The Old Dualisms: Are Emotions Irrational?

2001

Emotions and rationality often are seen as polar opposites. In this seminar, we draw on literature from both economics and psychology to understand whether this view is warranted. As suggested by the title of this seminar announcement, our working hypothesis is that emotions are indeed rational in a sense that will be made precise. The seminar will be conducted in English.

… of the Royal …, 2010

Consistent with what seems to be common parlance, philosophers like Amélie O. Rorty and Jesse J. Prinz have argued that emotions are not, strictly speaking, rational in-themselves. I argue that emotions can be understood not only as being rational in-themselves, i.e., intrinsically rational, strictly speaking, but also as being instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For every emotion or emotion-type there exists some normative standard, given by what emotions are or what an emotion-type is, against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated, in light of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I then distinguish what it means for emotions to be rational in-themselves from what it means for emotions to be instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. Finally, I bring my argument to a close by providing a sketch of an account of what emotions are—emotions as superordinate inference rules—that fulfills the CORe, and I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account of emotions on claims of knowledge, and how we understand the rationality of infants, some people with disabilities, and emotional animals.

Consistent with what seems to be common parlance, philosophers like Amélie O. Rorty and Jesse J. Prinz have argued that emotions are not, strictly speaking, rational in-themselves. I argue that emotions can be understood not only as being rational in-themselves, i.e., intrinsically rational, strictly speaking, but also as being instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or any emotion-type there exists some normative standard, given by what emotion is or what an emotion-type is, against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated, in light of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I then distinguish what it means for emotions to be rational in-themselves from what it means for emotions to be instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. Finally, I bring my argument to a close by providing a sketch of an account of what emotions are—emotions as superordinate inference rules—that fulfills the CORe, and I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account of emotions on claims of knowledge, and how we understand the rationality of infants, some people with disabilities, and emotional animals.

Philosophers like Amélie O. Rorty and Jesse J. Prinz have argued that emotions are not, strictly speaking, rational in-themselves. In this paper, I argue that emotions can be understood not only as being rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but also as being instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For every emotion or emotion-type there exists some normative standard, given by what emotions are or what an emotion-type is, against which our emotional responses can be judged or evaluated, in light of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I then distinguish what it means for emotions to be rational in-themselves from what it means for emotions to be instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. Finally, I bring my argument to a close by providing an account of what emotions are—emotions as superordinate inference rules—which fulfills the CORe, and I conclude that emotions can be understood as being rational in-themselves, qua emotions or qua an emotion-type.

2019

Emotions and epistemic rationality have been traditionally considered to be in opposition. In the last twenty years, the role of emotions in epistemology has been increasingly acknowledged, but there is no systematic argument for the rational assessability of emotions that is compatible with both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of emotions and fits with the epistemic rational assessability of mental states in general. This thesis aims to fill this gap. Using empirically informed philosophical methodology, I offer a novel account of the rational assessability of emotions that fits with the rational assessability of other mental states and that could in principle be accepted by cognitivist and some prominent non-cognitivist theories of emotions. The possibility to epistemically rationally assess emotions opens up a fresh set of questions that regards the nature of the evaluations involved in the emotions, the epistemic norms that apply to them and the extent to which we are e...

Roy. Inst. Philos. Suppl., 2003

There are now quite a number of popular or semi-popular works urging rejection of the old opposition between rationality and emotion. They present evidence or theoretical arguments that favour a reconception of emotions as providing an indispensable basis for practical rationality. Perhaps the most influential is neuroanatomist Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error, which argues from cases of brain lesion and other neurological causes of emotional deficit that some sort of emotional 'marking,' of memories of the outcomes of our choices with anxiety, is needed to support learning from experience. 2 Damasio's work has interesting connection to such issues as how to understand psychopaths, agents who lack normal feelings of guilt and other moral motives based on empathy. 3 It seems that psychopaths are not like the rational 'amoralists' of philosophic lore but rather are unable to follow through reliably on long-term plans they make in their own interests. A failure of emotional empathy-with one's own future self, in effect-apparently yields elements of practical irrationality. On the other hand, Damasio wrongly sets up Descartes and mind/body dualism as a philosophic foil for his view. 4 His real

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2025

Emotional recalcitrance is where an emotion occurs in conflict with a belief or judgment and does not subside despite your efforts to rationalize or reason against it. If, for example, you experience fear of flying whilst sitting on an airplane despite wholeheartedly believing that you are completely safe, your fear is recalcitrant. Much of the discussion surrounding recalcitrant emotions has been concerned with determining the respect(s) in which the agent who experiences one is irrational (e.g., Brady, 2009; Döring, 2015; Helm, 2015; Majeed, 2022). This will be my focus here. More specifically, I want to offer an account that focuses on the irrationality of the cognitions-particularly the reasoning-that these emotions motivate.

Emotion & Value, Oxford: OUP, ed by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd