The Semantic Error Problem for Epistemic Contextualism

Metaphilosophy, 2020

The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view-referred to here as the default view-has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.

Studia Philosophica Estonica 6:1 https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2013.6.1.02

My paper aims to account for the possibility of disagreements concerning what we know; for clearly, people disagree about what they know. More precisely, my goal is to explain how a contextualist theory of knowledge attributions can explain the existence of disagreement among speakers. My working hypothesis is that genuine epistemic disagreement is possible only under the assumption that the meaning of the word “knowledge” is governed by contexts that are objective, in the sense that the content of the word “knowledge” is fixed for all speakers sharing a common conversational goal. The paper is divided into two sections. In the first section, I explain why current versions of epistemic contextualism cannot account for epistemic disagreement. In the second section, following Christopher Gauker’s theory of linguistic communication, I offer my own contextualist solution to the problem of epistemic disagreement.

Any contextualist approach to knowledge has to provide a plausible definition of the concept of context and spell out the mechanisms of context changes. Since it is the dynamics of context change that carry the main weight of the contextualist position, not every mechanism will be capable of filling that role. In particular, I argue that one class of mechanisms that is most popularly held to account for context changes, namely those that arise out of shifts of conversational parameters in discourses involving knowledge claims, are not suited to the job because they cannot account for the genuinely epistemic nature of the context shift. A form of epistemic contextualism that defines the context through the structure of our epistemic projects is suggested. Context changes in this account are linked to changes in the background assumptions operative in our epistemic projects and the methods used to carry out our inquiries.

Modeling and Using Context, 2005

Philosophical Quarterly, 2005

Epistemological contextualism has become one of the most important and widely discussed new proposals in the theory of knowledge. This special issue contributes to the debate by bringing together some of the main participants to provide a state-of-the-art discussion of the proposal. Here we offer a brief overview of the contextualist position, describe some of the main lines of criticism that have been levelled against the view, and present a summary of each of the contributions to this collection.

The recent popularity of contextualist treatments of the key epistemic concepts has tended to obscure the differences that exist between the various kinds of contextualist theses on offer. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards rectifying this problem by exploring two of the main formulations of the contextualist position currently on offer in the literature-the 'semantic' contextualist thesis put forward by Keith DeRose and David Lewis, and the 'inferential' contextualist thesis advanced by Michael Williams. It is argued that by evaluating these theses in the light of each other one can gain a deeper understanding of the contextualist position. In particular, it is argued that this relative evaluation highlights one interesting way in which contextualism might be developed. Grazer Philosophische Sudien 64 (2002), xx-yy.

2007

Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being due to the alleged fact that their linguistic views about ‘know’ provide the resources for a resolution of sceptical puzzles. In this paper I will address an objection to EC claiming that, as a linguistic view about the term ‘know’, EC cannot be of any epistemological significance.

Philosophia

Epistemological contextualism is a dissident approach to understanding reason's requirements and human knowledge. In this essay, I review the work of important contextualists, clarify the view and its variants, and carve out a uniquely viable contextualist theory of justification.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017

Not all philosophical theses have the charm of epistemic contextualism, which, on one hand, offers appealing solutions to classical problems such as scepticism and, on the other hand, accounts for an immense range of phenomena comprising ordinary language, practical reasoning, and almost all that can be discussed in a philosophical 'conversation'. Given the scope of the topic and its extensive literature, epistemic contextualism has become remarkably difficult to fully defend. Peter Baumann has performed this task beyond expectation. His recent book systematically argues for epistemic contextualism on linguistic evidence [ch. 1] and theoretical grounds [chs 2, 3], with its problem-solving prospects [ch. 4] and extended significance for ethics [ch. 6]. Along with current objections to contextualism [ch. 7], Baumann also examines the 'knowability problem' that arises out of intercontextual knowledge-ascriptions [ch. 5]. Although many disputes over contextualism were due to the insufficient description of the purported cases, Baumann's selected examples of knowledge-ascription and knowledge-denial seem to be sophisticated enough to resist alternative explanations. Moreover, they illustrate the parameters and the determinants of the attributor's epistemic context. In addition to the stakes of the subject, Baumann has shown that the required levels of evidence, reliability, and credence for knowledge also depend on the ascriber's purpose, intention, and the norms that govern his conversation. Instead of putting 'too much weight on the argument from cases' [32], Baumann proceeds to defend contextualism with more theoretical considerations. The first theoretical argument begins with the reliability requirement of knowledge. Via the contextsensitivity of reliability, it concludes that knowledge is also context-sensitive [ch. 2]. The context-dependency of reliability is motivated by the contextualist solution to the well-known generality problem. For any particular belief, it always seems possible to individuate the belief's cognitive method so that it is reliably acquired. Thus, one should find a principled way of individuating cognitive methods; otherwise, the reliability condition would be trivial. Mark Heller has first suggested a contextualist way out of the trouble [1995]. That is, 'reliable' is context-dependent, and whether a process is reliable is already obvious in each context. Baumann follows this idea by extending the issue to the individuation of topics. In fact, the object of one's belief can also be indeterminate, which could affect the resultant reliability even when the cognitive method is fixed. The method of 'looking around', for instance, is good for 'figuring out whether a red coffee mug is in front of me', but is inadequate for determining 'whether my favorite red coffee mug with the piece missing in the handle is in front of me' [43]. Underneath the generality problem for the method and the topic is the indeterminacy of the reference class. Here, Baumann's favoured example concerns the life expectancy of a bus driver who lives in Glasgow, smokes two packets of cigarettes a day, regularly plays golf, etc. Provided that the groups by those properties do not have the same life expectancy, there is an 'irreducible and genuine indeterminacy' about which group it is to which we should refer [51-4, 145-6].

2014

According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory. In recent works, several authors have challenged the coherence of epistemic contextualism. 1 They hold that assuming the factivity of knowledge and epistemic closure, the contextualist cannot coherently assert, or know, the content of her theory. After presenting the objection in section 1, we will examine three responses we deem unsatisfactory in section 2, and then put forward our own solution in sections 3 and 4. In a nutshell, our solution rejects the idea that the contextualist should be construed as asserting that her theory is true. We also argue that the contextualist framework does not entail that high epistemic standards are in place in a context in which contextualism is presented. Let 'K(S, h)' stand for 'S knows that h,' where S is a contextualist and 'h' denotes the proposition that S has hands. According to contextualism, there are ordinary, low-standards, contexts (hereafter C L ) in which 'K(S, h)' is true. Now, contextualism holds that there is no such thing as knowing that p, simpliciter. On this view, in uttering 'K(S, h)' in C L , S asserts that she knows that h relative to low epistemic standards. 2 In other words, we have (1) K L (S, h), 1 See, among others, Brueckner (2004), Brendel (2005), Wright (2005), and Jäger (2012). 2 This notation is meant to be neutral between two linguistic accounts, one according to which the predicate 'know' is context-sensitive and designates a binary relation (between a person and a proposition) corresponding to different epistemic standards in different contexts, and another that holds that 'know' designates a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition and (context-dependent) epistemic standards.