Logic, Thinking and Language in Frege

Philosophy Compass, 2015

This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege’s philosophy of logic. In section 1 of Part 1 I discuss Frege’s view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking, and is therefore a normative science. In section 2 I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In section 1 of Part 2 I survey a number of interpretations of Frege’s conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally in section 2 I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege’s conception of logic.

Philosophy Compass, 2015

This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege’s philosophy of logic. In section 1 of Part 1 I discuss Frege’s view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking, and is therefore a normative science. In section 2 I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In section 1 of Part 2 I survey a number of interpretations of Frege’s conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally in section 2 I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege’s conception of logic.

Metascience, 2017

Though Frege occasionally discusses actual thinking in his writings, frequently in order to contrast it with timeless thoughts or Gedanken, most scholars would agree that his scattered remarks on that issue do not deserve closer attention. The new book by Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo (henceforth: G&V) challenges that assumption. According to G&V, Frege did not only devote ''much attention to human mental processes'' (1); he also thought these processes to be highly relevant to epistemological issues. The book contains four main chapters, all of which are based on previous work by G&V. Thus, to a large extent, the chapters can be read independently of each other. Chapter 2 discusses the ''many faces of Frege's anti-psychologism'' and argues for the surprising claim that Frege, a paradigmatic anti-psychologist, is actually committed to some kind of psychologism. This claim is based on Haack's distinction between three possible stances that may be held regarding the relation between logic and human thinking: according to strong psychologism, logic is descriptive of mental processes; weak psychologism claims that logic is prescriptive of mental processes; and anti-psychologism claims that logic ''has nothing to do'' with mental processes (24). In this sense, according to G&V, Frege's position ought to be described as a weak or prescriptive psychologism: ''For Frege, the laws of logic prescribe how actual thinking may be correct; so there is a connection between the laws of logic and actual thinking: the former prescribes the rules for the latter'' (25). I doubt that this is a correct rendering of Frege's position. Admittedly, Frege repeatedly stresses the normative function of logic, sometimes comparing it to ethics in this respect, but he nevertheless claims that the laws of logic proper-for instance, the laws expressed by Begriffsschrift axioms such as p ? (q ? p)-are

Mind, 2008

Frege's attempt to provide a foundation for the possibility of language and communication, like Kant's attempt to provide a foundation for the possibility of knowledge, fails to provide us with something absolute and foundational in a fixed sense. However, both these philosophers succeed in showing something about necessity that can be preserved independently of their absolutisms. Part III of this paper will provide reasons for accepting this thesis, while Parts I and II will provide an expository background on Frege's view in preparation for supporting the thesis. I. Overview: Frege's Ideas, Sense, and Thought In his attempt to find a foundation for mathematics in logic, Frege was led to address central issues in the theory of knowledge and meaning. In this project he advanced a radically new theory of the proposition. Frege follows the Kantian priority of judgments over concepts as the basis of his logic of propositions and for him words have meaning only in the context of sentences. Frege's views on eidetic structure and theory of the noun, of reference, definability, and well-made language remain classical. But where classical theory tried to understand the complexity of propositions by starting with a simple and uniform structure of the whole and then analyzing this into a very complex, intricate and functionally structured interior, Frege reversed this direction of analysis and saw the proposition, or "thoughts" (in his own terminology), as constructed from a few precise basic constituents. What is it to understand a language and a sentence? You must understand its parts. Whereas classical theory had not clearly distinguished the judgment from the proposition or thought, Frege says thoughts (propositions) are independent of thinking. There would be no judgment without judging, but there are thoughts without thinking. Frege's introduction of the sense/reference distinction allows thoughts to be formed and expressed without being asserted. The function of the verb in classical theory as assertive is removed from the interior of the proposition and is replaced in Frege in the distinction of complete and incomplete, which solves the problem of embedded verbs and propositions. We can "grasp" a sentence without knowing its truth-value and thereby keep knowledge of language and of the world separate. This is very classical. However, the move toward the current view that knowledge of language cannot be separated from other knowledge ironically begins in Frege with his radical reinterpretation of propositions. In classical theory, the noun system is isomorphic with eidetic structure and definition makes translation possible. Frege preserves the notion of ideas and eidetic structure in the classical sense in his notion of sense. But he distinguishes the notions of judgment and proposition which was not clear in classical theory. Frege reserves the term "idea" for that which is purely subjective, and uses "sense" as the objective though not perceived reality that stands between the object and my idea of the object and makes knowledge and communication of knowledge of objects possible.

Between Logic and Reality, 2011

The paper's aim is to determine and discuss in which sense, if any, Frege's and neo-Fregean logicism are responding to the epistemological challenge concerning our arithmetical knowledge. More precisely the paper analyses what the epistemological significance of Frege's logicist programme amounts to, namely, the objective justificatory connections obtaining between arithmetical and logical statements. It then contrasts this result with the self-understanding of the neo-Fregeans who allegedly follow Frege's steps, but in fact take a rather different direction.

2019

This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I extend Frege’s position and use it to develop an account of the hierarchy of senses, the senses expressed by indexicals and demonstratives, and the distinction between logical and non-logical structure. I also discuss various connections with the nature of meta- representation, our capacity for reflective judgment, some aspects of the structure of conscious experience, the way we perceive regions of space and durations of time, and our conscious awareness of our own perceptions and events of thinking.

Theoria, 2021

Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege's conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, i.e., the truth-vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a conditional, I provide reasons why we ought to consider the possibility seriously that truth is an object for Frege. I also explain how we can make sense of Frege's conception of logic as the science of truth while accepting truth is an object.

New Essays on Frege

Frege's conception of science includes three features: (1) a science is applicable to other sciences, or even to itself, (2) a science consists of a more or less rigid system of judgements and (3) a science presupposes elucidations, illustrative examples and a "catch on" among scientists. Together, I label these three features "The scientific Picture". Both logic and mathematics are included among the sciences and are covered by the scientific picture. As I understand Frege, this picture guides his logical and philosophical reflections. Here it is invoked in a treatment of two well-known and controversial Fregean topics: His claim, often repeated, that the axioms of Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze are obvious and stand in no need of justification, and his use of a Kantian terminology in classifying judgements as analytic or synthetic, a priori or a posteriori. The most significant consequence of my reading is that it underscores the epistemological nature of Frege's thinking and, at the same time, downplays a current, and in my mind unfortunate, trend of ascribing to Frege a rather "thick" metaphysics. Towards the end, I discuss different aspects of the notion of a judgment at play in Frege's discussions: judgement as movement from thought to truth-value and judgement as represented by the judgement-stroke. These aspects point back to the distinction, so nicely illustrated by Frege's own writings, between a scientist, engaged in scientific research, and a philosopher, explicating the scientific activity and its general presuppositions, respectively.