Deterrence in the Cold War and the ‘War on Terror’
David K Levine2006, Defence and Peace Economics
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Abstract
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This paper examines the evolution of deterrence policy from the Cold War era to the modern context of the War on Terror, highlighting the role of economic theory and game theory in shaping military strategies. It distinguishes between deterring state actors and non-state terrorist groups, positing that while the former can be approached similarly to Cold War deterrence, the latter presents unique challenges. The authors argue for a nuanced understanding of deterrence in the face of modern threats, suggesting that failure in deterrence may not yield as catastrophic consequences as in the past, provided that fear does not dominate policy.
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