Guest Editorial Game Theory in Wireless Communications

2004

I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Chaouki Abdallah, for his support, continuous guidance and inspiration and for introducing me to the field of this in-teresting research. I would also like to thank the dissertation committee: Professor Majid Hayat, Professor Christos ...

Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Performance monitoring and measurement of heterogeneous wireless and wired networks, 2013

In this paper, we revisit the power control problem in wireless networks by introducing a signaling game approach. This game is known in the literature as "Cheap Talk". Under the considered scenario, we consider two players named player I and player II. We assume that player I only knows his channel state without any information about the channel state of player II and vice-versa. Player I moves first and sends a signal to player II which can be accurate or distorted. Player II picks up his power control strategy based on this information and his belief about the nature of the informed player's information. In order to analyze such a model, the proposed scheme game is transformed into 4 × 4 matrix game. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria and show by numerical results the equilibria and the performance of the proposed signaling game.

In cognitive radio network (CRN), the utilities results in Nash equilibrium of power control game without using pricing are inefficient. In this paper, a distributed power control algorithm is proposed to improve the utilities of both primary user (PU) and secondary users (SUs) in the CRN based on game theoretic framework. A distributed power control is a non-cooperative power control game, and the quality of service (QoS) received by PU and SUs terminals are referred to as the utility function. PU and SUs act as decision makers in the game and they maximize their utilities in a distributed fashion. We introduce a new pricing function for SUs as a function of transmit power and square amount of interference in order to guide SUs to an efficient Nash equilibrium point. Analysis of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed power control game with pricing is presented. Simulation results show that the proposed power control algorithm via a new pricing function maximizes the number of SUs access the unused spectrum, and improves the utilities of PU and SUs.

Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications, 2017

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61st IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, Vol. 1, Stockholm, Sweden, pp. 314 - 318, 30 May-1 June 2005, 2005

In this paper we present an analysis of power control algorithms established over the past decade for cellular telephone systems, in conjunction with utility functions introduced recently to specify quality of service in wireless systems providing data services. These algorithms are compared with power control algorithms based on game theory established relatively recently. The analysis shows that the Nash equilibrium points to which the game theory based algorithms for power control converge are not efficient, and that better solutions are possible.

2003 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking, 2003. WCNC 2003., 2003

In this paper we use statistical learning theory to evaluate the performance of game theoretic power control algorithms for wireless data in arbitrary channels, i.e., no presumed channel model is required. To show the validity of statistical learning theory in this context, we studied a flat fading channel, and more specifically, we simulated the case of Rayleigh flat fading channel. With the help of a relatively small number of training samples, the results suggest the learnability of the utility function classes defined by changing the users power (adjusted parameter) for each user's utility function.

Wireless Personal Communications, 2021

In communication industry one of the most rapidly growing area is wireless technology and its applications. The efficient access to radio spectrum is a requirement to make this communication feasible for the users that are running multimedia applications and establishing real-time connections on an already overcrowded spectrum. In recent times cognitive radios (CR) are becoming the prime candidates for improved utilization of available spectrum. The unlicensed secondary users share the spectrum with primary licensed user in such manners that the interference at the primary user does not increase from a predefined threshold. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to address the power control problem for CR networks. The proposed solution models the wireless system with a non-cooperative game, in which each player maximize its utility in a competitive environment. The simulation results shows that the proposed algorithm improves the performance of the network in terms of high SINR and...

In cognitive radio networks, if the license spectrum that is allocated to the primary users (PUs) is not utilized, the unutilized spectrum can be used by the secondary users (SUs). This unutilized spectrum is called spectrum hole. However, when the SUs access the spectrum hole, they become source of interference to the others primary and secondary users. Interference temperature is the model, which used to manage the amount of interference that the PU can tolerate. Therefore, efficient power control is crucial to control the interference in the cognitive radio system and promote system quality. Previous works on power control are mainly focus on the SUs SIR maximization as the QoS requirements, ignoring the Primary User (PU). In this paper, PU is considered that has a general utility function, and a linear pricing function is used for SUs utility function. Pricing is an effective tool used to reduce the potential harmful effect of the system and guarantee the PU QoS. We formulated the power control game as a non-cooperative game, in which the first player is the PU. The number of SUs in the system is limited by the status of PU and its ability to achieve its QoS rather than used the interference temperature limits. The numerical results show that the proposed power control algorithm with pricing reduce the power consumed by PU and SUs terminals, and improved the utility functions of PU and SUs.

1995

We study the transmission power control in wireless networks where the cochannel interfering users are random. Examples of such systems are Frequency Hopping and Direct-Sequence CDMA cellular networks, Packet Radio Networks, and Voice connections with Silent Detection. We derive a simple algorithm to control the power, which converges to a unique set of powers, under synchronous or asynchronous power updates. When all the connections can be supported, these powers meet the SIR requirement of all connections, with a minimum power level. It is shown how to precisely implement the algorithm in a xed stationary packet radio network, and how to implement it distributively, in a frequency hopping cellular network. Two distributed implementations are presented, which are based on local measurements taken by each receiver during a time window where powers are kept constant. Each transmitter adjusts its power level at the end of every window, based on percentile, or mean interference estimators. The distributed implementations are e cient in the sense that they derive the desired theoretical powers, if the number of measurements in each window approaches in nity.

IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 2006

This paper presents a new pricing function for noncooperative power control game in a single cell CDMA data network. Considering a utility function for each terminal, the purpose of power control in wireless data networks is to maximize network utility. In the proposed game, the pricing function is a linear function of the terminal's Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR). We first prove that the new game is a supermodular game and then we show the strategy space of the new game is such that it is possible to reach better equilibrium point compared to pricing function based on terminal's power. Simulation results show that the game with the proposed pricing function can improve the utility and power consumption of the terminals at equilibrium.