Plato and the Abolition of the Family

Apeiron, 1978

In Republic V Socrates offer three successive waves of paradox, the first being that amongst the rulers men and women will be assigned to fulfill the same social functions and the second being that amongst the rulers the traditional private family will be abolished. In her article “Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on Women and the Family” (Philosophy and Public Affairs (1977)) Susan Moller Okin argued that Plato’s argument is that the second wave of paradox implies the first. In this note I rebut Okin’s arguments and show, in part based on evidence adduced by Okin herself, that for Plato it is the first wave of paradox that implies the second.

This article explores the justice of the family. From the perspective of justice, the family causes serious concerns, for it causes severe inequalities between individuals. Several justice theorists remark that by its mere existence the family impedes the access to equality of life chances. The paper examines whether this means that justice requires the abolition of the family. It asks whether everyone, and, in particular, the worst off, would prefer the family to a generalized well-run orphanage. This thought-experiment is used to inquire which value, if any, is such that (a) it would be menaced by the abolition of the family, and (b) in a just society, it would to prioritized over the principle of equality of life chances.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1999

This article explores the justice of the family. From the perspective of justice, the family causes serious concerns, for it causes severe inequalities between individuals. Several justice theorists remark that by its mere existence the family impedes the access to equality of life chances. The paper examines whether this means that justice requires the abolition of the family. It asks whether everyone, and, in particular, the worst off, would prefer the family to a generalized well-run orphanage. This thought-experiment is used to inquire which value, if any, is such that (a) it would be menaced by the abolition of the family, and (b) in a just society, it would to prioritized over the principle of equality of life chances.

History of Political Thought, 2011

This article deals with the issue of the abolition of both property and family for the Guardians in Plato's Republic. My aim is to show that such abolition answers to the problem of the art of ruling raised in Book I: how can the rulers rule not in their own interest, but rather in the interest of the ruled? The abolition of property and family changes the very economic and social framework of the city, leading to an identity of the private interests of the rulers and of the common interests of the polis, by establishing a koinÜnia among the Guardians and a relationship of interdependence between them and the producers. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the lower class from the abolition of property and family creates a situation of fundamental asymmetry in the relationship between the classes and renders ambiguous the manner in which the producers belong to the city, creating in this way a 'differential inclusion into citizenship'.

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2018

Because families disrupt fair patterns of distribution and, in particular, equality of opportunity, egalitarians believe that the institution of the family needs to be defended at the bar of justice. In their recent book, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have argued that the moral gains of preserving the family outweigh its moral costs. Yet, I claim that the egalitarian case for abolishing the family has been over-stated due to a failure to consider how alternatives to the family would also disturb fair distributions and, in particular, equality of opportunity. Absent the family, children would continue to be exposed to care-givers of different levels of ability, investment in child-rearing and beneficial partiality. In addition, social mechanisms other than the family would lead to the accumulation of economic inequalities. Any kind of upbringing will fail to realise equality for reasons that go deeper than the family: our partiality and unequal abilities to nurture.

University of the Philippines

Plato’s The Republic seeks to answer the question “what is justice?” and attempts to reflect the philosophical of views of his teacher Socrates. The book begins with some of Socrates’ friends trying to figure out what justice is: (1) Justice is telling the truth and returning what you received (Cephalus), (2) justice is giving each his due (Polemarchus), and (3) justice is the advantage of the stronger (Thrasymachus). Socrates rejects each of these definitions. He starts a discussion to find out what true justice is and to discover whether the just man or the unjust man is happier. I admire Plato’s philosophy. He seems to be saying that “just” human beings produce “just” societies. There can never be any justice or goodness in this world if there is no justice or goodness in the human heart. This is a profound concept. While many tend to focus primarily on structures, rules, and rewards, Plato brings us to the heart of the problem, which is the problem of the human heart.

Forthcoming, 2023

Plato is not the author of the first political writings that have come down to us. Even in classical Greece he was preceded by such authors as Herodotus and Isocrates. Nevertheless, he can be considered the “father” of political philosophy, in that he tries to apply a higher standard—justice—to the experience and the political theory of statesmen and citizens, previously presented by rhetoricians and sophists as morally indifferent. Today it seems evident to us that justice should be the principle used in organizing a political society and that, if a society is too unjust, then it should be reformed through political means: either peacefully through legislation, or even through a violent revolution which turns everything upside down. From Plato we have inherited the idea that justice is something we should aspire to. The central theme of classical philosophy is the development of a doctrine of “the best regime,” which in essence means the most just regime. There is, however, a chasm between ancient and modern political doctrines. The “best regime”, for the ancients, doesn’t seem to be an ideal to be achieved, but rather a sort of “mental experience” which reveals the limits of what can be expected in political life. The goal of this experience is, according to Cicero, to make apparent the principles of political life, and not to give birth to an actual, real city. According to this interpretation, the most beautiful city, Calpollis—which Socrates proposes in the Republic and which raises countless objections from his interlocutors—isn’t a likely scenario, and perhaps not even a possible one. Socrates’ companions, among them Plato’s elder brothers, even ask themselves whether such a city would be desirable. The most famous of Plato’s dialogues should, therefore, be interpreted more like a comedy, rather than a sort of intellectual debate which seeks to find principles for an actual society. Pascal stated that the work wasn’t to be seen as a serious one, but rather a sort of demonstration through a reduction to the absurd. For the ancients, the best regime might not be contrary to nature, but it is extremely unlikely to be achieved. Justice is a virtue of the soul, but the systematic implementation of this standard in the city will always reveal itself to be paradoxical, in light of the ridiculous consequences that would result, such as the abolition of the family and of private property, the purging of the main Hellenic cultural works, the abolition of poetry, and a government by “philosophers”, who can’t even find their way around the public square (meaning that they lack practical experience). Even if their projects were implemented, they would meet so much resistance that it would be necessary to ban all persons older than ten years from the city. The conclusion seems to be that it is not possible to formulate a theory of justice which stipulates the best political institutions and the best laws, without relying to a great extent on the virtue of the citizenry. This perspective strikes us as alien, and it is almost incomprehensible that Plato wouldn’t at least try to put the conjectures of his characters into practice. The traditional view of the Republic in the twentieth century, on the contrary, is that Plato seriously proposes a reign by philosophers, equality between men and women in the military and in public life, shared property, and a communist totalitarian state, or at least a kind of kibbutz avant la lettre, which takes children from the family to ensure social equality. It is said, moreover, that in Plato’s opinion, philosophers should be the counselors of princes, prepared to manipulate the crowds with noble lies. To understand Plato’s political teachings, we are required to read his works as dialogues, in their dramatic context, detecting irony, and without assuming that Plato agrees with what Socrates says to his interlocutors. Whichever way we interpret him, it is undeniable that no political theory since Plato has been able to dispense with the notions of justice and of an “ideal” political regime, one “in accordance with our prayers”—and it was Plato who placed these notions at the heart of political philosophy.

This essay is a review of Catherine Zuckert's monumental new book, Plato's Philosophers, and an explanation of how is should revolutionize Plato scholarship.

Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2004

Although its title may suggest a narrowly focused study of Plato's attitude to democracy this book is, in fact, a comprehensive examination of his political philosophy with substantial sections devoted to the Republic, to the Politicus and Timaeus-Critias and to the Laws. In these Samaras develops a distinctive interpretation not just of Plato's views on democracy but of his political philosophy as whole. One major theme concerns questions of unity and development with reference particularly to the relationship between the Republic and the Laws. Samaras rejects unitarian interpretations, which, he thinks, treat the Laws as a mere appendix to the Republic. However he sees a fundamental continuity in Plato's thought, which he calls 'a dynamic unity', that is, 'a unity within which development stands in a discernible relation to the philosopher's previous position' (p. 1). Fundamental to this interpretation is a fairly conservative reading of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Republic. Plato distinguishes between forms and sensible particulars in terms of the degree to which they really exist. Only knowledge of the forms can legitimise political power. The 'ontological transcendence of the forms' thus supports the 'unchallengeable rule of the Guardians' (p. 105), who have perfect knowledge and (as a consequence) perfect virtue. According to Samaras, Plato never abandoned his belief in transcendent forms, but from the Politicus onwards he revised his views in important respects. Because he now doubted the possibility of finding anyone with the knowledge required of an ideal ruler, he became an advocate of strict obedience to written laws. These do not replace the wisdom of the philosopher but are imitations of the truth which enable the common people to govern themselves in the best way that is practically possible. At the same time Plato abandoned his view that an understanding of the forms is essential for virtue and, with it, his Socratic belief that virtue is one. He came to hold that true opinion could be an acceptable substitute for knowledge and could form the basis for a certain