Generalization versus contextualization in automatic evaluation.

Journal of Experimental Psychology-general, 2003

In the present research, the authors examined contextual variations in automatic attitudes. Using 2 measures of automatic attitudes, the authors demonstrated that evaluative responses differ qualitatively as perceivers focus on different aspects of a target's social group membership (e.g., race or gender). Contextual variations in automatic attitudes were obtained when the manipulation involved overt categorization (Experiments 1-3) as well as more subtle contextual cues, such as category distinctiveness (Experiments 4 -5). Furthermore, participants were shown to be unable to predict such contextual influences on automatic attitudes (Experiment 3). Taken together, these experiments support the idea of automatic attitudes being continuous, online constructions that are inherently flexible and contextually appropriate, despite being outside conscious control.

Cognition and Emotion

Initial evaluations generalise to new contexts, whereas counter-attitudinal evaluations are context-specific. Counter-attitudinal information may not change evaluations in new contexts because perceivers fail to retrieve counter-attitudinal cue-evaluation associations from memory outside the counter-attitudinal learning context. The current work examines whether an additional, counter-attitudinal retrieval cue can enhance the generalizability of counter-attitudinal evaluations. In four experiments, participants learned positive information about a target person, Bob, in one context, and then learned negative information about Bob in a different context. While learning the negative information, participants wore a wristband as a retrieval cue for counter-attitudinal Bob-negative associations. Participants then made speeded as well as deliberate evaluations of Bob while wearing or not wearing the wristband. Internal meta-analysis failed to find a reliable effect of the counterattitudinal retrieval cue on speeded or deliberate evaluations, whereas the context cues influenced speeded and deliberate evaluations. Counter to predictions, counter-attitudinal retrieval cues did not disrupt the generalisation of first-learned evaluations or the context-specificity of second-learned evaluations (Experiments 2-4), but the counter-attitudinal retrieval cue did influence evaluations in the absence of context cues (Experiment 1). The current work provides initial evidence that additional counter-attitudinal retrieval cues fail to disrupt the renewal and generalizability of first-learned evaluations.

Cognition and Emotion, 2001

A review of the literature concerning the phenomenon known as automatic attitude activation is presented. The robustness of the affective priming effect across many different procedural variations, the mediating mechanisms thought to underlie the effect, and the moderating role of associative strength are discussed. The relevance and importance of automatic attitude activation to many fundamental cognitive and social processes also is highlighted. Finally, an overview of the articles included in this Special Issue of Cognition and Emotion, their essential contributions, and their relation to the earlier literature is presented.

European Journal of Social Psychology, 2017

Co-occurrence of an object and affective stimuli does not always mean that the object and the stimuli are the same valence (e.g., false accusations that Richard is a crook). Contemporary theory posits that information about the (in)validity of co-occurrence has stronger influence on deliberate than automatic evaluation. However, available evidence supports that hypothesis only when the (in)validity information is delayed. Further, the existing evidence is open to alternative methodological accounts. In six high-powered experiments (total N = 1750), we modified previous procedures to minimize alternative explanations and examine whether delayed (in)validity information has a discrepant effect on automatic versus deliberate evaluation. Casting doubt on the generality of the hypothesis, we found more sensitivity of deliberate than automatic evaluation to delayed validity information only when automatic evaluation was measured with the Implicit Association Test and not with the evaluative priming task or the affective misattribution procedure. People evaluate everything: a new job, a coworker, or a potential pet. The evaluation can be deliberate and thoughtful, after serious consideration, or automatic and swift, with little care or intention. It is of particular interest to understand the factors that produce discrepancies between automatic and deliberate evaluations

Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2000

Humans continuously evaluate aspects of their environment (people, objects, places) in an automatic fashion (i.e., unintentionally, rapidly). Such evaluations can be highly adaptive, triggering behavioral responses away from threats and toward rewards in the environment. Even in the absence of immediate threats and fleeting rewards, the ability to automatically evaluate aspects of the environment enables individuals to effortlessly make sense of their world without depleting limited and valuable cognitive resources. We discuss two lines of research on automatic evaluation: The first demonstrates that people can evaluate a stimulus even when they are not conscious of the stimulus and thus unaware of having evaluated it. The second line of work shows that even when people are conscious of a stimulus, they may evaluate it without intending to do so. We end by discussing current theoretical questions regarding this topic.

Social & Personality Psychology Compass, 2014

A central theme in contemporary psychology is the distinction between implicit and explicit evaluation. Research has shown various dissociations between the two kinds of evaluations, including different antecedents, different consequences, and discrepant evaluations of the same object. The current article provides a brief review of the associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model, which accounts for these dissociations by conceptualizing implicit and explicit evaluations as the behavioral outcomes of two functionally distinct, yet mutually interacting, mental processes. Whereas implicit evaluations are assumed to be the outcome of associative processes, explicit evaluations are conceptualized as the outcome of propositional processes. Associative processes determine the activation of mental contents on the basis of feature similarity and spatiotemporal contiguity; propositional processes involve the validation of activated mental contents on the basis of cognitive consistency. The APE model includes specific assumptions about mutual interactions between the two processes, implying precise predictions about converging versus diverging patterns of implicit and explicit evaluation.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2005

Findings from three experiments suggest that participantsÕ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. ParticipantsÕ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that oneÕs automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2011

A central theme in contemporary psychology is the distinction between implicit and explicit evaluations. Research has shown various dissociations between the two kinds of evaluations, including different antecedents, different consequences, and discrepant evaluations of the same object. The associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model accounts for these dissociations by conceptualizing implicit and explicit evaluations as the outcomes of two qualitatively distinct processes. Whereas implicit evaluations are described as the outcome of associative processes, explicit evaluations represent the outcome of propositional processes. Associative processes are further specified as the activation of mental associations on the basis of feature similarity and spatiotemporal contiguity; propositional processes are defined as the validation of activated information on the basis of logical consistency. The APE model includes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay between associative and propositional processes, implying a wide range of predictions about symmetric and asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit evaluations. The current chapter reviews the conceptual and empirical assumptions of the APE model and evidence in support of its predictions. In addition, we discuss conceptual and empirical challenges for the APE model and various directions for future research on implicit and explicit evaluation.

Psychological Bulletin, 2006

A metacognitive model (MCM) is presented to describe how automatic (implicit) and deliberative (explicit) measures of attitudes respond to change attempts. The model assumes that contemporary implicit measures tap quick evaluative associations, whereas explicit measures also consider the perceived validity of these associations (and other factors). Change in explicit measures is greater than implicit measures when new evaluative associations are formed and old associations are rejected. Implicit measure change is greater than explicit when newly formed evaluative associations are rejected. When implicit and explicit evaluations conflict, implicit ambivalence can occur. The authors relate the MCM to the associative-propositional evaluation model and explain how the MCM builds on the attitude strength assumptions of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion.