Islamic Caliphate: A Quasi-State, A Global Security Threat

Initially a terrorist group within the Al Qaeda organization, the Islamic State of Iraq refused to obey orders from its previous superiors and declared the Islamic State, the caliphate which existed for over 1,300 years but which had ceased to exist in 1924 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. This declaration was possible because contrary to previous terrorist organizations which attacked targets and dissolved into the community, the Islamic State actually governs the territories it controls. It has a radio and a TV station. It counts with a prolific presence in the Internet, especially in social media. It prints its own currency, manages its own postal system and runs its schools, hospitals and police stations. It exploits resources, taxes its populations and imposes its distorted interpretation of Sharia law. It considers itself the pristine manifestation of Islam and authorizes the killing of any non-Sunni Muslim as not-true believers. This paper analyzes what we know about the Islamic State, using a variety of public sources, and makes recommendations about potential measures that could be taken to eliminate this threat from the civilized world.

On 29 June 2014, the ISIS/ISIL or Daesh announced the change of its name to just "Islamic State" (IS), proclaimed itself a "Caliphate" and named its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as "Caliph Ibrahim". About a year later, this article intends to evaluate the trajectory and reach of this territorial jihadist entity. It starts by contextualizing the self-proclamation in terms of ideology and objectives and then it describes how the IS has sought to consolidate itself as a de facto "State" and the tragic effects of its policy of terror. The last part examines the international expansion of the IS, analysing its reach in attracting "foreign fighters", the new wilayats created outside Syria and Iraq, the newly affiliated local groups, and the activities of the IS in cyberspace.

The Islamic State (also known as IS, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-ISIS—and their brother organization, the Islamic State of ) has been fighting their way through Iraq and Syria, and more recently Libya steadily and quickly gaining ground. The United States government has been actively engaged against this ideological paramilitary group since August of 2014 in Iraq and September of 2014 in Syria. The ISIS ideology is of a Muslim Caliphate, which is a system of governance with a Caliph as a leader. The importance of a Caliph comes from the term’s origins. Upon Prophet Muhammad’s death, a Caliph was created as “the leader of the faithful,” and the Caliphate was the Muslim way of life up to about a hundred years ago. Under a Caliphate, control of lots of land was a prerequisite for Caliphs and Caliphates to not only prosper but as a symbol of power and legitimacy. The more territory a Caliph controlled in his Caliphate, the more powerful and influential he was because through the control of massive territory, his governance is legitimized and his leadership is legitimized thus there will be less dissidence when the Caliph gives an order. This is particularly of concern where Muslims are not supporters of ISIS but are supporters of the ideal of a Caliphate where the Caliph is a terrorist. According to the Time article, “Why ISIS is more dangerous than it was a month ago,” even though very few Muslims support ISIS, “a great many express either nostalgia or banked hope for the notion of a caliphate.” If ISIS gains enough territory throughout the Muslim lands of the Middle East to gain legitimacy, ISIS will control the people and the interests of those territories up to and including the governments themselves. Such legitimacy and control would mean that every international effort the Iraqi, Syrian, or Libyan governments are involved in, would henceforth have ISIS influence. This could cause devastating results through the use of ISIS support for or against any international treaties, sanctions, and laws as ISIS would most likely act and vote in their own best interests, which are anti-Westernization. ISIS has proven they are not a peaceful governance so there is real likelihood that the Caliphate would align itself with such nations and governments that are known for potential violent tendencies as well as aligning itself with those nations and governments that are anti-Westernization or anti-US. The joining of legitimate, violent forces that are anti-US or anti-Westernization could result in attacks against the United States or even a major war. Through ISIS’ methods of gaining territory, the pattern of attack and control appear to include “siege warfare, holding territory, and seizing strategic installations, particularly those involving water and energy resources." So far ISIS has gained control of the Rabqa Dam, the Fallujah Dam, and many of the oil refineries throughout Iraq and Syria. Looking at the NY Times’ pictures of ISIS controlled territories prior to and after gaining control of individual cities, highlighting ISIS’ actual presence, their modus operandi (MO) appears to involve surrounding a target area and taking control of the target area from the surrounding areas and working in towards the center of the target area, as shown with Ramadi.

Following text is focused on current conflict between the international community and so called Islamic State, the one of the biggest threat of (not only) Middle-East region. The involvement of many internal and external actors makes conflict in Iraq and Syria very complicated. Their goals differ from each other and that is the main reason the Islamic State still exists in very good shape. The main aim of this text is to explain and to analyze motives and goals of all relevant actors and sides of mentioned conflict and describe the way they affect its dynamics. Due to that it is possible to increase the knowledge of readers in such a chaotic, unclear and often misinterpreted situation in the Middle-East.

Abstract: The Islamic State, proclaimed on 29 June 2014, has tremendously shaken up the Middle East and the whole world forcing hostile and friendly states alike to close ranks and create a collective military platform to fight and contain this new danger before it spirals out of control. This analysis probes the threats and the challenges the Islamic State, which has conquered and currently controls vast swathes across the Iraq – Syria borders, poses to the West and its Middle Eastern allies and examines why the challenges warranted a military response spearheaded by the US. It argues that the Islamic State poses formidable ideational challenges to the West, beyond its military threats to the Middle Eastern states, that question the very base and organizing principles of Western political order and the West’s dominance over the Middle East, what is better dubbed ‘Eurocentrism’ –a concept that articulates and sustains Western claim to universalism. Unless coerced into submission or at least militarily weakened, the IS holds the potential to successfully challenge eurocentric ideas with its own version of Islamic universalism.

TOMÉ, Luis (Ed.) (2015). “Islamic State” – the new global jihadist phenomenon. Formalpress/Media XXI, 2015

“Introduction”(pp. 9-18); “Chap. 3. The international expansion of the self-proclaimed “Caliphate” (pp. 65-92); e “Final Remarks – A global threat to fight in a very sensitive geopolitical chessboard” (pp. 235-243).

For the last 1400 years the Middle East has observed the Muslim division into Sunnis and Shi’as, European colonializing, civil wars, and the rise and fall of governments. One of the most recognized terrorist groups to rise out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein’s fallen monarchy is widely known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS has quickly overwhelmed Iraq and Syria like a tidal wave and continues their march through the Levant. In this case study we look at the earliest roots of the Islamic State, how they came to power, where they are progressing, and question if they have the ability to continue.

The recent tremendous rise of Islamic State/ISIS (Daesh in Arabic) has formed conceptually new threats and challenges to the existing international security system. The rise of IS demonstrates the great shift of conflicts in 21st century, from interstate to internal conflicts and insurgency. Simultaneously, the Islamic State has big flexibility in planning and executing its activities through variety of profoundly designed strategies and tactics - a phenomenon which makes this insurgency/terrorist group quite different from the rest of armed groups all over the World.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

islamic-state-and-its-viability/ MOHAMMED NURUZZAMAN, OCT 19 2014 The rise of the Islamic State (IS), previously called the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or the ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), is more than an explosive event in the traditionally volatile Middle East region. Proclaimed on 29 June 2014, the IS, which captured and now controls huge swathes of territories straddling northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, is in a state of war against the whole world. The self-styled caliph of the IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, made his first official speech the same day. He divided the whole world into two camps-'the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy' [1]. He put the Muslims and the mujahidin in the first camp; the Jews, the crusaders, and their allies (meaning America's Arab allies), and the rest of the nations (including Shiite apostates in Iran and elsewhere) fill the second camp. This new division of the world strictly on religious lines, coupled with IS's lightning military offensives and rapid victories over the US-trained and equipped Iraqi defense forces, soon rang alarm bells of serious proportions in Tehran, Riyadh, and Washington, unleashing diplomatic realignments across the region and coordinated military actions to halt advances by IS militants. Erstwhile bitter rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia are closing their ranks to face the common IS threat (Reuters, 2014); Iran and the US are engaged in 'give and take' talks over the nuclear issue to devise a common strategy to stop the IS (CNBC, 2014a); and President Obama has forged a military coalition, consisting of Gulf Arab allies and some European states, to 'degrade and destroy' the IS (The Wall Street Journal, 2014a). Surprisingly, the IS, despite mounting military pressures and financial sanctions (The Huffington Post, 2014a), continues to launch relentless military offensives to capture more urban centers and territories both in Iraq and Syria. But can it survive the US-led air strikes, and Iran-supported counterattacks (Branen, 2014) by the Iraqi and Syrian armies? This article cross-checks the military, economic, and political viability of the IS in long-term perspectives. It concludes that the IS is a reality and it is here to stay, whether we like it or not. Moreover, the IS looks to have set for gradual expansion of its territorial boundaries to ultimately redraw the political map of the Middle East. What Explains the Rise of the IS? Academics and journalists alike take the position that the former Nouri al-Maliki government was primarily culpable for the rise of the IS, while the sectarianism-driven civil war in Syria fed into the process (Phillips, 2014; Kayaoğlu, 2014). That the al-Maliki government was divisive, did not pursue the right policies to integrate the minority Sunnis in his government, and failed to create a sense of Iraqi national identity are true. But they fall short of accounting for the violent outbreak of armed conflict and capture of territories by the IS. Discriminatory socioeconomic and political policies based on sectarian paranoia are nothing new in Iraq or, for that matter, in other Arab states in the Gulf (Nasr, 2007). The late Saddam Hussein's anti-Shiites and anti-Kurds policies galvanized resistance to his regime, but not on such a dangerous scale as we currently see in Iraq. The Sunni-dominated regimes in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are also known for their anti-Shiite policies, but there is no IS-type violence brewing up there.

The US and the Islamic State (IS) use coercive force to project authority. This might be valid in classical political philosophy as well as in Muslim political practices; but it is not customary in democratic governance. Acclaimed evidence has characterized democracies as sensitive to violence and coercive measures. And the US is a democracy, while IS is not. This is the fundamental difference between the two camps. This difference diminishes when both engage in the propaganda of war: waging war is a parcel identity of states. States are often created from the disorder of war. The US is an example, and IS is not. States are defined by sovereignty over a territory; this territorial jurisdiction justifies their legitimate monopoly on violence. Religion is neither about territory nor about legitimate monopoly on violence. IS understands this benefit of statehood, and that the secret of its ongoing name change in search of territorial jurisdiction for its violent Jihad. From the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to the 'borderless' Islamic State (IS), there appears to be an obsession with the state: haltering its apparatus and replacing it with a perpetually expanding caliphate. Why is IS so obsessed with the state? What is the new scheme behind this strategy? And how is the US conduct in the war feeding into the same scheme? The article seeks to answer these questions.