Animals as moral patients. Let us try to clarify.

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 2013

The central purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the relationship between ethics and nonhuman animals. That is, in what way ethics has been understanding and incorporating nonhuman animals as participants in our moral community. To that end, I present how some of the different ethical perspectives concur to offer a more adequate response to the question of how we should include nonhuman animals in morality. The theoretical contributions offered by Peter Singer (utilitarianism), Tom Regan (law), Karen Warren (care) Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Maria Clara Dias (functionings) are called for the construction of this panorama and to the development of this debate.

Bioethics. Ed. Bruce Jennings. 4th ed. Vol. 1. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2014. 252-254. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 26 June 2014.

Ethical concerns about nonhuman animals arise from the recognition that many animals, such as mammals, birds, and vertebrates generally, as well as some invertebrate species, are conscious and sentient, that is, capable of negative and positive sensations. Further mental states attributed to many animals include beliefs, desires, reasoning, memory, expectations for the future, rich and varied negative and positive emotions, social engagement, self-awareness, and a psychological unity that enables identity over time. A growing body of research in cognitive ethology, the branch of scientific research focused on animal minds, is providing increasingly stronger reasons—beyond common sense, observations, and arguments from analogy to human behavior, physiology, and evolution—to believe that many animals are, like human beings, minded, psychologically complex beings whose lives can go better and worse for them and thus are capable of being harmed (Armstrong and Botzler 2008). Little scientific research supports an opposing view that all animals are mindless, incapable of suffering or experiencing negative emotions, or are otherwise incapable of being harmed or made worse off. In light of this understanding of animals' cognitive and emotional lives, most contemporary ethicists who address these issues argue that there are some direct moral duties owed to conscious, sentient animals, although they disagree on the extent and seriousness of these obligations. And there are debates about what difference the cognitive sophistication of the species might make to our obligations concerning individuals of that species: for example, might a prima facie obligation to not harm be stronger concerning chimpanzees, less toward chickens, and even less for fish? Answers here depend on our scientific understanding of the mental lives of the species, as well as our moral theorizing.

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 2005

Law, Culture and the Humanities, 2010

The animal welfare position, which represents the prevailing paradigm for thinking about our moral and legal obligations to nonhuman animals, maintains that animal life has a lesser value than human life and, therefore, it is morally acceptable to use animals as human resources as long as we treat them ‘humanely’ and do not inflict ‘unnecessary’ suffering on them. According to this position, animals are not self-aware and live in an eternal present; they do not have an interest in continuing to live as distinguished from an interest in not suffering. The use and killing of animals does not per se involve inflicting harm on them. The view that animal life has a lesser moral value cannot be justified in that all sentient beings are self-aware and have an interest in continuing to live. Although we do not treat all humans equally, we accord all humans the right not to be treated as property. We cannot justify not according this one right to all sentient nonhumans.

All animals' interests deserve proportional consideration to sentience, whilst suffering of any kind and of any species, should be equally considered, as morality should be conducive to the good. This makes the breeding and killing of non-human animals for food morally permissible, so long as the outcome is void of emotional or physical suffering, short and long term, for any animal involved. Though the base distinction between any different species is a genetic code, the result of a genetic code allows varying levels of sentience. Sentience, for the sake of this argument, is defined by Broom: " Key issues in any discussion of the sentience of all animals, including fish and invertebrates, are: (i) whether they are aware of what is happening around them; (ii) whether they are capable of cognitive processing; and (iii) whether they can have feelings such as pain. " (2014). Under these criteria, any animals' interests should be proportionally considered, so long as minimisation of pain takes priority. To ponder the morality of equal consideration amongst animals, one would be assuming the good life is attainable through ethical actions. This essay operates under this assumption, wherein pain or suffering, for the vast majority of cases, is something to be avoided, for to argue the opposite results in meaningless discussion. Singer's valid argument denotes the moral irrelevance of quantifiable evidence as a factor in the equal consideration of the interests of all humans, and therefore all species (1974, p.174). This is applicable to differing levels of pain that do not require differing levels of consideration, in so far as equality is a moral ideal, not an assertion of fact, one should adopt the view that any suffering is worth considering, and that, if possible, it should altogether be avoided (Singer, 1974, p. 174). If an animal has the ability to feel pain, then it's pain deserves equal consideration to the pain felt by any species. It is futile to argue that the good life is obtainable through suffering, though one must acknowledge that suffering contrasts pleasure, and enables its existence. Good cannot exist without bad, however, when considering morality, the obvious bias is to the good. This means limiting the bad, hence, with contemplation of animal equality, and sentience specifically, consideration of all suffering must be accounted for. Pain is a physiological response to harm of the body, to which the body signals the brain intending to stop this occurrence. Without an emotional response, this signal would be useless; no animal would care for its own life, or any other's for that matter. Being that this is not the reality we live in, all pain is to be avoided from a moral perspective. The emotional response of pain is a sympathetic tie between non-human animals and humans. And humans, if they were to adopt this moral, should experience guilt for being the cause of any such pain, and to be ethical in their actions, should avoid any type of pain before all else. Where non-human animals differ to humans is in the level of sentience based on other criteria, for instance whether they are aware of their surroundings, and whether they are cognitively capable of processing such information. There is no doubt surrounding sentience in non-human animals, most have the ability to feel pain, to feel pleasure, to operate intelligently in their surroundings, and to process new information and learn A1668863 Timothy Whiffen PHIL2042

Sonja Haugaard Christensen, 2011

…animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated. (2) The moral problems raised by human use of animals are highly relevant and animals should not be treated as mere things, they deserve respect. How can we categorize animals - do they have a moral status like human beings? An answer to the question probably opens up a deeper understanding of human nature and our obligations to animals. Among the issues, we face the important question of animal farming, where cattle, pigs, and birds are housed under extreme conditions and exposed to hunger, pain, and suffer. However, the basis of moral consideration has been the source of much disagreement so now we turn to Tom Regan’s and Peter Singers' (animal liberationist movement) to see their opinions about the moral status of animals.

2014