Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future

The May 12, 2003, suicide bombings of three Western housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia reopened questions about the strength and viability of Al Qaeda in the post-Iraq conflict environment. The apprehension of a number of senior Al Qaeda leaders in recent months, combined with the absence of major terrorist attacks during the military campaign in Iraq, had led some to believe that Al Qaeda was severely crippled and unable to launch major attacks. Others argued that the organization was in transition to a more decentralized structure, had gained new recruits, and might even be a growing threat. This report analyzes current viewpoints about the state of Al Qaeda and the threat it poses to the United States. It will be updated as events warrant.

Jurnal Studi Sosial dan Politik

After the death of Osama Bin Laden and the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda movement changed from being aggressive to being passive. The aggressiveness of the Al-Qaeda movement, for instance, was seen during the spectacular terror of 9/11, which was then followed by various actions carried out by followers in various parts of the world. However, Bin Laden's death and the rise of the ISIS group made Al-Qaeda look passive. This paper seeks to see the history of the Al-Qaeda movement to the dynamics that influence the movement’s choices. The author found that changing Al-Qaeda's orientation from aggressive to passive did not deny the existence of a consolidated movement that deliberately distanced itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States.

An assessment of how Al Qaeda became a worldwide movement and the huge role that suicide terrorism played in its campaign

2015

This report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. Overview ISIL is a real threat and must be targeted, but al-Qaeda shouldn’t be forgotten. Indeed, al-Qaeda should remain a key focus for international counterterrorism efforts. It’s a resilient and resolute terrorist organisation, but it’s also weaker than it’s been for many years. We should use this brief opportunity to dismantle the organisation completely. The report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. How will al-Qaeda seek to regain the oxygen of publicity that’s central to terrorist organisations if they’re to recruit, grow and, ultimately, challenge their enemies? Does the rise of ISIL signal the end of al-Qaeda or might al-Qaeda merge with ISIL, confront it head on or take some other course of action? The authors explore four alternative futures for al-Qaeda and ISIL and conclude that a worrying scenario of ‘one-upmanship’ is likely to take place between ...

ARI 37/2013 , 2013

Al-Qaeda has withstood arguably the greatest international onslaught directed against a terrorist organisation in history, but it has survived for nearly a quarter of a century and continues to pursue a core strategy. The ongoing unrest in the Middle East could potentially resuscitate al-Qaeda’s waning fortunes and it may assume unpredicted forms. Its final elimination may take years, if not decades, more to achieve.

Al-Qaeda is widely regarded by the military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence communities as being the foremost threat to U.S. national security and safety. The nature of this threat, however, has changed since al-Qaeda first emerged in the late 1980s. This article describes the emergence of a new form of transnational terrorism and details al-Qaeda's progression from being an organization to an ideological movement. Drawing on a theory of social movements, we analyze its trajectory and the levels of influence. We also offer a behavioral perspective in explaining how al-Qaeda has adapted as a learning organization with new leadership, tactics, and patterns of recruitment and training.

2012

During 2011, Brian Michael Jenkins was asked to testify about the status of al Qaeda before Congress on several occasions and to brief members of Congress, NATO ambassadors and planners, federal judges, and senior intelligence and law enforcement officials. This paper summarizes those briefings. It focuses on the recurring questions of whether America has won the operational battle but lost the ideological contest; whether homegrown terrorism is a growing threat; whether maintaining American troops in Afghanistan is essential; whether the United States should declare on its own an end to the war on al Qaeda. The assessment presented in this paper should be of particular interest to policymakers and law enforcement officials who are concerned with the threat of international terrorism and with maintaining national security. This publication results from the RAND Corporation's Investment in People and Ideas program. Support for this program is provided, in part, by the generosity of RAND's donors and by the fees earned on client-funded research.

2011

In the midst of so many books and reports produced on the topic in the past decade in the United States alone who would need yet another book. Though published three years ago, this is still the one book that any concerned policy maker must read it. Professor Fawaz Gerges, a lifetime Middle-Easternist, has compressed in about 200 pages U.S. government sources as well as solid research from academia. But the best part of the book that makes it so convincing is his own interviews with former leading jihadi leaders in the Middle East, and his use of their writings in Arabic with loathing but candid confession of their miserable failure. What went wrong for the terror organization to fail is the major bulk of the book, and, thus, it is more about the fall than the rise of al-Qaeda. Gerges is bending over backwards in successfully convincing his readers, especially, this Pashtun, that al-Qaeda is dead. But the multi-billion-dollar network of the national security complex and vested interests are even harder at work instilling the fear of terror in the heads and hearts of average Americans. Unfortunately, in the anti-terror frenzy, several the far-right racial and religious hate groups in the US have turned Islamophobia into a 'new anti-Semitism.' In the worldview of the so-called counterterrorism experts, including many US officials, 'Islamic' terrorism has replaced the Soviet nuclear threat. For many anti-Islam experts, al-Qaeda is also alfaeda (big business). Gerges gives us solid reasons why al-Qaeda central had in fact collapsed way before the United States assassinated its terror chief, Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The monster that was destined to death even at its conception grew up only to shoot itself in the mouth by carrying out the horrific event of September 11, 2001. The strangest feature of al-Qaeda was that 9/11 was not inevitable if only the terror organization had remained what it was: a local or a regional training organization like several jihadi groups who fought and drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan. With an introduction and conclusion and five chapters in between, the book deals more with the fall than the rise of al-Qaida. The Introduction shows how, in the aftermath of their 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden and his top commanders, worried for their personal safety, could neither run nor hide for too long as the Pakistani and other Muslim countries intelligence networks in the region were hunting them and handing them over to the United States. The vast majority of Muslims, even those who were highly critical of the US foreign policy in the Middle East, did not support al-Qaeda before or after 9/11 for a simple religious and rational factor that United States, unlike the Soviet Union, the other superpower, had not attacked a Muslim country to justify Jihad. The fact that American intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s had saved millions of Muslims was not lost on the minds of Muslims. In Chapter 1, "The Rise of Al-Qaeda," Professor Gerges informs us that Osama bin Laden, at his most glorious point in life, emerging as a winner of the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan in early 1990s had many doubts as to the right direction for the rest of his life. In fact, the CIA had "nicknamed bin Laden a 'good-gooder'" because he helped the CIA-operated jihad both monetarily and militarily. To the Saudi royal house he was know for his gratitude for the US support of the Afghan Jihad against "godless communism." (p. 48). What turned bin Laden and many Saudi secular and religious leaders against both the US and Saudi Arabia were the US invasion of Iraq and the stationing of US forces in Saudi Arabia during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. He "vowed to expel US troops from the lands of the two holy

contains the presentations that were made at this meeting. They constitute a valuable synopsis of current knowledge on al Qaeda and the policies in place to counter threats of future terrorist attacks. The papers in this book will contribute to understanding how al Qaeda has evolved from a movement to an ideology, what influence it has on Middle East stability, and what continued threat it is to the United States, Europe, and other areas of the world. The contributors are from academia, research centers, government agencies, and the media. They represent a cross section of recognized experts on al Qaeda and international terrorism.

In this paper, I will focus on the evolution and current status of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization leading up to one of its more recent franchises which is known most frequently by any of three names-the

2010

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SSRN, 2021

The unprecendeted growth of terrorism had made the environment of international peace and security far more complex than in the era of World war and Cold war. By utlizing the features of globalization the terror organizations had gone transnationalwith its elaborate complicated networks thereby changing the nature of conflict fought so far as these terror organizations as non-state actors tends to challenge the state stability as never before. Further the process of globalization had blurred the distinction between global and regional security because if there is a threat to regional stability then it willhave its spillover effects like in the form of refugee, migration crisis and other human right rights issues which became a matter of concern for international community as it threatens the international peace. Therefore in order to devise an efficient and effective counter policy to terrorism it is necessary to understand the perpetuators of terrorism- the terrorist organizations. This paper tends to analyse one of the prominent terror organization Al-Qaeda using the combined aspects of strategic framework and organizational theories that usually explains the decision making process of the organization. In this paper the background events that contributed to the evolution of Al-Qaeda as a organization, its objectives and underlying ideological narrative are discussed in detail. Further the modus operandi of Al-Qaeda are explained in the form of its terror tactics strategies, its organizational features and its revenue and logistics supply methods. Therefore this paper gives the detailed understanding about the working method of Al-Qaeda which helps to understand the policy implications that demands the combination of hard power to contain and soft power to curb it.

No major Al Qaeda attack has taken place since the 2 May 2011 killing of Osama Bin Laden. The organisation has lost quite a few important leaders. Its operations are said to be in shambles. It is merely attempting to survive rather than expand or even plan an attack. While the Arab spring is said to have depleted the Al Qaeda of its popular appeal, the difficult fiscal situation in the United States could be directing the Obama administration’s public posturing of the outfit’s reduced threat potential. While 11 September is a time for an introspection of a decade-long counter terrorism policy aimed at decimating and defeating the Al Qaeda, a trend analysis of the threat from Al Qaeda post-Abbotabad might have important pointers that speak otherwise.

Over a decade has passed since the United States launched the global “war on terror” in the aftermath of tragic September 11 incident, yet the defeat of Al-Qaeda seems a far cry. This pre-emptive war, spread across the globe, is falling short of achieving its goals as the threat of Al-Qaeda to the security of the US and other allied countries is still very much alive. This global war seems to have no definitive end. This paper argues that the lack of synergy in the global alliance between the US and Muslim countries, where Al-Qaeda has found safe havens, is the key cause of failure. The Muslim states are either weak to establish its writ on both the material and ideational aspects of life in its societies or they do not share the US threat perception about Al-Qaeda. This leaves the efforts of joint counter-terrorism in doldrums. This paper predicts that lack of will and ability in the partner countries of the US will ensure the continuation of international terrorism.