USSR: Nuclear Weapons

The American Historical Review, 1994

for their help on various aspects of the book. Professors William E. Griffith and James McAdams read early drafts and made numerous helpful suggestions. My sister, Claire Van Oudenaren, helped with the notes and bibliography. I would also like to thank Richard C. Rowson, director of Duke Uni versity Press, for seeing the book through to completion, and Enid Hickingbotham for her care and patience in editing the manuscript. I alone am responsible for the content of the book. Finally, I would like to express my special thanks to my wife Carol and to my children, John, Daniel, and Laura, who were patient and supportive throughout. I dedicate this book to the memory of my father. unesco un Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization unga un General Assembly voks All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries wcc World Council of Churches weu Western European Union wfsw World Federation of Scientific Workers wftu World Federation of Trade Unions who World Health Organization wpc World Peace Council wto Warsaw Treaty Organization A second reason to study this period relates to the future. Al though the old order was destroyed in 1989, a new order is being built out of institutions and patterns of cooperation that originated in the 1950s and 1960s and flourished in the 1970s and early 1980s. The role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (csce) has been upgraded. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt) of 1969 has taken on a new significance with Germany's reunification, as have the military confidence-building agreements of 1975 and 1986, the agreements between the European Community (ec) and the USSR, and many other bilateral and multilateral agreements and institu tions that grew out of very different political circumstances but that now are being adapted to the post-postwar situation. Despite its importance, detente in Europe has not been exten sively studied. There are no up-to-date surveys of Soviet-West Eu ropean relations and few monographs on specific issues, countries, or historical episodes.3 In any case, much of the existing literature is not about policy but about "views," "images," or "perceptions," particularly on the Soviet side.4 The book thus attempts to fill a gap 4 Detente in Europe form of the "two plus four" talks) of four-power negotiations in early 1990 following the collapse of the East German state. Chapters four to nine document the post-195 3 development of So viet-West European relations in different spheres. Chapter four deals with three levels of diplomacy: summits and other high-level meet ings, political consultations between foreign ministries, and regular contact through embassies and diplomatic channels. Chapter five ex amines parliamentary visits and exchanges, cooperation between po litical parties, and trade union ties. Chapter six discusses three areas of arms control: nuclear, conventional, and confidence-building. Chapter seven outlines the development of bilateral and multilateral economic institutions. Chapter eight deals with cultural exchange, contacts between churches, and contacts between the Soviet and West European peace movements. Chapter nine examines csce and the "all European process" from its origins in the 1950s to its new role in the post-1989 order. The final chapter deals specifically with the changes in Europe since 1989. It begins with a discussion of the Gorbachev leadership's approach to Europe in 1985-89, describes its efforts to shape change in 1989-90, and concludes with an assessment of the long-term out look for Russia as a European power. 26 Detente in Europe were skeptical.7 Eisenhower was wary of any meeting, which he as sociated with the sterile exchanges of the late 1940s and feared "would give our opponent the same kind of opportunity he has so often had to use such a meeting simultaneously to balk every rea sonable effort of ourselves and to make the whole occurrence another propaganda mill for the Soviet."8 But he also believed that if there was to be a meeting, France should be included. In his reply to Chur chill he suggested that the United States, the United Kingdom, and 36 Detente in Europe Adenauer preferred to strengthen his position at home before coming to grips with East-West issues. He believed that the Soviet view on Germany had "sharpened and hardened," and that it would be "very difficult to set up any plan to negotiate with the Soviets."59 West German and U.S. suspicions regarding Soviet dealings with Austria also tended to argue against an early meeting. Notwithstanding his own skepticism, on March 23, 1955, Eisen hower declared that he would be in favor of "exploratory talks," pre sumably at the foreign minister level, which could lead to a summit. He added three preconditions: that the talks follow the ratification of the Paris accords, that they result in something more substantive than just propaganda, and that they exclude China and "Germany."60 Eisenhower's insistence on the exclusion of Germany was consistent with a pattern going back to the Palais Rose meetings, at which the Western powers sought to broaden the agenda to deflect Soviet calls for a return to Potsdam. Later, after the Paris agreements were rati fied and West Germany was safely in nato, the positions of the sides were to reverse: the Western powers would press for a narrow focus on German reunification (diluted over time by a growing interest in arms control), while the Soviets would all but refuse to discuss Ger many and called for measures to promote a "relaxation of tensions." In mid-April the United States agreed in principle to attend a sum mit, but Eisenhower continued to insist that the meeting was to be Index Abrasimov, Petr, 136 Acheson, Dean, 25

2019

Articles: [“Churchill, Winston (1874-1965), 31-34; (with Christopher John Bright), “Committee on the Present Danger,” 39-40; “Cuban Missile Crisis,” 48-52; “Dulles, John Foster (1888-1959),” 56-59; “Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890-1969),” 61-64; “Kennan, George Frost (1904-2005),” 99-101; “Kissinger, Henry Alfred (1923-),” 107-108; “Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913-1994),” 151-153; “Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911-2004),” 184-187; “United Nations,” 222-228.] The impact of the Cold War is still being felt around the world today. This insightful single-volume reference captures the events and personalities of the era, while also inspiring critical thinking about this still-controversial period. Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide is intended to introduce students to the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States that dominated international affairs in the second half of the 20th century. A comprehensive overview essay, plus separate essays on the causes and consequences of the conflict, will provide readers with the necessary context to understand the many facets of this complex era. The guide's expert contributors cover all of the influential people and pivotal events of the period, encompassing the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Southeast Asia, China, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa from political, military, and cultural perspectives. Reference entries offer valuable insight into the leaders and conflicts that defined the Cold War, while other essays promote critical thinking about controversial and significant Cold War topics, including whether Ronald Reagan was responsible for ending the Cold War, the impact of Sputnik on the Cold War, and the significance of the Prague Spring. Features •Several analytical essays by prominent historians, plus 85 additional A–Z reference entries about conflicts, incidents, leaders, and issues •35 examples of relevant primary source documents, including speeches, treaties, policy statements, and letters, such as the Marshall Plan and Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech •A detailed chronology of important events that occurred before, during, and after the Cold War •Numerous maps and images of key leaders and events •A comprehensive bibliography of print resources Highlights •Provides readers with a look inside the Cold War, pinpointing the main causes and consequences of this long-running conflict •Analyzes controversial Cold War topics that still generate widespread debate today to inspire critical thinking among readers •Supplements entries with a broad overview to help readers grasp the far-reaching implications of this worldwide conflict •Discusses key leaders and events in a scholarly, yet accessible manner

After signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1945 China and Soviet became allies. Stalin and Mao kept a similar interpretation on practicing Marxism even though there were some ideological differences. When Khrushchev first came to power, USSR kept the same relationship with China. However, after he criticized Stalin during the 20th Part Congress, the Sino-Soviet relationship of allies started to break down. Sino-Soviet relationship’s deterioration mainly happened in Khrushchev’s office time especially the period after 1956. Therefore the aim of this research is to answer the question that: Why did the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated in Khrushchev’s office time after 1956? The scope of this essay will be focused on Khrushchev’s office time after 1956. Events happened between 1956 to 1964 will be analyzed to find the causes of the deterioration on Sino-Soviet relation. The Methology of explaining the causes is used to analysis the factors that led the Sino-Soviet relation changes happened in 1956-1964. There are two relevant resources which will be used: Wich, R (2004) Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics and 沈志华 （2007）中苏关系史纲

International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 1989

President Reagan came to office in 1981 as an enthusiastic Cold Warrior determined to restore American power and pre-eminence and to show the Soviet Union that it could not embark upon expansionist policies without paying a very high price. He left office in 1989 as the co-architect of a new superpower detente. It was not called that, of course, as the idea of detente was still associated with America's period of malaise in the 1970s, when both foreign policy and domestic politics were in disarray after Watergate, Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis. But the antipathy that had characterized Soviet-American exchanges in the early 1980s had been replaced by a relationship that was less acrimonious and much more cordial. A series of summit meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had culminated in the Washington summit of December 1987 at which the INF Treaty, removing all land-based medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, was signed. In June 1988 President Reagan visited Moscow, and although little of substance emerged from this summit the symbolic importance of a visit to the centre of what Reagan, only a few years earlier, had called the 'evil empire' was immense. Although the superpowers found it impossible to reach an agreement on long-range arms reductions (START) before Reagan left office, it was clear that they had entered another period of relaxation in which they were increasingly willing to take steps to moderate and regulate their relationship and to cooperate on security issues. What had occurred was effectively detente by another name. What remains uncertain, of course, is whether the Reagan-Gorbachev detente is sustainable. Is it just another phase in the old cyclical pattern in which the superpowers pass from periods of Cold War to detente and back again? Or does it represent a more fundamental and long-term trend in the evolution of US-Soviet relations from confrontation to cooperation? In short, is the Cold War finally over? It may be tempting to dismiss such questions as premature and ill-conceived. There have been thaws in the Cold War before, but they have been succeeded by periods of renewed tension between the superpowers. The 'spirit of Camp David' of 1959, for example, when Khrushchev visited the United States for talks with Eisenhower, was followed by one of the most dangerous periods in the Cold War, with the superpowers confronting each other over Berlin and Cuba. Similarly, the detente of the 1970s gave way to a renewed period of tension in which the two sides abandoned cooperative ventures for a more confrontational approach. Although the rhetorical belligerence of Moscow and Washington was not matched by recklessness on either side, the superpower relationship in the first half of the 1980s was characterized by a degree of mutual paranoia and hostility that many found extremely disturbing.

Encyclopedia of the Cold War. 2 vols.

3 short articles in Encyclopedia of the Cold War. 2 vols. Eds. Ruud van Dijk et al. “Chiang Kai-shek,” 1:138-141; “Great Leap Forward,” 1:379-381; “Liu Shaoqi,” 2:548-550. New York: Routledge, 2008. Between 1945 and 1991, tension between the USA, its allies, and a group of nations led by the USSR, dominated world politics. This period was called the Cold War – a conflict that stopped short to a full-blown war. Benefiting from the recent research of newly open archives, the Encyclopedia of the Cold War discusses how this state of perpetual tensions arose, developed, and was resolved. This work examines the military, economic, diplomatic, and political evolution of the conflict as well as its impact on the different regions and cultures of the world. Using a unique geopolitical approach that will present Russian perspectives and others, the work covers all aspects of the Cold War, from communism to nuclear escalation and from UFOs to red diaper babies, highlighting its vast-ranging and lasting impact on international relations as well as on daily life. Although the work will focus on the 1945–1991 period, it will explore the roots of the conflict, starting with the formation of the Soviet state, and its legacy to the present day.