Mindfulness and Free Will

Buddhist Studies Review, 2014

2017

| I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen's consequence argument, which asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk Pereboom's two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim authorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson's impossibility argument, which asserts that choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the diametrical opposite of Strawson's impossibilism and Pereboom's hard incompatibilism, what I call possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to suggest that Buddhism contains or endorses a theory of free will, but that Buddhism may formulate such a theory.

I argue that central Buddhist tenets and meditation methodology support a view of free will similar to Harry Frankfurt’s optimistic view and contrary to Galen Strawson’s pessimistic view. For Frankfurt, free will involves a relationship between actions, voli- tions, and “metavolitions” (volitions about volitions): simplifying greatly, volitional actions are free if the agent approves of them. For Buddhists, mental freedom involves a relationship between mental states and “metamental” states (mental attitudes toward mental states): simplifying greatly, one has mental freedom if one is able to control one’s mental states, and to the extent one has mental freedom when choosing, one has free will. Philosophical challenges to free will typically question whether it is compatible with “determinism,” the thesis of lawful universal causation. Both Frankfurt’s metavolitional approval and the Buddhist’s me- tamental control are consistent with determinism. Strawson has argued, however, that free will is impossible, determinism not- withstanding, because one’s choice is always influenced by one’smental state. I argue, however, that Buddhist meditation culti- vates control over mental states that undermine freedom, whether they are deterministic or not, making both mental free- dom and free will possible. The model I develop is only a sketch of a minimally risky theory of free will, but one that highlights the similarities and differences between Buddhist thought on this subject and relevantly-related Western thought and has explana- tory promise.

Zygon, 2020

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?

I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument, which asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk Pereboom’s two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim au- thorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson’s impossibility argument, which asserts that choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the diametrical opposite of Strawson’s impossibilism and Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism, what I call possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to suggest that Buddhism contains or endorses a theory of free will, but that Buddhism may formulate such a theory.

Psychological Reports, 2019

Two experiments investigated the influence of mindfulness, meditation, and type of induction (free will, determinism, or neutral) on affect and beliefs in free will/deter-minism. In Experiment 1, it was found that high mindful participants reported experiencing more positive affect and less negative affect than low mindful participants. In the determinism induction condition in Experiment 2, high mindful participants scored higher on free will beliefs after they meditated, whereas low mindful participants scored lower on free will beliefs after they meditated. So it would seem that mindfulness can have differential effects for high and low mindful individuals. It was also found that high mindful participants (depending on the task and induction condition) sometimes had longer reaction times than low mindful participants. This could be an indication of high mindful participants having a higher decision boundary for some tasks or simply an indication that high mindful participants enjoyed some tasks more than others (i.e., processing fluency). In addition, the internal consistency of the questionnaires was compared to the internal consistency found for those questionnaires in previous research.

PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010

This dissertation examines whether something like free will is implied by or consistent with the causal, ethical and soteriological theories presented in the works of the fifth century Indian Buddhist master, Vasubandhu (namely, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa) and in the Theravādin Abhidhamma. I argue that Vasubandhu and his Thervādin counterparts assume persons have the ability to choose or control their actions and have the conceptual resources to account for these freedoms. I also explain why it is a mistake to read their claims about action and causation through the lens of the categories and assumptions that inform the modern, Western debate over free will. I demonstrate that, despite what some interpreters have claimed (and despite significant differences in between their causal theories), neither Vasubandhu or his Theravādin counterparts engage with the problem of causal determinism. They do, however, deny agent causation and explain a person’s ability to control his actions in terms of the impersonal mental events that issue in action. The result is a view of action similar to some forms of compatibilism, but unlike most compatibilists, they are not primarily concerned with the rational control required for moral responsibility, but with the self-control required for liberation--a self-control born of habit, affection and moral sentiment as much as responsiveness to reason. I pay particular attention to the role the distinguishing feature of karma, intending (cetanā), plays in both incontinent action and the cultivation of this self-control. Conceiving of a karmic result as a kind of moral desert, many interpreters take intending to signal some variety of free will, but an intending is simply the movement of a mind toward an object or end. I explain how this movement may be sensitive to desire and reason and thus amenable to various sorts of control, but also unconscious or compelled in ways that we and/or Buddhists would not consider free. In the final part of the dissertation, I explain how the view that persons are free to choose or control their actions is consistent with the view that actions are caused by impersonal mental events such as intendings and why both perspectives on action are essential to the Buddhist soteriological project.

The MIT Press eBooks, 2004

This is the third article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar- ticle (“Earlier”) focused on the first publications on this issue in the 1970s, the “early period.” The second (“Paleo- compatibilism”) and the present articles examine key responses published in the last part of the Twentieth and the first part of the Twenty-first centuries, the “middle period.” The fourth article (“Recent”) examines responses published in the last few years, the “recent period.” Whereas early-period scholars endorsed a compatibilism between free will and determinism, in the middle period the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued for a two tiered compatibilism/incompatibilism (or semi-compatibilism) that he dubs “paleo-compatibilism,” grounded in the early Buddhist reductionist notion of “two truths”: conventional truth and ultimate truth; and Charles Goodman argued that Buddhists accept hard determinism—the view that because determinism is true, there can be no free will—because in the absence of a real self determinism leaves no room for morally responsible agency. In “Paleo-compatibilism,” I focused on Siderits’s reductionist account. The present article focuses on Goodman’s hard determinism, and the fourth article will examine the most recent publications expressing Buddhist views of free will. Together with my own meditation based Buddhist account of free will (“Meditation”), this series of articles provides a comprehensive review of the leading extant writings on this subject.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 2020

On initial analysis, Indian Buddhist philosophers seem to have an inconsistent set of commitments with regard to the nature of action. First, they are committed to the reality of karman (Skt: action), which concerns the moral quality of actions and the short- and long-term effects of those actions on the agent. Skillful or wholesome (kuśala) actions will tend to have positive consequences for oneself, while unskillful or unwholesome (akuśala) actions will tend to have negative consequences. Second, they are committed to an understanding of karma as deeply connected with intention or volition (cetanā). Third, they are committed to the idea that, through Buddhist practice, one may become liberated from the afflictions of craving, aversion, and ignorance and achieve nirvāṇa. Thus, it is not surprising that the relationship between volition, action, and the results of action for the agent constitutes a central theme of Indian Buddhist philosophy. Yet, fourth, while Buddhist philosophers are committed to the reality of action and its results, they are also committed to the unreality of any substantial self or agent of actions. How can one affirm the reality of volition, action, efficacious practice, and liberation, while denying the existence of agents, practitioners, or liberated beings? Reconciling the doctrine of no-self (anātman) with an account of agency and karma was a central task of great Buddhist philosophers such as Vasubandhu (fl. 4th to 5th century CE). This chapter will discuss Buddhist philosophy of action in the context of their views of the self, general ontology, ethics, and soteriology. After discussing some important preliminaries, section 2 will examine the connection between intention, action, and the skillful. Section 3 takes up the Buddhist account of agency without agents. Section 4 examines the important Buddhist idea of skillful means (upāyakauśalya) in ethics and soteriology. Section 5 will discuss the thorny issue of the discontinuity between awakened and unawakened forms of action.