Consciousness Already There, Waiting to Be Uncovered

A man must have not only faith, but intellectual faith too.

2020

philosopher David Chalmers coined the problem of consciousness "the hard problem" in 1994, the term has stuck as a poignant reminder of the colossal task that faces anyone trying to approach it. 'It is a topic like no other', opines psychologist Susan Blackmore, 'studying consciousness will change your life' (Blackmore, 2007, p. 5). Notwithstanding the philosophical barrage of assaults against it, or neuroscientific attempts to pacify it, the hard problem has remained steadfast, unmoved, and defiantit remains the problem to solve, or as Daniel Dennett put it, it remains 'the last surviving mystery' (Blackmore, 2007, p. 8). This essay will argue why the hard problem is so enduring by firstly looking at the intractable problem of subjective experience and how reductionist attempts have failed to address the question. Secondly, reductionist conclusions derived from the correlation of brain activity and mind activity fail to distinguish correlation from ontological identity. Thirdly, the underpinning of reductionism is materialism, and this in turn implies determinism, which is self-refuting. Therefore, materialist-reductionism is an incoherent theoretical framework in which to approach the hard problem. Fourthly, the failure of materialism warrants a new approach, one that accounts for the measurable causal power of consciousness on the body, on the reshaping of the brain, and on subatomic particles. Cosmopyschism is a candidate that can account for a wide range of fundamental features of the physical world, including the hard problem. THE HARD PROBLEM ITSELF The hard problem is better grasped in light of what Chalmers contrasted it against: the "easy problems" of understanding the physical functions of the brain, which are by no means easy (Chalmers, 2017, p. 33). The point is however, that they are 'directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science' (Chalmers, 2017, p. 32) and thus, able to be explained by such methods (Chalmers, 2017, p. 33). The question that strikes at the heart of consciousness studies is why, and indeed how, should the synapses of neurons, which is an entirely physical process, give rise to a private, first-person, subjective experience (Blackmore, 2007, p. 21), impervious to direct examination (Blackmore, 2007, p. 3). As philosopher Thomas Nagel famously put it, we could know every detail of the physical workings of a bat's brain and still not know what is it like to be a bat (Blackmore, 2007, pp. 22-3). The hopes of finding a conceivable method by which the hard problem can be broached seem remotely distant (Pinker, 2007, p. 43). It is no wonder why pioneer of forensic psychiatry, Charles Mercier, appropriately called it 'the fathomless abyss' (Blackmore, 2007, p. 20). Critics of the hard problem, nevertheless point out that by virtue of working on

Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy 6 ESJP #1 | 2011 As for the pure philosophical 'freedom of the will' my will is as free as I feel it to be and there is an end to the matter.

2019

A problematisation of the Hindu philosophical culture comprised in the Advaita Vedanta through the teachings of Sri Ramana Maharshi, centred in the role and meaning of consciousness to such body of knowledge. We build this endeavour via metaphysics, to try and understand how such culture deals with the classical problems of being, mind, and consciousness; and how these relate with the world. To such end, we expose and hopefully clarify, the three cosmogonical theories of ajata vada, drishti-shristi vada and shristi-drishti vada, present in the Advaita Vedanta. Through them, we posit the conceptual cascade of i) the world does not exist, ii) the world’s illusive existence arises from the mind, iii) the mind does not exist, iv) the mind’s illusive existence arises from the ‘I-thought’, v) this ‘I’ does not exist, vi) only pure consciousness exists, and as such vii) 1 the reality of the ‘I’ and the world only exist in consciousness as consciousness. To help us in such 2 effort, we make...

"The Death of Newton: Consciousness, Spirituality, and the Second Scientific Revolution" embarks on an journey to redefine the foundation of scientific inquiry, positing consciousness—not matter—as the fundamental essence of the universe. Drawing from a wide array of disciplines, including physics, mysticism, psychology, and noetic research, the paper challenges the prevailing Newtonian paradigm that has dominated science for centuries. Through a critical examination of anomalous phenomena such as psychokinesis (PK), extrasensory perception (ESP), and remote viewing, alongside a personal narrative of mystical experiences, this work argues for a profound paradigm shift towards a consciousness-centric science. It introduces a "Strong Theory of Consciousness" as a new theoretical framework, suggesting that consciousness is the prime mover and substance of all reality. The paper not only critiques the limitations of materialist science but also offers a vision for a second scientific revolution that bridges the gap between science and spirituality, heralding an era of greater understanding and integration of the mystical dimensions of existence. By advocating for a science that embraces the study of consciousness as its core, this work seeks to initiate a dialogue that could lead to revolutionary advancements in our understanding of the universe, human nature, and the interconnectedness of all things.

2017

This dissertation examines how a network of “quantum consciousness” scientists have sought to change the epistemological and ethical boundaries of scientific research in hopes of creating knowledge that can adequately address contemporary problems in both science and society more generally. Quantum consciousness (QC) is defined as both scientific research and spiritual practice that seeks to understand consciousness in light of foundational questions that emerge from quantum physics. QC scientists believe neuroscience alone cannot provide a scientific explanation of consciousness because neuroscience is premised on “materialism” of Newtonian physics. QC scientists draw on the authority of physics to argue the correct scientific account of the mind-matter relationship will have to incorporate quantum physics, understood as the correct theory of matter since the quantum revolution of the 1920’s. Insofar as the physical delimits and shapes the mental, QC makes good on the potential quantum physics holds for redefining what mind is and can be. By examining the practices and discourses of QC scientists, I demonstrate that conceptual transference between science, philosophy and New Age spirituality is part of the formation of scientific disciplines and the bounds of scientific debate. QC’s cultural contestations with mainstream science show how the demarcation problem in science becomes intertwined with the mind-matter problem of philosophy. My ethnography follows QC scientists’ movements between conferences, research settings, classrooms, and dinner parties to show how technical philosophical disagreements in quantum foundations, such as the measurement problem and the theory of decoherence, are the fulcrum of a cultural, de facto demarcation between QC scientists and mainstream scientists. Max Weber postulated “disenchantment” as the result of a world rendered knowable in principle, yet the doctrine of intrinsic probability in quantum mechanics denies the possibility of such a world, and thereby troubles the assumption of a necessarily disenchanted science. I show how QC science is motivated by an expectation of a future “spiritual” discovery, called the New Paradigm, that redeems QC’s hypothesis that “universal consciousness is the ground of physics.” This expectation encourages QC scientists to incorporate and proliferate non-science within science, in ways that make hybrids, rather than clear boundaries. My dissertation shows how QC’s expectation of a “New Paradigm” guides what may be called a spiritual revivalism to redefine the secular norms of science.

Journal of Psychology & Clinical Psychiatry

Consciousness has proven difficult to define. One approach is to recognize it requires several different component 'prongs'. Neppe and Close had published on the EPIC prongs, now standing for Essence, Paradigmatic Levels, Information-Meaning, and Cybernetic Consciousness. While these were demonstrably valuable in one Neuropsychiatry study, the prongs require further amplifications and hence eight other have been introduced.

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2010

I run a blog entitled “Conscious Entities” at http://consciousentities.com which is devoted to short discussions of some of the major thinkers and theories about consciousness. This is another small collection of my writings on consciousness which the editor of JCER very kindly selected to appear here. It contains my short accounts of six major thinkers in consciousness studies including Daniel Dennet, John Searle, David Chalmers, Colin McGinn, Roger Penrose & Gerald Edelman. In reading the books of these writers, I found I had views which were very clear, but also completely contradictory; so these pieces are written in the form of dialogues between a character I call Bitbucket (represented by the abacus) who is a hard-line materialist computational reductionist, and Blandula (the cherub) who leans towards dualism and mysterianism. (The last few words of each article, by the way, are actually quotes from the subject himself.)

This essay by Nishida Kitarō from 1927, translated into English here for the first time, is from the initial period of what has come to be called “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku), when Nishida was first developing his conception of “place” (basho). Nishida here inquires into the relationship between logic and consciousness in terms of place and implacement in order to overcome the shortcomings of previous philosophical attempts—from the ancient Greeks to the moderns—to dualistically conceive the relationship between being and knowing in terms of subject-object or form-matter. During the course of articulating his novel approach to consciousness and cognition, Nishida discusses what he takes to be the weaknesses of Greek hylomorphism, Kantian (and neo-Kantian) dualism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Dissatisfied with the attribution of mere passivity to placiality, and turning away from consciousness objectified as a subject of statement, Nishida imparts to consciousness qua place a certain logical independence as an active yet un-objectifiable “predicate.” This investigation of consciousness as the unobjectifiable place for objectification leads Nishida to the notion of what precedes consciousness itself, a “place of nothing” (mu no basho) that envelops the dichotomized structures of subject-predicate, being-nothing, subject-object, universal-particular, et cetera.

Science in Context, 2020

ArgumentIn this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond’s thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond’s speech “On the limits of natural science” (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the “hard problem of consciousness.” Du Bois-Reymond’s position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.