Planetary protection for human exploration of Mars

Acta Astronautica, 2008

When searching for life beyond Earth, the unique capabilities provided by human astronauts will only be advantageous if the biological contamination associated with human presence is monitored and minimized. Controlling biological contamination during planetary exploration is termed 'planetary protection,' and will be a critical element in the human exploration of other solar system bodies. To ensure the safety and health of the astronauts and the Earth, while preserving science value, planetary protection considerations must be incorporated from the earliest stages of mission planning and development. Issues of concern to planetary protection involve both 'forward contamination,' which is the contamination of other solar system bodies by Earth microbes and organic materials, and 'backward contamination,' which is the contamination of Earth systems by potential alien life. Forward contamination concerns include contamination that might invalidate current or future scientific exploration of a particular solar system body, and that may disrupt the planetary environment or a potential endogenous (alien) ecosystem. Backward contamination concerns include both immediate and long-term effects on the health of the astronaut explorers from possible biologically active materials encountered during exploration, as well as the possible contamination of the Earth. A number of national and international workshops held over the last seven years have generated a consensus regarding planetary protection policies and requirements for human missions to Mars, and a 2007 workshop held by NASA has considered the issues and benefits to planetary protection that might be offered by a return to the Moon. Conclusions from these workshops recognize that some degree of forward contamination associated with human astronaut explorers is inevitable. Nonetheless, the principles and policies of planetary protection, developed by COSPAR in conformance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, can and should be followed when humans are exploring space. Implementation guidelines include documenting and minimizing contamination of the exploration targets, protection at the most stringent levels for any target locations in which Earth life might grow, protection of humans from exposure to untested planetary materials, and preventing harmful contamination of the Earth as the highest priority for all missions. These considerations should be incorporated in planning for future human exploration missions.

Advances in Space Research, 2008

In accordance with the United Nations Outer Space Treaties [United Nations, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UN doc A/RES/34/68, resolution 38/68 of December 1979], currently maintained and promulgated by the Committee on Space Research [COSPAR Planetary Protection Panel, Planetary Protection Policy accepted by the COSPAR Council and Bureau, 20 October 2002, amended 24 March 2005, http://www.cosparhq.org/scistr/PPPolicy.htm], missions exploring the Solar system must meet planetary protection requirements. Planetary protection aims to protect celestial bodies from terrestrial contamination and to protect the Earth environment from potential biological contamination carried by returned samples or space systems that have been in contact with an extraterrestrial environment. From an exobiology perspective, Mars is one of the major targets, and several missions are currently in operation, in transit, or scheduled for its exploration. Some of them include payloads dedicated to the detection of life or traces of life. The next step, over the coming years, will be to return samples from Mars to Earth, with a view to increasing our knowledge in preparation for the first manned mission that is likely to take place within the next few decades. Robotic missions to Mars shall meet planetary protection specifications, currently well documented, and planetary protection programs are implemented in a very reliable manner given that experience in the field spans some 40 years. With regards to sample return missions, a set of stringent requirements has been approved by COSPAR [COSPAR Planetary Protection Panel, Planetary Protection Policy accepted by the COSPAR Council and Bureau, 20 October 2002, amended 24 March 2005, http://www.cosparhq.org/scistr/PPPolicy.htm], and technical challenges must now be overcome in order to preserve the Earth’s biosphere from any eventual contamination risk. In addition to the human dimension of the mission, sending astronauts to Mars will entail meeting all these constraints. Astronauts present huge sources of contamination for Mars and are also potential carriers of biohazardous material on their return to Earth. If they were to have the misfortune of being contaminated, they themselves would become a biohazard, and, as a consequence, in addition to the technical constraints, human and ethical considerations must also be taken into account.

SAE Technical Paper Series, 2003

A recent NASA workshop examined systems and concepts that might enable the future safe and productive human exploration of Mars. The workshop emphasized planetary protection (PP)issues-protecting Mars from forward contamination during exploration, protecting astronaut health during the mission, and protecting Earth from back contamination upon return. A range of critical design and operational considerations were identified including mitigation procedures and equipment; human health and life support needs; mission tasks and schedules; equipment and operations for laboratory, habitat, life support,exploration, sampling and sample integrity needs, and sample; and back contamination controls and procedures for the return to Earth. The workshop report includes findings and recommendations that are likely to affect the design and cost of advanced life support systems for long duration human missions to Mars.

2015

This report on Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions summarizes the presentations, deliberations and findings of a workshop at NASA Ames Research Center, March 24-26, 2015, which was attended by more than 100 participants representing a diverse mix of science, engineering, technology, and policy areas. The main objective of the three-day workshop was to identify specific knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to make incremental progress towards the development of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) for Planetary Protection during human missions to Mars. Knowledge Gap 1.1: What are the technologies and procedures that should be used for microbial sampling and collection? Knowledge Gap 1.2: What are the appropriate technologies for microbial monitoring to mitigate risk to crew, ensure planetary protection, and preserve scientific integrity? Knowledge Gap 1.3: What technologies and procedures should be used for sample processing and analysis to reduce crew time and mitigate contamination concerns? Knowledge Gap 1.4: What technologies and procedures should be used for data collection, storage, and interpretation during missions? Workshop Report: Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions DAA_TN36403 v Knowledge Gap 1.5: What is needed to understand spaceflight-specific microbial responses and heritable changes during extended spaceflight and relocation to a different planetary body? Knowledge Gap 1.6: What is needed to monitor astronaut, vehicle, and external environmental microbial populations effectively? Knowledge Gap 1.7: What novel approaches can be developed for: (a) Effective, low toxicity disinfectants, and (b) Prevention/recovery from biofilms/microbial-induced corrosion, fouling, etc. Knowledge Gap 1.8: What studies are needed to understand crew health and biomedicine related to microbial and contamination exposures? Knowledge Gap 1.9: What information is needed to develop acceptable and appropriate ethical and operational guidelines for human missions to Mars? Six of the nine identified knowledge gaps in Study Group 1 focused on questions typically associated with microbial research per se-such as understanding the microbes themselves and the diverse populations to be monitored; as well as how to monitor, collect and process data about them during the missions (Gaps 1.1 through 1.6). Another gap focused on developing novel approaches for lowtoxicity microbial disinfectants and addressing problems associated with microbial biofilms, such as induced corrosion and fouling of equipment. (Gap 1.7 a and b). The two final gaps relate to biomedical considerations associated with microbes. There is a need to develop diagnostic treatment options for crew microbial and health exposures, and to develop operational guidelines for how to integrate data with ethical and operational considerations during Mars missions. (Gaps 1.8, 1.9) Study Group 2: Technology & Operations for Contamination Control Study Group 2 focused on technologies needed for cleaning, sterilization and prevention of recontamination; mitigation of spacecraft and system effluents; contamination control associated with surface mobility systems and spacesuits; contamination avoidance in Special Regions 2 and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) areas; operational strategies to mitigate contamination; and sample containment technologies. They identified the following eight knowledge gaps: Knowledge Gap 2.1: Does the Duration of human surface stay (30 v. 500 days) matter? Does it change objectives of planetary protection during mission? What is the relationship between duration of human exploration time and the overall density and spread of contamination? Knowledge Gap 2.2: What level of non-viable bioburden escape is acceptable? I non-viability can be demonstrated, does this significantly address human microbial bioburden concerns? Does it address concerns about external dissemination of microbial contamination? How should differences of opinion between the science and planetary protection communities be addressed regarding acceptable levels? Workshop Report: Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions DAA_TN36403 vi Knowledge Gap 2.3: Is there a need for decontamination and verification procedures & protocols after releases (nominal or otherwise). Are decontamination procedures needed for both inside/outside the spacecraft as well? Knowledge Gap 2.4: What considerations should go into the design of quarantine facilities and methods (for uses on the way to-, on Mars , or returning from Mars)? Knowledge Gap 2.5: How can contamination concerns during human missions be addressed, given that the parameters defining Mars Special Regions vary in space and time (e.g. over diurnal and seasonal cycles) ? Knowledge Gap 2.6: What research is needed to address gaps in assorted questions about ISRU, habitation, and testing? What related research is needed in advance of planning and design of technologies, systems, and operations? Knowledge Gap 2.7: What is "acceptable containment" (type; location; duration) of wastes intentionally left behind? Similarly, what are acceptable constraints and procedures on vented materials? Knowledge Gap 2.8: What microbial contaminants would vent from an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit, and at what concentrations? What are the implications for suit materials and cleaning tools, designated for Mars? Knowledge gaps in Study Group 2 focused mainly on technology and operations for mitigating and controlling contamination-both microbial and organic. Six of eight identified knowledge gaps applied to mission-related questions, including the implications of mission duration; the escape of viable microbes; understanding what vents from different hardware; containment needs for both planetary protection and science considerations; and developing procedures for decontamination and verification (Gaps 2.1 through 2.6). The other two gaps centered on questions about operations and microbial vulnerability-specifically on acceptable containment of wastes and constraints on vented materials near infrastructural elements (Gap 2.7); and on similar considerations related to EVA systems (2.8). Study Group 3: Natural Transport of Contamination on Mars Study Group 3 discussed transport mechanisms on the Mars surface; potential natural sterilization by Martian conditions; and environmental cleanup of inadvertent releases of terrestrial materials. The group identified the following eight knowledge gaps: Knowledge Gap 3.1: How do interactions of biocidal factors affect microbial survival, growth, and evolution in Mars-type environments? And what is the potential for survivability and replication of very hardy microbes-in dust environments, across Mars, and in biofilms? Knowledge Gap 3.2: What data or models are needed to determine what happens to windblown dust on the Martian surface, and where it might go? What research is needed to understand meteorological conditions spanning several Martian years at particular site(s) Knowledge Gap 3.3: What is the probability of transporting hardy terrestrial microbes to Mars via different pathways on a human mission?

2015

This report on Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions summarizes the presentations, deliberations and findings of a workshop at NASA Ames Research Center, March 24-26, 2015, which was attended by more than 100 participants representing a diverse mix of science, engineering, technology, and policy areas. The main objective of the three-day workshop was to identify specific knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to make incremental progress towards the development of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) for Planetary Protection during human missions to Mars. Knowledge Gap 1.1: What are the technologies and procedures that should be used for microbial sampling and collection? Knowledge Gap 1.2: What are the appropriate technologies for microbial monitoring to mitigate risk to crew, ensure planetary protection, and preserve scientific integrity? Knowledge Gap 1.3: What technologies and procedures should be used for sample processing and analysis to reduce crew time and mitigate contamination concerns? Knowledge Gap 1.4: What technologies and procedures should be used for data collection, storage, and interpretation during missions? Workshop Report: Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions DAA_TN36403 v Knowledge Gap 1.5: What is needed to understand spaceflight-specific microbial responses and heritable changes during extended spaceflight and relocation to a different planetary body? Knowledge Gap 1.6: What is needed to monitor astronaut, vehicle, and external environmental microbial populations effectively? Knowledge Gap 1.7: What novel approaches can be developed for: (a) Effective, low toxicity disinfectants, and (b) Prevention/recovery from biofilms/microbial-induced corrosion, fouling, etc. Knowledge Gap 1.8: What studies are needed to understand crew health and biomedicine related to microbial and contamination exposures? Knowledge Gap 1.9: What information is needed to develop acceptable and appropriate ethical and operational guidelines for human missions to Mars? Six of the nine identified knowledge gaps in Study Group 1 focused on questions typically associated with microbial research per se-such as understanding the microbes themselves and the diverse populations to be monitored; as well as how to monitor, collect and process data about them during the missions (Gaps 1.1 through 1.6). Another gap focused on developing novel approaches for lowtoxicity microbial disinfectants and addressing problems associated with microbial biofilms, such as induced corrosion and fouling of equipment. (Gap 1.7 a and b). The two final gaps relate to biomedical considerations associated with microbes. There is a need to develop diagnostic treatment options for crew microbial and health exposures, and to develop operational guidelines for how to integrate data with ethical and operational considerations during Mars missions. (Gaps 1.8, 1.9) Study Group 2: Technology & Operations for Contamination Control Study Group 2 focused on technologies needed for cleaning, sterilization and prevention of recontamination; mitigation of spacecraft and system effluents; contamination control associated with surface mobility systems and spacesuits; contamination avoidance in Special Regions 2 and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) areas; operational strategies to mitigate contamination; and sample containment technologies. They identified the following eight knowledge gaps: Workshop Report: Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions DAA_TN36403 vi Knowledge Gap 2.3: Is there a need for decontamination and verification procedures & protocols after releases (nominal or otherwise). Are decontamination procedures needed for both inside/outside the spacecraft as well? Knowledge Gap 2.4: What considerations should go into the design of quarantine facilities and methods (for uses on the way to-, on Mars , or returning from Mars)? Knowledge Gap 2.5: How can contamination concerns during human missions be addressed, given that the parameters defining Mars Special Regions vary in space and time (e.g. over diurnal and seasonal cycles) ? Knowledge Gap 2.6: What research is needed to address gaps in assorted questions about ISRU, habitation, and testing? What related research is needed in advance of planning and design of technologies, systems, and operations? Knowledge Gap 2.7: What is "acceptable containment" (type; location; duration) of wastes intentionally left behind? Similarly, what are acceptable constraints and procedures on vented materials? Knowledge Gap 2.8: What microbial contaminants would vent from an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit, and at what concentrations? What are the implications for suit materials and cleaning tools, designated for Mars? Knowledge gaps in Study Group 2 focused mainly on technology and operations for mitigating and controlling contamination-both microbial and organic. Six of eight identified knowledge gaps applied to mission-related questions, including the implications of mission duration; the escape of viable microbes; understanding what vents from different hardware; containment needs for both planetary protection and science considerations; and developing procedures for decontamination and verification (Gaps 2.1 through 2.6). The other two gaps centered on questions about operations and microbial vulnerability-specifically on acceptable containment of wastes and constraints on vented materials near infrastructural elements (Gap 2.7); and on similar considerations related to EVA systems (2.8). Study Group 3: Natural Transport of Contamination on Mars Study Group 3 discussed transport mechanisms on the Mars surface; potential natural sterilization by Martian conditions; and environmental cleanup of inadvertent releases of terrestrial materials. The group identified the following eight knowledge gaps: Knowledge Gap 3.1: How do interactions of biocidal factors affect microbial survival, growth, and evolution in Mars-type environments? And what is the potential for survivability and replication of very hardy microbes-in dust environments, across Mars, and in biofilms? Knowledge Gap 3.2: What data or models are needed to determine what happens to windblown dust on the Martian surface, and where it might go? What research is needed to understand meteorological conditions spanning several Martian years at particular site(s) Knowledge Gap 3.3: What is the probability of transporting hardy terrestrial microbes to Mars via different pathways on a human mission? Workshop Report: Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions DAA_TN36403 ix 14 Dr. Jitendra Joshi, NASA HQ, a member of the Science Organizing Committee for the Workshop, was also a designated Lead for Study Group 2. However, he was unable to attend the workshop.

Bulletin of the AAS, 2021

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2001

These are intriguing times in the exploration of other solar-system bodies. Continuing discoveries about life on Earth and the return of data suggesting the presence of liquid water environments on or under the surfaces of other planets and moons have combined to suggest the significant possibility that extraterrestrial life may exist in this solar system. Similarly, not since the Viking missions of the mid-1970s has there been as great an appreciation for the potential for Earth life to contaminate other worlds. Current plans for the exploration of the solar system include constraints intended to prevent biological contamination from being spread by solar-system exploration missions.

41st International Conference on Environmental Systems, 2011

Designers of new systems and technologies for human missions to Mars must consider how to support astronauts and scientific exploration in safe, effective and productive ways throughout the mission, while also protecting Mars from forward contamination during operations and exploration, protecting astronaut health and safety during the mission, and safeguarding Earth from back contamination upon return. Accordingly, a range of critical design and operational considerations related to planetary protection will touch on aspects of future missions including mitigation procedures and equipment; human health and life support needs; mission tasks and schedules; equipment for exploration, collection and laboratory handling of sample materials; and methods and systems to avoid back contamination upon return to Earth. Because of the complexity of future human-robotic missions to the moon and Mars, these planetary protection challenges must be integrated from the earliest planning and design stages.

2004

Current evidence indicates that Mars may harbor biologically viable microclimates. Until proven naturally sterile, such zones will be afforded the fullest protection of NASA’s planetary protection policy. Methodical investigation to disprove extant biological activity requires human field science. Traditional human exploration system and operational concepts are “biologically leaky” and cannot guarantee protection, yet fully prophylactic approaches would burden exploration infrastructure for a long time, perhaps unnecessarily. Knowing a reasonable solution could become a precondition for specific mission planning and substantial investment in infrastructure development. A potential solution consists of (1) a framework that undertakes to conclude in stepwise fashion that Mars is sterile, (2) mapping and progressive management of the boundaries of increasingly smaller zones requiring protection, and (3) a protocol that uses robots and humans together to perform this sequential investi...

Journal of Geophysical Research, 1998

As the prospect grows for a Mars sample return mission early in the next millennium, it will be important to ensure that appropriate planetary protection (PP) controls are incorporated into the mission design and implementation from the start. The need for these pp controls is firmly based on scientific considerations and backed by a number of national and international agreements and guidelines aimed at preventing harmful cross contamination of planets and extraterrestrial bodies. The historical precedent for the use of pp measures on both unmanned and manned missions traces from post-Sputnik missions to the present, with riodic modifications as new information was obtained. In consideration of the anticipated attention to pp questions by both the scientific/technical community and the public, this paper presents a comprehensive review of the major issues and problems surrounding pp for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, including an analysis of arguments that have been raised for and against the imposition of pp measures. Also discussed are the history and foundations for pp policies and requirements; important research areas needing attention prior to defining detailed pp requirements for a MSR mission; and legal and public awareness issues that must be considered with mission planning.