores the development of current debates among philosophers and scientists on issues such as confirmation, explanation, realism, scientific method, and the ethics of science. Part three discusses controversial concepts such as causation, prediction, unification, observation, and probability that lie at the heart of many disputes about science and scientific theories. The final part addresses some of the main philosophical problems that arise within eight branches of science: biology, chemistry, cognitive science, economics, mathematics, physics, psychology, and the social sciences. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy of science and the connections between philosophy and the natural and social sciences. Stathis Psillos is an Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Athens, Greece. He is the author of Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge), Causation and Explanation and Philosophy of Science A–Z. Martin Curd is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA. He is co-editor (with Jan Cover) of Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. PART I Historical and philosophical context 1 1 The epistemology of science after Quine 3 PAUL A. ROTH 2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science 15 JOANNE WAUGH AND ROGER ARIEW 3 Metaphysics 26 Stephen Mumford 4 Philosophy of language 36 Rod Bertolet 5 The role of logic in philosophy of science 47 Diderik Batens 6 Critical rationalism 58 Gürol Irzik 7 The historical turn in the philosophy of science 67 ALEXANDER BIRD 8 Logical empiricism 78 Thomas Uebel 9 Pragmatism and science 91 Robert Almeder Part II Debates 101 10 Bayesianism 103 Colin Howson 11 Confirmation 115 ALAN HÁJEK AND JAMES M. JOYCE 12 Empiricism 129 Elliott Sober vi 13 Essentialism and natural kinds 139 BRIAN ELLIS 14 Ethics of science 149 David B. Resnik 15 Experiment 159 Theodore Arabatzis 16 Explanation 171 JAMES Woodward 17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science 182 CASSANDRA L. PINNICK 18 Inference to the best explanation 193 Peter Lipton 19 Laws of nature 203 Marc Lange 20 Naturalism 213 RONALD N. GIERE 21 Realism/anti-realism 224 Michael Devitt 22 Relativism about science 236 Maria Baghramian 23 Scientific method 248 Howard Sankey 24 Social studies of science 259 ROBERT NOLA 25 The structure of theories 269 Steven French 26 Theory-change in science 281 John Worrall 27 Underdetermination 292 Igor Douven 28 Values in science 302 GERALD DOPPELT vii Part III Concepts 315 29 Causation 317 Christopher Hitchcock 30 Determinism 327 Barry Loewer 31 Evidence 337 Peter Achinstein 32 Function 349 D. M. WALSH 33 Idealization 358 James Ladyman 34 Measurement 367 HASOK CHANG AND NANCY CARTWRIGHT 35 Mechanisms 376 Stuart Glennan 36 Models 385 DEMETRIS PORTIDES 37 Observation 396 ANDRé KUKLA 38 Prediction 405 MALCOLM FORSTER 39 Probability 414 Maria Carla Galavotti 40 Reduction 425 Sahotra Sarkar 41 Representation in science 435 PAUL TELLER 42 Scientific discovery 442 Thomas Nickles 43 Space and time 452 OLIVER POOLEY 44 Symmetry 468 Margaret Morrison viii 45 Truthlikeness 478 Graham Oddie 46 Unification 489 TODD JONES 47 The virtues of a good theory 498 Ernan McMullin Part IV Individual sciences 509 48 Biology 511 Alexander Rosenberg 49 Chemistry 520 Robin FINDLAY Hendry 50 Cognitive science 531 Paul Thagard 51 Economics 543 USKALI MÄKI 52 Mathematics 555 PETER CLARK 53 Physics 567 SIMON SAUNDERS 54 Psychology 581 RICHARD SAMUELS 55 Social sciences 594 HAROLD KINCAID Index 605 THEN AS A COMPLEMENTARY READING https://www.academia.edu/2807083/In_defence_of_scientism
KUNSTLER_Review_varieties of scientific realism.pdf
Draft of a review of Varieties of Scientific Realisme, édited by E. Agazzi (Springer, 2017).
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