The Idea of "Free Public Reason

International Political Theory 3(1), 2007: 129 - 143

Teorema, 2020

The scope of public reason determines which political decisions should be taken ac- cording to its standards. In this paper, I defend a broad-scope view of public reason, ac- cording to which every single political decision should be justified by public reasons. In the first part, I argue that, despite the unclarity of Rawls’ position, it is compatible with the wide-scope view. In the three following parts, I refute the main arguments in favour of the narrow-scope view of public reason. Finally, I offer an argument for the wide-scope view and conclude that it is preferable from the point of view of political liberalism. // El alcance de la razón pública determina qué decisiones deben atenerse a ella. En este artículo defiendo una concepción de la razón pública de amplio alcance, según la cual todas las decisiones políticas deberían estar justificadas por razones públicas. Prime-ro sostengo que, aunque la postura de Rawls es confusa, es compatible con una razón pública de amplio alcance. En las tres siguientes secciones rechazo los argumentos principales en favor de una razón pública restringida. Después ofrezco un argumento a favor de la concepción amplia y concluyo que ésta es preferible desde el punto de vista del liberalismo político. PALABRAS CLAVE: Rawls, liberalismo político, razón pública, alcance, argumentación pública.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2006

Political Theory, 2008

Rawls and Schmitt are often discussed in the literature as if their conceptions of the political had nothing in common, or even referred to entirely different phenomena. In this essay, I show how these conceptions share a common space of reasons, traceable back to the idea of public reason and its development since the Middle Ages. By analysing the idea of public reason in Rawls and in Schmitt, as well as its relation to their theories of political representation, I show in what way Schmitt's concept of the political cannot be divorced from an idea of justice, while, conversely, Rawls' conception of justice cannot be divorced from a theory of the political. In that way this paper thematizes the internal relation that each theory establishes between justice and power, deliberation and decision, and consensus and disagreement.

Res Publica, 2000

What sorts of reasons are i) required and ii) morally acceptable when citizens in a pluralist liberal democracy undertake to resolve pressing political issues? This paper presents and then critically examines John Rawls's answer to this question: his so called wide-view of public reason. Rawls's view requires that the content of liberal public reason prove rich enough to yield a reasoned and determinate resolution for most if not all fundamental political issues. I argue that the content of liberal public reason will prove inadequate in this regard far more often than Rawls suspects.

Lux Veritatis, 2017

In a society defined by such fact of reasonable pluralism, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot secure the basis of social unity nor can it provide the content of public reason on fundamental political questions such as questions on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Rawls must go one step further and show that reasonable persons would prefer his political conception to any other political conception. Rawls argues this point by introducing the idea of reasonable consensus together with the idea of political conception of justice where the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception. It is where social unity is based on political conception. It raises the question of political stability; that is, whether political stability through social unity is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements. Overlapping consensus as a process mechanism of justice as fairness must be seen in its operationalization in actual practice in a constitutional democracy. Political groups having political agenda promoting their common and specific interests must engage themselves in public political fora projecting, presenting, and substantiating their claims and arguments that concern matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials affecting and influencing political culture to come up with better thinking, better reasons, better process, and better arguments. Relying on the capacity of the human persons to posit the idea of objectivity in their political actions and behavior in the sense of the motivation and goal of such actions is common welfare. The idea of objectivity is expressed, recognized, and validated when better ideas are articulated in public debates and open argumentations in a democratic society are seen as part of the community of inquiry. The notion of objectivity is where the role of public reason can be seen. The citizens follow the public principles and communal laws because all subscribe and endorse to these laws and principles regardless of their social backgrounds and comprehensive doctrines they hold. No one can be exempted from these laws and principles because these are the things that all citizens render to be objective principles of justice. Everyone also knows and feels that once he violates any or all of these principles, he must be accountable to the whole community who subscribes to these principles of justice. The comprehensive doctrines will not find the exercise of public objective principles of justice offensive because they know and feel that they are the results of public reason. The identified and expressed forms of objectivity out of public reason would serve as the groundwork of policymaking and legislative agenda. When such kind of public reason is addressed and shown that critical examination and evaluation of ideas are made and therefore there is affirmation and revision of comprehensive doctrines conforming to the idea of the political posed by justice as fairness as a political conception of justice. The idea of public reason takes central point in order to realize overlapping consensus in particular and justice as fairness in general. Without the idea of public reason, the moral conceptions and moral grounds of justice as fairness become useless. Given the conceptions and principles in justice as fairness specifically and especially the idea of public reason, the paper intends to present what Rawls meant by his idea of public reason as found in his major texts (I); survey the various serious criticisms taken against Rawls’ idea of public reason and provide critiques against those criticisms (II); critique and at the same time clarify Rawls’ idea of public reason (III); and create a conceptual model for public reason based on Rawls’ idea of public reason vis-à-vis all relevant literatures and studies on the matter (IV).

2011

This paper examines two different theories in relation to the optimal modes of public deliberation about constitutional values and the public good in the context of democratic pluralism: Rawlsian Public Reason and Nedelsky's Enlarged Mentality.

I examine Rawls' indebtedness to Kant in A Theory of Justice, Kantian Constructivism and in "Themes from Kant's Philosophy". I argue that the way Rawls develop the justification of A Theory of Justice relies heavily on Kant's claims that rationality requires reciprocity and that rationality is to be understood as moral rather than as instrumental. Rawls thus reveals something new in Kant's theory namely that for Kant the hypothetical imperative is actually subordinate to the categorical imperative. However, Rawls eschews Kant's attempt at proving that we are rational and thus committed to treating each other with respect, hence Rawls argument fails to show that we do, in fact, share the intuitions about justice as fairness that underlie Rawls' theory.