Political Parties and the Power of Money in Indonesia and Beyond

NOMOI Law Review, 2021

Political money are a forms of abuse, p olitik money can be done by granting the form of money or goods such as food to the people in order for them to vote for the party concerned a tau may also mean vote-buying in the political process and power and the act of handing out money either privately or by a party to influence the voter's vote. The method used in this paper is normative juridical legal research. In Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning Elections Article 1 point 1 that Elections are a means of people's sovereignty to elect members of the DPR, DPD members, the President and vicepresident and to elect members of the DPRD which are carried out directly, publicly, freely, confidentially, honestly and fairly. in the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Thus, elections are an important means for the people in the life of the state, namely by electing their representatives who in turn will control the wheels of government. However, in reality, few people are aware of the importance of the community's role in elections. As a result, it is difficult to prove the practice of money politics , thus making the candidates who will be elected freely practice money politics with the aim of getting the most votes in the implementation of the election .

International Journal of Business, Law, and Education

Elections for Village Heads, Regional Heads, Legislative Elections and General Elections in Indonesia should be carried out without being coloured by political money fraud, because of the dangers of political money for a clean democratic process ahead of the election of village heads, regional heads, legislative elections and general elections in Indonesia 2024, to achieve that power and victory, they used all kinds of methods. And that power will later be used to recover losses due to money politics. For this reason, Money Politics is considered a serious crime in the world of politics that must be fought and eliminated together. Money politics is the biggest enemy of democracy and is a 'bogey' that is familiar with holding elections in Indonesia. In the implementation of post-reform elections, money politics is a violation that is always in the spotlight. Uniquely, both election participants and the public are both involved in money politics circles. To fight the practice ...

PCD Journal, 2017

This paper aims to map out practices of political financing in Indonesia from the political to the socio-historical perspective. Arguing about the party financing and the corruption of politicians and the parties, this paper also proposes about strategies at the individual level for performing financing politics, as well as factors that help to explain their performance. It compares cases in three different periods of Indonesian history: the postindependence, the Suharto (New Order) era, and reformasi after the fall of Suharto in 1998. This paper discusses and analyses the financing politics belonging to the political and socio-historical perspective, the issue of financing politics, the results of mapping students' theses from three universities in Java together with relevant papers by LIPI (the Indonesian Sciences Institute), and directly presents three case studies of individual performing financing politics. Two of the case studies concern with politicians from the post-independence and Suharto era, while the third concerns a member of the city of Solo's local parliament. This paper shows how financing politics would be no longer relevant, as the cultural capital, political capital, and social capital also may contribute in supporting one's political career.

Social Science Research Network, 2014

Southeast Asia, riding on a wave of economic and asset growth in the last few decades, has developed an exaggerated level of money politics and enrichment opportunities for all sorts of political entrepreneurs. The part of political parties in this game and the different methods of securing enough funding for the management of the party machineries and the increasingly costly election campaigns vary from country to country. But the basic pattern can be described as a skilful move to blur the distinction between big business, state funds, and political parties in order to control and manipulate cash flows as the main instrument for coming to power and secure it. Based on traditional patron-client relationships and the remaining big income gap between mostly rural poor and mostly urban middle and upper classes, "pluto-populism" and "porkbarrelling", nepotism, cronyism, and favouritism have become prominent features of party politics almost everywhere. The overrepresentation of businessmen and bankers in parliaments and governments reflects the interdependence of party politics and business sectors, once dubbed as "incestuous relationship" by veteran opposition politician Lim Kit Siang in Malaysia. And the rising cost of being selected as a candidate or branch leader as well as the goodies to be showered on potential voter groups and party supporters are only a logical consequence of these developments which have hardly been affected by progress in democratic and institutional development. Frustration with the level of corruption is high among citizens in Southeast Asia, but the vicious cycle of political cash flows and party politics remains below the necessary domestic debate threshold to lead to radical reforms. As the May 2013 election in Malaysia has shown, anti-corruption rhetoric strikes a strong chord with large sectors of the electorate, but the well-oiled machinery of the incumbent government coalition could not be defeated. In Indonesia, and certainly similarly in other parts of the region, the anti-corruption sentiments seem to be superseded by resignation. Since all parties are more or less involved, and people are so used to the daily petty corruption, the argument is losing appeal in campaigns, also because even the most corrupt parties use it strategically.

PERSPEKTIF

This study aims to see the relationship between patterns of patronage, clientelism, money politics, and campaign financing within the framework of patronage democracy that occurs in Indonesia. This paper uses the literature review method, the use of this method is related to the practice of patronage democracy and campaign financing which limits researchers in data collection. Data collection is done by collecting various books, scientific articles or journals related to the problem and research objectives. The results of this paper describe the pattern of patronage causing the large campaign costs incurred by each party and the candidate it nominates. The amount of money spent on campaigns can lead to acts of corruption. The solution offered in this paper has two points. First, campaign funding is financed 100% by the state, meaning that no other source of funds is allowed to enter the party. Thus, parties and candidates do not need to look for other sources of funds, so as to avoi...

The party system in Indonesia has expanded in the post-Suharto era. With each successive election, voters have spread their support across a wider array of parties. This has occurred despite deliberate institutional tweaks designed to consolidate the system by privileging large parties. Why has the party system expanded despite increasing institutional incentives to consolidate? This article places party system change in a broader context of decentralization and corruption. The decentralization and deconcentration of political power has opened multiple avenues for voters and elites to access state resources. Whereas major parties were expected to dominate resources in the immediate aftermath of the transition, changes to the formal and informal institutions eroded their control over the state. This has caused previously consolidated subnational party systems to fracture. The argument is demonstrated using narrative and newly constructed cross-district datasets. The paper develops the concept of rent opportunities, defined as the ability to access and abuse state resources. Party system expansion has been greatest in areas with high rent opportunities, where both voters and elites are particularly motivated by the competition for state resources. In these areas, characterized by large state sectors, the formerly authoritarian party (Golkar) initially won large electoral victories due, in part, to its control over patronage. As Golkar lost its ability to monopolize resources, the party system fractured. Voting for small parties surged and the party machine was replaced by a partisan melee. My argument exposes the limits of institutional engineering and underlines the formative role corruption has had on the evolution of Indonesia’s party system.

Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review

Circulating debates concerning the intense influence of direct local election towards money politics remains ongoing among Indonesian scholars. This article demonstrates several aspects indicating the relationship between direct local election (Pilkada) and money politics. In more specific rhetoric, current practices in money politics tend to occur before and during the election day, engaging political actors, voters, and soaring capital. As the novelty of this article, the findings reveal that the likelihood of money politics would most occur within the environment where the existing regulation encourages corruption. Hence, people have less concern to support a fair election, inevitably due to the weak law enforcement, exacerbated by disengagement of political parties.

Palgrave Macmillan, 2019

This book investigates the impact of vote buying on the accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in newly democratic countries, with a focus on Indonesia. In doing so, the book presents a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia’s young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, determinants, targeting and effectiveness of this practice. It addresses these central issues in the context of comparative studies of vote buying, arguing that although party loyalists are disproportionately targeted in vote buying efforts, in total numbers —given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia— vote buying hits more uncommitted voters. It also demonstrates that the effectiveness of vote buying on vote choice is in the 10 percent range, which is sufficient for many candidates to secure a seat and thus explains why they still engage in vote buying despite high levels of leakage.

Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (ICSPS 2017), 2018

General election is one of the indicators of democratization alongside the other values of democracy. Beside presidential election, the general local election was also held in Indonesia under the Law No. 32/2004 of Local Government. Adding to that, the government also composed the Law No.22/2007 about the implementation of the general election. The increasing number of civic participation in the local election can be seen from the comparison between the number of voters in 2012 election and the 2017 election. Despite the higher public engagement, money politics has been a prominent phenomenon in several election at the district level. Election Monitoring Institution (or in Indonesia known as Bawaslu) found that there are 600 cases of money politics from 101 districts in Indonesia, including the one happened in Jakarta. Regarding these matters, Edward Aspinal used the concept of patronage and clientelism which observe the significant benefits within political elite to distribute something in the form of money or other things to their constituent to get political support. Clientelism encompasses the reciprocal, hierarchical, the repetitional aspects.The society tends to think in a pragmatic way in addressing this issue. During the 2017 local election in Jakarta, the solution that was used to solve money politic issue was by continuously improving the political literacy for the society, especially for the political elites. Receiving money, things or services from the elite that would be exchanged by political right of constituent will break the high values of democratization.

Indonesia, 2013

a group of political economists, political scientists, and political sociologists gathered at the University of Sydney to consider the effects of inequalities in wealth and power on contemporary Indonesian politics.1 The lively and critical discussion over two days centered on competing interpretations of oligarchy in Indonesian democracy by scholars representing a range of theoretical traditions. This special issue is the product of these discussions. As Jeffrey Winters noted at the workshop, "beyond oligarchy" could mean one of two things in assessments of the state of Indonesian politics. On the one hand, it could refer to a time when oligarchs were no longer politically dominant. On the other, it

The phenomenon of political dynasties remains a significant issue in modern democracies, particularly in Indonesia, where familial political networks continue to influence electoral outcomes. This study examines the presence and implications of dynastic politics in the 2024 Indonesian General Elections, focusing on candidates from elite political families in Jember Regency. Utilizing a qualitative case study approach, this research explores the factors contributing to the persistence of political dynasties, the public perception of dynastic candidates, and their impact on democratic processes. Findings indicate that dynastic candidates benefit from name recognition, extensive political networks, and financial resources, which provide them with substantial electoral advantages. However, public trust in dynastic candidates varies, with some voters perceiving them as more experienced and capable due to their political lineage, while others view them as perpetuating oligarchic control and limiting democratic competition. The study also reveals that independent candidates face structural disadvantages, such as limited access to campaign funding, lower media exposure, and weaker political backing, which reduce their electability. The research further highlights that political parties often prioritize dynastic candidates due to their established influence and the expectation of electoral success, leading to a decline in political meritocracy. Despite this, civil society organizations and electoral watchdogs continue to advocate for fairer election processes, emphasizing the need for institutional reforms to mitigate the excessive influence of political dynasties. This study contributes to the growing discourse on political dynasties in emerging democracies, providing a nuanced understanding of how historical, sociopolitical, and institutional factors sustain dynastic dominance in Indonesian politics. The findings suggest that addressing this issue requires comprehensive electoral reforms, greater political education for voters, and stricter regulations on campaign financing and party nominations. By analyzing the Jember case study, this research provides valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and electoral bodies seeking to enhance democratic competitiveness and ensure more equitable political representation. The study concludes that while political dynasties remain deeply embedded in Indonesian electoral politics, strategic policy interventions and increased public awareness can gradually reduce their dominance and promote a more inclusive democratic system.

Indonesia, 2013

1 This thesis is most comprehensively set out in Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). Given that this paper is a development of that thesis, and its defense in the current debate, the arguments in the book are necessarily referred to and repeated.

SAGE Open

Reform toward open-list elections in Indonesia has transformed the nature of campaigning to become more personalized. This has raised questions regarding the role of money in elections and calls for stricter campaign finance regulation. However, the merits of limits on campaign finance depend on whether and how campaign finance affects incumbents and challengers differently. Literature on this issue has produced ambiguous results, with only few studies conducted in a developing country democracy. This study estimates the effect of campaign money, along with other factors including list position and incumbency status, on the probability of a candidate being elected in the 2014 legislative election in Indonesia. Our econometric estimations confirm that campaign money effectively raises the probability of candidates being elected. The probability of getting elected will increase up to approximately 5 percentage points for each additional IDR 100 million of campaign money. Campaign mone...

Asian Politics & Policy, 2019

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Nur Hidayat Sardini, 2019

This article scrutinizes the phenomenon of Local Government Election (Local election) of a regency at the easternmost province in Indonesia, Jayapura Regency of Papua. During the election period, there was a great number of violations against election rules which were not only sporadic but also designed on a structured, systematic and massive scale-using the term of Indonesian Constitutional Courts. The violations were related to the role of the oligarchs who cooperatively worked hand in hand to win the political contestation. The activities of the oligarchs which involved clerical-technical issues are undoubtedly prohibited by the Law of Pilkada. The clerical-technical issues include unlawful activities such as replacing some officials of polling station a day before the election, manipulating the official report documents like voting and the calculation of the votes forms, certificates of results and holographic forms of the votes calculation details and records of the results of valid vote calculation at the polling stations in massive numbers. In the Jayapura Regency Election, it is found that the practice of the election administration regime is defied by an electoral shadow structure played by the Oligarchs. Thus, this article argues that the political decentralization results in a powerful control of the local oligarchs on the Local Elections which must be solved for the sake of Indonesia's democratization. Keywords: the role of local oligarchs, electoral integrity, structured, systematic and massive violations