On Vulgar and Platonic Justice in Plato

2013

International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities, 2017

In the Republic, the city-soul analogy made by Plato paves the way for the entire dialogue. The main interlocutors use the analogy to show the nature of justice and aim to prove that just people live better and are happier than unjust people, by establishing a city to which justice, as defined by them, is applied. Scholars have recently been debating the validity of this analogy. Some critics assert that there are several significant structural inconsistencies and logical misconceptions, thus making the analogy fallacious; at the same time, there are proponents who write extensively in favor of this analogy and defend it against the objections raised. In this paper, I will reexamine passages in the Republic where the analogy first occurs, evaluate the critique made by Bernard Williams, and present arguments defending Plato' strategy. Ultimately, I will show that Plato' city-soul analogy is not as far-fetched as Williams argues and this analogy-as a crucial strategy of Plato'sis efficient and powerful enough in showing the similarities between the city and the soul, for the interlocutors to justifiably and reasonably reach the conclusion that the justice of the individual is the same as that of the city. 7 Plato 370a-b, 374a-c, 394e, 423c-d, 433a, 443b, 453b. 8 Plato 414c-417b. 9 Plato 354a. 10 Plato 428b-429a. 11 Plato 429a-430c. 12 Plato 430e-432b. 13 Plato 434d-435a.

This is an uncorrected pre-publication version of one chapter of my Book "Knowledge and Truth in Plato". Please use the published version and cite by the page numbers in that book.

In this paper I challenge the widespread idea that Plato (or Socrates) proposes a definition of justice in the Republic. I consider what it would be for a term like "justice" to be univocal across the two different domains that Plato considers, the state and the soul, and argue that he does not think that there needs to be a common definition. I explore how Socrates can deliver knowledge of what justice is, by describing an imaginary city in action, without ever giving or receiving anything like a definition. And I consider and reject two famous challenges that have supposed that there is something wrong with Plato's method and with the analogical reasoning it employs.

100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, 2011

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the City

Now, the members of this small group have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and at the same time they've also seen the madness of the majority and realized, in a word, that hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and survive, that instead they'd perish before they could profit either their city or their friends and be useless both to themselves and to others, just like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this into account, they lead a quiet life and do their own work. Thus, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher-seeing others filled with lawlessnessis satisfied if he can depart from it with good hope, blameless and content. Well, that's no small thing for him to have accomplished before departing. But it isn't the greatest either, since he didn't chance upon a constitution that suits him. Under a suitable one, his own growth will be fuller, and he'll save the community as well as himself.-Republic 496e-497a

In the Republic, the city-soul analogy made by Plato paves the way for the entire dialogue. The main interlocutors use the analogy to show the nature of justice and aim to prove that just people live better and are happier than unjust people, by establishing a city to which justice, as defined by them, is applied. Scholars have recently been debating the validity of this analogy. Some critics assert that there are several significant structural inconsistencies and logical misconceptions, thus making the analogy fallacious; at the same time, there are proponents who write extensively in favor of this analogy and defend it against the objections raised. In this paper, I will re-examine passages in the Republic where the analogy first occurs, evaluate the critique made by Bernard Williams, and present arguments defending Plato’ strategy. Ultimately, I will show that Plato’ city-soul analogy is not as far-fetched as Williams argues and this analogy – as a crucial strategy of Plato’s – is efficient and powerful enough in showing the similarities between the city and the soul, for the interlocutors to justifiably and reasonably reach the conclusion that the justice of the individual is the same as that of the city.

Philosophical Remarks on City And Right to the City, 2021

In Plato's Crito, Socrates has an imaginary conversation with the Laws of Athens. Socrates, say the Laws, lived in Athens for seventy years, raised children there, and made no attempt to change its laws. Socrates never left Athens, not even to attend a festival. This tacit acceptance of Athenian law is a strong argument against escaping. Socrates' deep connection to the city is marked in Plato's Phaedrus, where it is remarked that Socrates never leaves the city. Plato's literary representations attempt to create a deep linkage between Socrates and Athens. This depiction, and the argument of the Laws in Crito, is deeply Platonic, but is it Socratic? Variant texts of Plato's Crito suggest that Socrates attended the Isthmian festival. According to other sources, Socrates also visited Samos, and descended to the Piraeus to observe the Thracian festival of Bendis. Socrates relished talking with foreigners, but in the Republic Plato dismisses their ideas on justice. In Republic I Socrates discusses justice with foreigners like the Sicilians Cephalus and Polemarchus, and the Chalcedonian Thrasymachus. Republic I functions like an aporetic Socratic dialogue; in the constructive Republic II, the foreign interlocutors are replaced by Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. Plato's dismissal of foreign speakers in favor of those with family and friendship ties to the city, suggests his deep commitment to a bond of citizenship as a prerequisite for political theory. For Socrates, justice seems to be quite abstract and logical; for Plato justice is something that emerges organically from a deep bond of soul and body to the city.

The pursuit of justice in the Republic commences when the elderly, wealthy Cephalus suggests that justice involves nothing more than telling the truth and repaying one's debts. But Socrates points out that by following these simple rules without exception could have dire consequences. In an effort to avoid such difficulties, Polemarchus offers a refinement of the definition by suggesting that justice means " giving to each what is owed ". The new definition codifies formally our deeply-entrenched practice of seeking always to help our friends and harm our enemies. Thrasymachus recommends that justice should be seen as the advantage of the stronger because those in positions of power simply use their might to decree what shall be right. Glaucon and Adeimantus continue with the challenge concerning the meaning and the nature of justice. According to Glaucon the pursuit of justice disadvantages the just when they are deprived of the social rewards for their behaviour because justice is a social compromise. It is well known that people ignore the demands of justice when certain opportunities arise. Adeimantus places the emphasis on the condition of the individual soul, and of the individual himself, rather than the strength of justice over injustice. However not everyone will agree that justice should be defended as praiseworthy for its own sake, rather than for the extrinsic advantages that may result from its practice. Socrates expounds on the importance of justice in a simple though ambiguous sense, pointing to the fact that true justice must also contribute to the self-fulfilment of the just man. The just city serves the primary purpose of illuminating the just soul which is liberated from the subjection of injustice.

Rhizomata, 2021

One puzzling feature of Plato’s Republic is the First City or ‘city of pigs’. Socrates praises the First City as a “true”, “healthy” city, yet Plato abandons it with little explanation. I argue that the problem is not a political failing, as most previous readings have proposed: the First City is a viable political arrangement, where one can live a deeply Socratic lifestyle. But the First City has a psychological corollary, that the soul is simple rather than tripartite. Plato sees this ‘First Soul’ as an inaccurate model of moral psychology, and so rejects it, along with its political analogue.