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2000, Bulletin of Latin American Research
These are the seven di!erent types of populism identi"ed by Canovan (1981).
Chinese Political Science Review
After the death of president Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, Venezuela represents a very interesting and unique case of institutionalized populist system. In this article, I will attempt to explain some analytical elements by which we may speak of an institutionalized post-populist condition. It is interesting to understand why the populist Chavist system continues to endure, even if with difficulty, in spite of many unfavourable factors like: the death of a charismatic leader and the presence of a weak leadership; and unfavourable and adverse geopolitical and geoeconomical conditions, especially when compared with those of the initial phase of ascent and prosperity. The objective of this article is to study in its complexity the typicality of the post charismatic phase of Venezuela's system and present a case study of the post-populist condition to be able to compare it in a global and comparative perspective.
2015
espanolRecientemente se han consolidado en Venezuela dos polos politicos, los chavistas que apoyan al gobierno del fallecido Hugo Chavez y la oposicion. A pesar de la amplia divergencia en el contenido de sus proyectos politicos y la profunda polarizacion social que eso ha generado, los dos campos comparten similitudes, y de cierta manera se validan mutuamente a traves de sus practicas discursivas. En este trabajo se investiga el papel de la oposicion en la consolidacion de un discurso populista en Venezuela. A traves de un analisis de contenido cualitativo de articulos de noticias en linea, este trabajo muestra que las ideas y el discurso de la oposicion entre el 2000 y 2012 juega un papel importante en la consolidacion del discurso populista del gobierno de Hugo Chavez. EnglishIn recent years, two main political poles have consolidated in Venezuela, those in favor of the late President Hugo Chavez or Chavistas and those in opposition. Despite their divergent propositions and deep ...
This paper presents a comparative analysis of four cases of populism found in Venezuela and the United States: Betancourt’s Acción Democrática (1945-48), McCarthyism, the Chávez administration, and the Tea Party. Populism is here defined as a discourse containing a symbolic structure that demonizes the ‘enemy’ as the disruption of the legacy traced to a glorified ‘founding moment.’ This sense of nationalism represented in the relationship between the ‘founding moment’ and the demonization of the ‘enemy’ is reinforced through the attempt to define the enemy within a spectrum of linked internal and external threats to the nation. The symbolic discursive structure, which is found in all four cases, reveals further similarities between the anti-leftist content of McCarthyite and Tea Party discourse and the Bolivarian/social reformist content of AD and Chavista discourse. The key difference, however, between the cases of populism in the immediate postwar period (AD and McCarthyism) and present cases (Chávez and the Tea Party) is the relative success of the latter concerning their ability to institutionalize populist discourse within stable systems of democratic politics. This paper attempts to account for the emergence of these new forms of institutionalized populism in historical perspective by revealing how the relationship between the Manichean structure of discourse and corresponding reductive economic platforms provides for clear-cut methods of implementing policy initiatives within democratic politics.
In December 2001, Hugo Chávez and others changed Venezuela's Bolivarian revolutionary project, which consisted of replacing a corrupt and elitist constitution with a fair and popular one, into a radical one. In its early stages the project corresponded to what Gramsci called a "passive revolution." Attempts by opposition forces to crush the construction of a new populist hegemony (a coup in April 2002 and an indefinite strike in December 2002) were met with popular mobilization that reaffirmed Chávez's hegemonic project. The radical revolution consisted of social programs designed to alleviate the suffering of the poor and consolidated a new hegemonic structure among Venezuela's lower classes. The concept of "radical revolution" provides a theoretical alternative for assessing the extent to which a political project can be described as populist.
Latin American Perspectives, 2014
, Hugo Chávez and others changed Venezuela's Bolivarian revolutionary project, which consisted of replacing a corrupt and elitist constitution with a fair and popular one, into a radical one. In its early stages the project corresponded to what Gramsci called a "passive revolution." Attempts by opposition forces to crush the construction of a new populist hegemony (a coup in April 2002 and an indefinite strike in December 2002) were met with popular mobilization that reaffirmed Chávez's hegemonic project. The radical revolution consisted of social programs designed to alleviate the suffering of the poor and consolidated a new hegemonic structure among Venezuela's lower classes. The concept of "radical revolution" provides a theoretical alternative for assessing the extent to which a political project can be described as populist. En diciembre de 2001, Hugo Chávez y otros cambiaron el proyecto revolucionario bolivariano de Venezuela, que consistía en reemplazar una constitución corrupta y elitista por una justa y popular, por uno radical. En sus primeras etapas, el proyecto correspondió a lo que Gramsci definiera como una "revolución pasiva." Intentos por fuerzas de la oposición para frenar la construcción de una nueva hegemonía populista (un golpe de estado en abril de 2002 y una huelga indefinida en diciembre de 2002) se encontraron con una movilización popular que reafirmó el proyecto hegemónico de Chávez. La revolución radical consistió en programas sociales concebidos para aliviar el sufrimiento de los pobres y consolidó una nueva estructura hegemónica entre las clases inferiores de Venezuela. El concepto de "revolución radical" proporciona una alternativa teórica para evaluar la medida en que un proyecto político puede ser descrito como populista.
Science & Society, 2005
Ernesto Laclau's On Populist Reason, now over a decade old, is one of our genera-tion's most nuanced contributions to debates on political community and social change in the era of mass democracy. Against critiques of populism as illiberal demagoguery, Laclau's conceptualization emphasizes the discursive nature of power and politics and considers populist sequences as radical democratic openings in an era of consolidated global neoliberal capitalism. This article considers the shifting terrain of democracy – from liberal, to populist, and finally to protagonistic forms – in the context of Vene-zuela's Bolivarian Revolution. I argue that despite Laclau's important contributions, the formulations of power that underlie his populist reason are symptomatic rather than critical of contemporary liberal politics. The article offers an analysis of Bolivarian Venezuela that emphasizes popular experimentation with protagonism as an expression of democracy based in grassroots collective autonomy and direct democracy over the representation and managed development of the modern state.
Language of the thesis (under review): Spanish. Download abstract in English.
The regimes of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa undermine contestation while simultaneously increasing the material inclusion of the poor and the excluded. These regimes that are usually lumped together show distinct patterns in fostering participation. Whereas in Ecuador participation is reduced to voting in elections, participatory institutions were created in Venezuela and Bolivia. And whereas mobilization in Bolivia comes mostly from the bottom up, in Venezuela and Ecuador it comes from the top-down. To compare their divergent patterns this paper analyses: 1) the strength of subaltern organizations when these leaders were elected; 2) the confrontation between governments and the oppositions; and 3) the views of democratization of the coalitions that brought these regimes to power. Resumen: En nombre del pueblo: democratización, organizaciones populares y populismo en Venezuela, Bolivia y Ecuador Los regímenes de Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales y Rafael Correa atentan en contra del plura-lismo a la vez que incluyen materialmente a los pobres y a los excluidos. Estos regímenes que por lo general son aglutinados en un mismo saco tienen diferentes patrones para promo-ver la participación política. Es así que mientras que en Ecuador la participación se reduce a votar en elecciones, en Venezuela y Bolivia se crearon instituciones participativas. Mientras que en Bolivia la participación viene en gran medida desde las bases, en Ecuador y Vene-zuela viene desde arriba hacia abajo. Para comparar los diferentes patrones este trabajo estu-dia: 1) la fuerza de organizaciones de los subalternos cuando estos líderes fueron electos; 2) la confrontación entre el gobierno y las oposiciones; 3) las visiones sobre democratización de las coaliciones que llevaron al poder a estos líderes. Palabras clave: populismo, mo-vimientos sociales, autoritarismo, democratización.
This article analyses the articulation of populism and nationalism in Peronism and Chavism. Despite their inclusionary policies, their redistribution of wealth and the expansion of social and political rights, Perón and Chávez built authoritarian governments. These national populist leaders concentrated power in the executive, used laws instrumentally to repress dissent and made use of the state apparatus to colonise the public sphere and civil society. Their autocratic drift is explained by a combination of four factors. First, the logic of populism transformed democratic rivals into enemies. Second, these leaders constructed the people as one, and once in power enacted policies to transform diverse and pluralistic populations into homogeneous peoples embodied in their leaderships. Third, even though these former military officers promoted national sovereignty, they acted as the only interpreters of national interests, excluding rivals from the national community. Fourth, Perón and Chávez closed institutional spaces to process dissent and conflict, exacerbating the autocratic impulses of their opponents who used any means necessary, including military coups, to try to get rid of populist presidents. of populism transformed democratic rivals into enemies. Second, these leaders constructed the people as one, and once in power enacted policies to transform diverse and pluralistic populations into homogeneous peoples embodied in their leaderships. Third, even though these former military officers promoted national sovereignty, they acted as the only interpreters of national interests, excluding rivals from the national community. Fourth, Perón and Chávez closed institutional spaces to process dissent and conflict, exacerbating the autocratic impulses of their opponents who used any means necessary, including military coups, to try to get rid of populist presidents.
This text is intended to expose the reason why populism is used differently in the Venezuelan case compared to the Colombian case with regard to political elites, besides I will also be raising the possible reasons why it had a positive impact the Uribism and a negative impact on the Chavism from the period 2002 to 2003. Therefore, I will rely on the arguments of two great authors, Ernesto Laclau and Cristina De La Torre, which will contribute to the probable causes that led to this difference
Ve n e z u e l an Politics and Society in times of chavismo P o l í t i c a y Sociedad en la Venezuela del c havismo the Stockholm Review o f l a t i n am e r i c a n S t u d i e s i s p a r t o f t h e l a t i n am e r i c a n Futures research environ m e n t a n d w a s f o u n d e d w i t h t h e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t o f the Sida/ asdi depar tme n t f o r R e s e a r c h c o o p e r a t i o n (SaR Ec). Published by the Institut e o f l a t i n a m e r i c a n S t u d i e s , S t o c k h o l m un i v e r s i t y, S w e d e n www.lai.su.se © the authors a ll rights reser ved Editorial group: laura Á l v a r e z ló p e z , o s c a r J a n s s o n , S t a f f a n l ö f v i n g a n d thaïs machado-Borges layout and typesetting: B ad o l f s s o n de s i g n / a n n a l an d r é n cover photos for this iss u e : R i c k a r d o. l a l a n d e r ISSn 1654-0204 S t o c k h olm REVIEW oF latIn a mERIcan Stud IES I s s u e n o 1. n ovember 2006 Ve n e z u e l an Politics and Society in times of chavismo P o l í t i c a y Sociedad en la Venezuela del c havismo Contents 1 Introduction
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies | Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe
The regimes of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa undermine contestation while simultaneously increasing the material inclusion of the poor and the excluded. These regimes that are usually lumped together show distinct patterns in fostering participation. Whereas in Ecuador participation is reduced to voting in elections, participatory institutions were created in Venezuela and Bolivia. And whereas mobilization in Bolivia comes mostly from the bottom up, in Venezuela and Ecuador it comes from the top-down. To compare their divergent patterns this paper analyses: 1) the strength of subaltern organizations when these leaders were elected; 2) the confrontation between governments and the oppositions; and 3) the views of democratization of the coalitions that brought these regimes to power.
Democratic Governance and the New Left, 2009
In March 2008, the Latin American Program's project on "Democratic Governance and the 'New Left' in Latin America" convened the seminar "Understanding Populism and Political Participation." The purpose was to examine new forms of political participation and state-civil society interaction in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. In recent years, public opinion polls throughout Latin America have identified a great deal of popular dissatisfaction with the institutions of democratic governance and with existing channels of political representation. The conference sought to understand the extent to which the governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela had responded to these 'deficits' with new or innovative programs and what the resulting consequence for liberal democracy has been. This bulletin contains the observations of two distinguished analysts of Venezuelan politics: David Smilde of the University of Georgia and Luis Vicente León of the Caracas polling firm Datanálisis. The Wilson Center seminar took place several months following the defeat in Venezuela of a referendum to amend the constitution, a vote seen as a distinct setback for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Both authors revised their statements in late 2008, and Smilde updated his following the February 2009 approval of a constitutional reform in Venezuela that will allow Chávez to run for a third six-year term in 2012. David Smilde asserted that the policy of Chávez's government towards participation in
Latin American Research Review, 1997
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2000
Latin American Perspectives, 2005
Since the mid-1980s, Venezuela has been perceived both at home and abroad as a society in constant mobilization. Following the Amparo massacre in 1988 and the so-called Caracazo in 1989, the number of protests registered has generally been high, although naturally some years have been more turbulent than others. By way of contrast, in the early 1980s Venezuela was generally considered one of the countries in Latin America least prone to popular mobilizations. It was argued that its firm democratic institutions and substantial oil revenue had facilitated the consolidation of efficient mechanisms for mediation and representation, thus avoiding internecine social conflict. The Venezuelans were "different" from the rest of Latin America precisely because they had apparently succeeded in overcoming the sociopolitical turbulence endemic to the region. In academic circles this attitude was reflected in the literature that postulated the "exceptionalism" of Venezuela within the Latin American context. The sharp contrast between these two perceptions obliges us to reexamine the question of "street politics" in Venezuela since 1958. This article analyzes popular protest before and after the 1980s to demonstrate that, despite changes, the protests of the past were not substantially different from the more recent ones either in their frequency or in their motives and other aspects. Using the empirical information available in the Base de Datos El Bravo Pueblo (BDEBP) and in the annual reports of the Programa Venezolano de Educaci6n y Acci6n en Derechos Humanos (Venezuelan Program for Education and Action on Human Rights-Provea), we conclude that the characteristics of popular protest in recent decades are less of a Margarita L6pez Maya, a historian, is a professor at the Facultad de Ciencias Econ6micas y Sociales of the Universidad Central de Venezuela. She is editor of the Revista Venezolana de Economia y Ciencias Sociales and the coauthor (with Med6filo Medina) of Venezuela: Confrontacidn social y polarizacidn politica (2003). Luis Lander is a professor of economic and social sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela and the editor of Poderypetrdleo en Venezuela (2003). Dick Parker teaches Latin American studies at the Universidad Central de Venezuela.
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