Virtue and Happiness in Schopenhauer's Ethics

Inquiry, 2019

The aim of this paper is to elucidate Schopenhauer's moral philosophy in terms of an ethics of virtue, and to consider its plausibility relative to competing traditions. The paper consists of three sections. In the first section of the paper I outline three major objections Schopenhauer raises to Kant's moral philosophy, and argue that these plausible criticisms are in essence the same concerns that gave rise to the revival of 'virtue ethics' as a proposed distinctive school of ethical thought in the twentieth century. In section two I extract from these criticisms a sketch of Schopenhauer's own position, distinguishing a brand of virtue ethics from competing versions within the tradition, in which compassion is emphasised as the root of all virtue. I then consider the strengths of such a view. In the third and final section I consider and respond to one possible shortcoming of the ethical theory discussed, and adjudicate between competing solutions in the secondary literature. I conclude that refined forms of Schopenhauer's ethical views offer rich and plausible insights into both virtue and vice which have received less attention than they deserve. Hence, Schopenhauer warrants more serious concern in contemporary discussions of virtue ethics alongside the likes of Aristotle, Hume and Nietzsche.

2017

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The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2002

PhD Thesis, 2017

The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that a neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethic is a viable and defensible position in moral philosophy, preferable to deontological, consequentialist and neo-Aristotelian positions.

My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer’s grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view, and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, for each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer’s grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substituting the view that desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in Schopenhauer’s arguments but, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is consistent with Schopenhauer’s grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments.

The world, as Schopenhauer would say, has not been the work of an all loving Being, but rather that of a devil. In this world, creatures are brought up in order to suffer. He, being the Philosopher of Pessimism, claims that the inner nature of the world is an aimless blind striving. For the will itself has no goal, therefore impossible to satisfy. With it not being satisfied it continues to struggle, to be in conflict, to be dissatisfied. Thus the title, " Existence as Suffering and Dissatisfaction ". In doing so, first, this paper will briefly discuss Schopenhauer's life. Next, further discussions on his notion of suffering and Will-to-live will be shown. In relation to this, Schopenhauer's notion of love in which supports the Will-to-live by the means of striving – constantly needing to renew one's self thus produce an offspring, is the next to be shone light upon. After discussing and strengthening his idea that life is suffering, I would explicit the two solutions he gave in order to escape from this " suffering " life and become truly happy in the end. That even in the midst of all these sufferings, there is still hope for humankind, there is still a way towards satisfaction.

2019

This thesis will investigate three key aesthetic concepts Schopenhauer introduces, namely the beautiful, the charming and the sublime. Having a clear concept of beauty and the sublime is key to any theory of aesthetics; the charming however is a concept original to Schopenhauer, though it may bear a resemblance to the ‘agreeable’ in Kant’s philosophy as will be examined. This thesis aims to be mainly an in depth exegetical one, with the main source of our study being Schopenhauer’s magnum opus The World As Will And Representation. The overall aim of Section One of this thesis will be to examine Schopenhauer’s account of beauty, with the following questions in mind throughout: firstly, what role does beauty play in his theory of aesthetics, and in relation to this what separates it from the two other key concepts of the charming and the sublime? Secondly, what is Schopenhauer’s definition of beauty and what are the criteria for something being beautiful? Thirdly, what role does pleasure have in aesthetic contemplation? It is not possible to adequately elucidate Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetics without bringing in the notion of Platonic forms. Thus, a discussion of these will come early in the thesis and they will remain a constant theme throughout.

Journal of Happiness Studies, 2008

The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is well known for his pessimism. He did not believe in real happiness. In his view, the best a person can achieve is to reduce misery. At the end of his career, he wrote a book on how to live the most bearable life. This is a practical guide based on his personal experiences and illustrated by quotations from other thinkers subscribing to his views. In this paper, we summarize his recommendations and compare these with conditions for happiness as observed in present day empirical research. Little of the advice appears to fit current research on conditions for happiness. Following Schopenhauer's advice would probably make us unhappier, even if we had the same neurotic personality.

In Kant’s ethics, disinterest is derived from the concept of the categorical imperative and is taken to be the condition of the possibility of all moral actions. Schopenhauer, by contrast, treats disinterest as a necessary but insufficient condition for morality, and severs it from its ties to the categorical imperative. Disinterest, for Schopenhauer, leads to the concept of compassion, which he praises as the sole ground of all morality. But compassion seems fundamentally opposed to disinterest, since it involves taking an active interest in someone else’s plight: a consideration not really treated in Kant. In this paper, I tackle the problem of reconciling compassion, in Schopenhauer, with the criterion of disinterest that he inherits from Kant. I also take up the challenge of explaining compassion’s altruistic tendency to act for another’s well-being if we take Schopenhauer’s determinism at face value, and acknowledge that human actions are fundamentally egoistic.

Schopenhaueriana. Revista española de estudios sobre Schopenhauer, 2017

In recent years, the research on Schopenhauer has shown a change in the interpretation of his main work, The World as Will and Presentation, from (1) a normative and linear instruction which guides the reader from idealism to mysticism, pessimism and nothingness to (2) value-free and independent descriptions of the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness etc.) in it. Thus Schopenhauer’s main work has become an empirical or baconian approach—something like a «philosophical cosmography»—. this fundamentalchange of interpretation radically puts into question what Schopenhauer means by characterizing his main work as an «organic system». The present paper attempts to give an answer to this question, reviewing the self-reflexive, methodological and metaphilosophical hints which Schopenhauer gives in the first volume of his «World» («as Will and Presentation»).