The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The question about the role of the armed forces in the information space is in fact a question about the role of the factor of force in the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy. In Russia, this factor has invariably been treated as a hallmark of the country’s position as a global power, an instrument of deterrence, and a way to exert political pressure and build spheres of influence. The country’s military information strategy is designed to serve those tasks, and envisages multiple battle fronts, including internal and external affairs, the info-psychological front, the cyberspace and other spheres. Its visible consequences include a militarisation of the language of politics and propaganda, the imposition on public opinion of the narrative of an information war against Russia, and a radical change of the Russian army’s image. Today Russia forcefully demands that other countries respect its spheres of influence in the neighbourhood (as seen from its aggression against Ukraine and its armed intervention in Syria). It claims to be the guarantor of peace processes, even as it demolishes the European and global security architecture, and presents itself as a centre of power, asserting the right to co-decide on matters of global security.

‘Information is now a species of weapon’, write Russians Maj. Gen. (R) Ivan Vorobyev and Col. (R) Valery Kiselyov. Closer to the truth is that Russia has a long history of using information as a weapon – both in the context of mobilising its own population and in demonising foreign powers. Therefore, it is only natural that Russia has employed Information Warfare (IW) in Ukraine: from the onset of the ‘Euromaidan’ demonstrations, to the annexation of Crimea, and as a dimension of ongoing military operations in eastern Ukraine. And it is equally unsurprising that, in the internet era, Moscow has developed effective tactics for waging IW in cyberspace. This chapter discusses contemporary Russian IW theory and analyses Russian IW activities on the ground in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine. While the dynamic and diffuse nature of IW makes it difficult to gauge its precise impact, this chapter argues that Russian IW in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine has been highly successful, and that the West is currently playing catch up vis-à-vis Russia in this arena.

2016

This handbook provides an introductory guide to the Russian concept of information warfare, including elements of cyber warfare. The guide also functions as a source book for further detailed research as required. The period since the Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 has seen a large number of new publications on the topic of Russian cyber and information warfare, of widely varying quality. Most of these works discuss a specific aspect of the challenge, and many were highly time-sensitive and are therefore already outdated. The aim of this handbook is instead to circumvent the need for extensive ab initio research by providing a guide to the Russian approach which is both comprehensive and durable. The guide takes as its basis material already in the public domain; this material has been collated from a wide range of disparate and sometimes obscure publications in Russian and other languages. Where possible, key concepts and approaches are illustrated and explained by direct quotations from senior members of the Russian defence and security communities. Unless otherwise specified, quotations in the text are from Russian sources, in many cases authoritative papers and essays on the theory and practice of warfare from military journals and conferences. Although not all the sources quoted are ordinarily available to the public, no classified material has been used. In addition to extensive citations in footnotes, each section concludes with a list of recommended reading for deeper research on specific topics. Russian-language titles here and in the citations have been translated into English. URLs for online access to publications have been provided where they are known and available.

The belief in the power of information is deeply ingrained in the minds of the Russian top leadership, which operates under the premise that public opinion can be effectively influenced in order to reach desired outcomes domestically as well as on foreign soil. Ever since the beginning of the Euromaidan demonstrations, Russia has been seeking to promote its own narrative domestically, in Ukraine, and beyond, making use of the unique features of the cyberspace. As the crisis deepened in early spring of 2014, information operations played an important role in facilitating the de facto annexation of the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation, as well as throughout the continuation of the crisis. This paper sets out to examine the information-related events of early 2014 with a particular focus on the annexation of Crimea. The aim is twofold. First, it provides an insight into the Russian world of ideas regarding information and its power applying the concept of information superiority and how it connects cyber and information warfare. Second, this paper exemplifies how Russia or pro-Russian entities make use of a wide array of tools and methods – kinetic, cyber, and informational – with the purpose of achieving information superiority. The paper concludes with a discussion regarding the impact of cyber within Russian Information Warfare as experienced in Ukraine.

Since March 2014, European countries are facing massive disinformation campaigns originating from the Russian Federation. Information warfare itself cannot be considered as a new phenomenon in armed conflicts, however in today’s information era, the Internet and the social media have provide information warfare with a new battleground, where the main target groups are not militaries, but the minds of civilians. Russian behaviour became more and more aggressive and its origins can be traced back to 2007.

Cybersecurity and Law

This article seeks to identify social influence tools and techniques in the context of information operations conducted by the Russian Federation during the 2022 war in Ukraine. An attempt to analyse the creation and spread of information threats as a result of the actions taken by Russia in the ongoing conflict is dictated by the increasing impact of communication processes on global security. This article presents the role and impact of mass media on public awareness, revealing the mechanisms of forming public opinion.

During the last decade, 'information warfare' has become a much-politicised term in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. This article sheds light on the conceptual roots that have been shaping this idea in the Russian academic, political, and public discourse. Moreover, the article points to the major actors leading the politicisation of this idea by promoting narratives describing the so-called 'Western information war against Russia'. In the context of Russia's contemporary attempts to re-establish itself as a global power and Western fear and distress associated with Russian activities in the information domain, a grounded understanding of the major conceptual narratives influencing Russian thinking about information warfare, as well as perspectives on how these narratives have been politicised, is of paramount importance.

Security Science Journal, 2022

Strategic communication determines the communicative aspects of national soft power, and it is an integral part of the national security structure of a modern state. Russian military thought makes a substantial deviation from the term "strategic communication", defining and applying the communicative contents of soft power by the terms "information security" and "information warfare". Russian understanding uses these forms of strategic communication in a constant struggle for supremacy and control of all information domains. Thus, Russia declares a permanent state of war in the information sphere. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Russian scientific and operational approach to the interpretation of strategic communication, the article provides insight into Russia's basic idea and genesis of information warfare. By reviewing strategic documents and applied organisational forms, the paper contributes to understanding the vital level of strategic communication on the applied aspects of national security of the Russian Federation. The article elaborates application forms of the Russian's concepts of information security and information warfare, information operations, and psychological operations. Paper offers a case of Russia's information warfare toward Serbia. Conclusively, Russia is very active in an informative sphere in international relations, which should have in mind in the relations with that power.

MCU Journal, 2019

the location of bases, and extraction of resources in formerly frozen and lifeless landscapes in the poles. The role of climate change in creating new arenas of great power competition is a continuing theme in this issue. Icecaps melting, as discussed in "The American Polar Pivot: Gaining Advantage in Great Power Competition," by Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, presents new opportunities for expanding global influence for polar-oriented nations. Russia is rapidly expanding its presence in the Arctic, while the United States races to reopen abandoned Cold War-era Arctic bases or to create new fleets of icebreakers to compete with Russia's expanding fleet. The authors advocate an American polar pivot to counter the emerging Russian threat, particularly with the Russian Federation's construction of new polar bases and the construction of a fleet of icebreakers as well as the Chinese development of its first nuclear-powered icebreaker. They argue that America must pivot its focus to navigate and defend interests in the increasingly militarized Arctic and Antarctic, maintaining that America must be at the forefront of defending new routes of navigation due to melting icecaps. Great power competition could also foster cooperation against common threats. For example, climate change as an emerging threat to great power status is addressed in depth in Kevin Johnston's article, which advocates cooperation among great powers, specifically China and the United States, to counteract the worldwide effects of climate change. This is especially important for the Department of Defense, as many bases are near areas subject to flooding, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events. Climate change is a global threat that could dramatically shift great power arrangements in ways yet seen in the history of our planet. Aside from the physical and financial damage caused by these increasingly unpredictable extreme weather events that impact national security, the Department of Defense will also need to upgrade its current facilities to withstand damage during these events-at great cost. A variety of strategies have been adopted by our adversaries to challenge America's role as the world's sole superpower. As Daniel De Witt explains in his article "Competing through Competition: Leveraging Security Competition to Counter Chinese and Russian Influence in Africa," these tactics include China's incentive-based system of buying alliances through infrastructure improvement in countries across the world, while Russia remains content to challenge America and its allies through proxy, frozen conflicts throughout the world, thus destabilizing America and its allies. America must find its own way in this newly emerging world order of great power competition by adopting innovative solutions to secure global peace and democracy. There are many solutions to some of the emerging threats the United States will face in the future found in this volume of MCU Journal. Some of the solutions offered come from adversaries' adoption of new strategies in the 10 From the Editors MCU Journal face of a changing world. As Sun Tzu once said: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." 5 The remainder of the journal rounds out with a selection of review essays and book reviews that continues our focus on great power competition but also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the MCU Journal editors as we work to provide issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense. The upcoming Spring 2020 issue offers a diverse presentation of innovation and the changing character warfare, particularly plans and theories for future warfare, the potential or planned advances in technology, how the Services envision or plan for it, and key nation-states' future war strategies. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on these topics and to your future participation. Join the conversation on the MC UPress Facebook and MC_U Press Twitter pages or communicate with us via email at MCU_Press