Is Searching the Internet Making Us Intellectually Arrogant?

Social Epistemology, 2018

This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding, or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one's information-seeking behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units.

Philosophical Psychology, 2014

In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions-agent-reliabilism and agentresponsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)-as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation.

2013

This Article pre-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Repository Citation Baehr, Jason, "The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Works. 17. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/17

Arrogance and Polarization. Routledge., 2020

This paper explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility.

Minds & Machines

This paper has two distinct but related goals: (1) to identify some of the potential consequences of the Internet for our cognitive abilities and (2) to suggest an approach to evaluate these consequences. I begin by outlining the Google effect, which (allegedly) shows that when we know information is available online, we put less effort into storing that information in the brain. Some argue that this strategy is adaptive because it frees up internal resources which can then be used for other cognitive tasks, whereas others argue that this is maladaptive because it makes us less knowledgeable. I argue that the currently available empirical evidence in cognitive psychology does not support strong conclusions about the negative effects of the Internet on memory. Before we can make value-judgements about the cognitive effects of the Internet, we need more robust and ecologically-valid evidence. Having sketched a more nuanced picture of the Google effect, I then argue that the value of our cognitive abilities is in part intrinsic and in part instrumental, that is, they are both valuable in themselves and determined by the socio-cultural context in which these cognitive abilities are utilised. Focussing on instrumental value, I argue that, in an information society such as ours, having the skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information are (under most circumstances) more valuable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory. This is so, partly because using the Internet as an external memory system has overall benefits for education, navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship.

Learning and Instruction, 2011

In the present study it was investigated whether high school students are spontaneously able to reflect epistemologically during online searching for information about a controversial topic. In addition, we examined whether activating epistemic beliefs is related to individual characteristics, such as prior knowledge of the topic and argumentative reasoning skill; also whether learning from the Web is influenced by epistemic beliefs in action and the ability to detect fallacies in arguments. The participants (N ¼ 64) were students of Grade 13, who were asked to think aloud during navigation. Qualitative and quantitative analyses were performed. Findings reveal that most participants spontaneously activated beliefs about all four dimensions identified in the literature, that is, about the simplicity/complexity, certainty/uncertainty, justification, and source of knowledge, at different levels of sophistication. Most epistemic reflections were about the source of knowledge. Two patterns of contextualized epistemic beliefs emerged and significantly influenced learning from the Web, which was also affected by participants' ability to identify argumentative fallacies.

The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2014

The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To aide in our understanding of this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies to explore the implicit theory, or "folk" understanding, of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 355 adults engaged in a free listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for each of the three person-concepts. In Study 2, 335 adults rated the descriptors generated in the previous study by how characteristic each was of the target person-concept. In Study 3, 344 adults sorted the descriptors by similarity for each person-concept. By comparing and contrasting the implicit theories of the three person-concepts, a complex portrait of an intellectually humble person emerges with particular epistemic, self-oriented, and other-oriented dimensions.

Among the many groundbreaking inventions that happened during my lifetime, two have been of special importance to me: the Psychology of Personal Constructs (PCP) and the World Wide Web. How they connect, is the subject of this paper.

A familiar point in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement is that in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer the epistemically virtuous agent should adopt a stance of intellectual humility. That is, the virtuous agent should take a conciliatory stance and reduce her commitment to the proposition under dispute (e.g., Elga 2007; Feldman 2004; Christensen 2007). In this paper, we ask the question of how such intellectual humility would manifest itself in a corresponding peer disagreement regarding knowledge-how. We argue that while it is relatively straightforward to recast this debate in terms of a reductive intellectualist account of knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011), whereby knowledge-how just is a matter of having a particular propositional attitude, the issue becomes more complex once we turn to anti-intellectualist positions (e.g., Ryle 1945; 1949; Poston 2009; Carter & Pritchard 2013; 2014). On these views, after all, such a disagreement won’t be just a matter of disagreeing about the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, to the extent that some kind of conciliation is plausibly required of the virtuous agent in the face of a recognised peer disagreement, this conciliation will not consist simply in belief revision. We propose a novel way to address this problem. We claim that what is required of the epistemically virtuous agent when confronted with peer disagreement regarding knowing how to φ is that thereafter she should be disposed to employ her way of φ-ing across a narrower range of practical circumstances than beforehand. Moreover, just as an agent needs to call on her intellectual virtues in order to determine the extent of conciliation required in an ordinary case of epistemic peer disagreement, so the intellectual virtues will play an important role in determining this shift in dispositions to φ that occurs as regards epistemic peer disagreement about knowledge-how.

Virtue epistemology defines knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues. Virtue-Reliabilists, led by Ernest Sosa, argue that intellectual virtues are reliable dispositions. Virtue-Responsibilists, led by Linda Zagzebski, argue that they are acquired character traits for which the agent is (partly) responsible. This chapter contends that Sosa's definition of knowledge, in terms of Reliabilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze passive knowledge, while Zagzebski's definition, in terms of Responsibilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze active knowledge. It also argues that virtue epistemology has already begun to expand the way we analyze knowledge. Breaking with mid-and late-twentieth century analytic epistemology, it puts active knowledge back on the epistemological map, and encourages us to explore probabilistic connections between active knowledge and intellectual virtue.