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2014, 2014 American Control Conference
This work addresses the design of resilient estimators for stochastic systems. To this end, we introduce a minimum mean-squared error resilient (MMSE-R) estimator whose conditional mean squared error from the state remains finitely bounded and is independent of additive measurement attacks. An implementation of the MMSE-R estimator is presented and is shown as the solution of a semidefinite programming problem, which can be implemented efficiently using convex optimization techniques. The MMSE-R strategy is evaluated against other competing strategies representing other estimation approaches in the presence of small and large measurement attacks. The results indicate that the MMSE-R estimator significantly outperforms (in terms of mean-squared error) other realizable resilient (and non-resilient) estimators.
2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2015
We consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation in the presence of noise. We focus on the most general model for sensor attacks where any signal can be injected via the compromised sensors. An l0-based state estimator that can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program and its convex relaxation based on the l1 norm are presented. For both l0 and l1-based state estimators, we derive rigorous analytic bounds on the state-estimation errors. We show that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, meaning that the attacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we show how the presented attack-resilient state estimators can be used for sound attack detection and identification, and provide conditions on the size of attack vectors that will ensure correct identification of compromised sensors. This material is based on research sponsored by DARPA under agreement number FA8750-12-2-0247. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Several recent incidents have clearly illustrated the susceptibility of cyber-physical systems (CPS) to attacks, raising attention to security challenges in these systems. The tight interaction between information technology and the physical world has introduced new vulnerabilities that cannot be addressed with the use of standard cryptographic security techniques. Accordingly, the problem of state estimation in the presence of sensor and actuator attacks has attracted significant attention in the past. Unlike the existing work, in this paper we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation in the presence of bounded-size noise. We focus on the most general model for sensor attacks where any signal can be injected via compromised sensors. Specifically, we present an l0-based state estimator that can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program and its convex relaxation based on the l1 norm. For both attack-resilient state estimators, we derive rigorous analytic bounds on the stateestimation errors caused by the presence of noise. Our analysis shows that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, and thus the attacker cannot exploit the noise to introduce unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we show how the l0 and l1-based attack-resilient state estimators can be used for sound attack detection and identification; we provide conditions on the size of attack vectors that ensure correct identification of compromised sensors.
2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2017
This work investigates the effects of signal attacks possibly combined with network deception attacks injecting fake measurements on stochastic cyber-physical systems. The goal of the attacker is to maximize the estimation error based on the information available about the system and the measurement models, preferably without being detected. This problem is formulated following a worst-case approach characterizing the maximum degradation the attacker can induce at each time instant when a Bayesian filter developed within the random finite set (RFS) framework is employed for simultaneous attack detection and resilient state estimation. A novel concept of error which captures the switching (Bernoulli) nature of the signal attack is proposed as an appropriate distance measure for joint detection-estimation. Furthermore, the notion of stealthiness is introduced in order to derive attack policies useful to synthesize undetectable perturbations that can deceive a Maximum Aposteriori Probability (MAP) detector implemented for security.
2014 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS), 2014
The interaction between information technology and physical world makes Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) vulnerable to malicious attacks beyond the standard cyber attacks. This has motivated the need for attackresilient state estimation. Yet, the existing state-estimators are based on the non-realistic assumption that the exact system model is known. Consequently, in this work we present a method for state estimation in presence of attacks, for systems with noise and modeling errors. When the the estimated states are used by a state-based feedback controller, we show that the attacker cannot destabilize the system by exploiting the difeerence between the model used for the state estimation and the real physical dynamics of the system. Furthermore, we describe how implementation issues such as jitter, latency and synchronization errors can be mapped into parameters of the state estimation procedure that describe modeling errors, and provide a bound on the stateestimation error caused by modeling errors. This enables mapping control performance requirements into real-time (i.e., timing related) specifications imposed on the underlying platform. Finally, we illustrate and experimentally evaluate this approach on an unmanned ground vehicle case-study.
2020 American Control Conference (ACC), 2020
This paper proposes to analyze the resilient properties of a specific state estimator for LTI discrete-time systems. The dynamic equation of the system is assumed to be affected by a bounded process noise. As to the available measurements, they are potentially corrupted by a noise of both dense and impulsive natures. In this setting, we define an estimator as the map which associates to the measurements, the minimizing set of an appropriate (convex) performance function. It is then shown that the proposed estimator enjoys the property of resilience, that is, it induces an estimation error which, under certain conditions, is independent of the extreme values of the (impulsive) measurement noise. Therefore, the estimation error may be bounded while the measurement noise is virtually unbounded. Moreover, the expression of the bound depends explicitly on the degree of observability of the system being observed and on the considered performance function. Finally, a few simulation results are provided to illustrate the resilience property.
IEEE Control Systems, 2017
R ecent years have witnessed a significant increase in the number of securityrelated incidents in control systems. These include high-profile attacks in a wide range of application domains, from attacks on critical infrastructure, as in the case of the Maroochy Water breach [1], and industrial systems (such as the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial supervisory control and data acquisition system [2], [3] and the German Steel Mill cyberattack [4], [5]), to attacks on modern vehicles [6]-[8]. Even high-assurance military systems were shown to be vulnerable to attacks, as illustrated in the highly publicized downing of the RQ-170 Sentinel U.S. drone [9]-[11]. These incidents have greatly raised awareness of the need for security in cyberphysical systems (CPSs), which feature tight coupling of computation and
Proceedings of the 33rd Chinese Control Conference, 2014
This paper deals with the robust H∞ cyber-attacks estimation problem for control systems under stochastic cyberattacks and disturbances. The focus is on designing a H∞ ¿lter which maximize the attack sensitivity and minimize the effect of disturbances. The design requires not only the disturbance attenuation, but also the residual to remain the attack sensitivity as much as possible while the effect of disturbance is minimized. A stochastic model of control system with stochastic cyber-attacks which satisfy the Markovian stochastic process is constructed. And we also present the stochastic attack models that a control system is possibly exposed to. Furthermore, applying H ∞ ¿ltering technique-based on linear matrix inequalities (LMIs), the paper obtains suf¿cient conditions that ensure the ¿ltering error dynamic is asymptotically stable and satis¿es a prescribed ratio between cyber-attack sensitivity and disturbance sensitivity. Finally, the results are applied to the control of a Quadruple-tank process (QTP) under a stochastic cyber-attack and a stochastic disturbance. The simulation results underline that the designed ¿lters is effective and feasible in practical application.
2020 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications (CCTA)
In this paper, we present the concept of boosting the resiliency of optimization-based observers for cyber-physical systems (CPS) using auxiliary sources of information. Due to the tight coupling of physics, communication and computation, a malicious agent can exploit multiple inherent vulnerabilities in order to inject stealthy signals into the measurement process. The problem setting considers the scenario in which an attacker strategically corrupts portions of the data in order to force wrong state estimates which could have catastrophic consequences. The goal of the proposed observer is to compute the true states inspite of the adversarial corruption. In the formulation, we use a measurement prior distribution generated by the auxiliary model to refine the feasible region of a traditional compressive sensingbased regression problem. A constrained optimization-based observer is developed using l1-minimization scheme. Numerical experiments show that the solution of the resulting problem recovers the true states of the system. The developed algorithm is evaluated through a numerical simulation example of the IEEE 14-bus system.
2020 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2020
The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier work for continuous-time linear systems in [1], we term the convergence of the estimates to the true states in the presence of sensor attacks as 'observability under M attacks', where M refers to the number of sensors which the attacker has access to. Unlike the linear case, we only provide a sufficient condition such that a nonlinear system is observable under M attacks. The condition requires the existence of asymptotic observers which are robust with respect to the attack signals in an inputto-state stable sense. We show that an algorithm to choose a compatible state estimate from the state estimates generated by the bank of observers achieves asymptotic state reconstruction. We also provide a constructive method for a class of nonlinear systems to design state observers which have the desirable robustness property. The relevance of this study is illustrated on monitoring the safe operation of a power distribution network.
SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration
This paper deals with the problem of secure state estimation in an adversarial environment with the presence of bounded noises. The problem is given as min-max optimization, that is, the system operator seeks an optimal estimate which minimizes the worst-case estimation error due to the manipulation by the attacker. To derive the optimal estimate, taking the reach set of the system into account, we first show that the feasible set of the state can be represented as a union of polytopes, and the optimal estimate is given as the Chebyshev center of the union. Then, for calculating the optimal state estimate, we provide a convex optimization problem that utilizes the vertices of the union. On the proposed estimator, the estimation error is bounded even if the adversary corrupts any subset of sensors. For the sake of reducing the calculation complexity, we further provide another estimator which resorts to the interval hull approximation of the reach set and properties of zonotopes. This approximated estimator is able to reduce the complexity without degrading the estimation accuracy sorely. Numerical comparisons and examples finally illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed estimators.
2018 Annual American Control Conference (ACC), 2018
Ahstract- We consider the problem of secure state estimation in an adversarial environment with the presence of bounded noises. We assume the adversary has the knowledge of the healthy measurements and system parameters. To countervail the dangerous attacker, the problem is given as a min-max optimization, that is, the system operator seeks an estimator which minimizes the worst-case estimation error due to the manipulation by the attacker. On the proposed estimator, the estimation error is bounded at all times even if the system removing an arbitrary set of 2l sensors is not observable, where $l$ is the number of the compromised sensors. To this end, taking the reach set of the system into account, we first show the feasible set of the state can be represented as a union of polytopes, and the optimal estimate is given as the Chebyshev center of the union. Then, for calculating the optimal state estimate, we provide a convex optimization problem that utilizes the vertices of the uni...
arXiv (Cornell University), 2019
This paper proposes a resilient state estimator for LTI discrete-time systems. The dynamic equation of the system is assumed to be affected by a bounded process noise. As to the available measurements, they are potentially corrupted by a noise of both dense and impulsive natures. In this setting, we construct the estimator as the map which associates to the measurements, the minimizing set of an appropriate (convex) performance function. It is then shown that the proposed estimator enjoys the property of resilience, that is, it induces an estimation error which, under certain conditions, is independent of the extreme values of the (impulsive) measurement noise. Therefore, the estimation error may be bounded while the measurement noise is virtually unbounded. Moreover, the expression of the bound depends explicitly on the degree of observability of the system being observed and on the considered performance function. Finally, a few simulation results are provided to illustrate the resilience property.
2020
Network-based attacks on control systems may alter sensor data delivered to the controller, effectively causing degradation in control performance. As a result, having access to accurate state estimates, even in the presence of attacks on sensor measurements, is of critical importance. In this paper, we analyze performance of resilient state estimators (RSEs) when any subset of sensors may be compromised by a stealthy attacker. Specifically, we consider systems with the well-known l0-based RSE and two commonly used sound intrusion detectors (IDs). For linear time-invariant plants with bounded noise, we define the notion of perfect attackability (PA) when attacks may result in unbounded estimation errors while remaining undetected by the employed ID (i.e., stealthy). We derive necessary and sufficient PA conditions, showing that a system can be perfectly attackable even if the plant is stable. While PA can be prevented with the use the standard cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., message...
This paper deals with the robust H∞ cyber-attacks estimation problem for control systems under stochastic cyberattacks and disturbances. The focus is on designing a H∞ ¿lter which maximize the attack sensitivity and minimize the effect of disturbances. The design requires not only the disturbance attenuation, but also the residual to remain the attack sensitivity as much as possible while the effect of disturbance is minimized. A stochastic model of control system with stochastic cyber-attacks which satisfy the Markovian stochastic process is constructed. And we also present the stochastic attack models that a control system is possibly exposed to. Furthermore, applying H ∞ ¿ltering technique-based on linear matrix inequalities (LMIs), the paper obtains suf¿cient conditions that ensure the ¿ltering error dynamic is asymptotically stable and satis¿es a prescribed ratio between cyber-attack sensitivity and disturbance sensitivity. Finally, the results are applied to the control of a Quadruple-tank process (QTP) under a stochastic cyber-attack and a stochastic disturbance. The simulation results underline that the designed ¿lters is effective and feasible in practical application.
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2016
The paper deals with resilient state estimation of cyber-physical systems subject to switching signal attacks and fake measurement injection. In particular, the random set paradigm is adopted in order to model the switching nature of the signal attack and the fake measurement injection via Bernoulli and/or Poisson random sets. The problem of jointly detecting a signal attack and estimating the system state in presence of fake measurements is then formulated and solved in the Bayesian framework leading to the analytical derivation of a hybrid Bernoulli filter that updates in real-time the joint posterior density of the detection attack Bernoulli set and of the state vector. Exploiting a Gaussian-mixture implementation of the filter, a simulation example is developed in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2015
Motivated by the need to secure cyber-physical systems against attacks, we consider the problem of estimating the state of a noisy linear dynamical system when a subset of sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a secure state estimation algorithm and derive (optimal) bounds on the achievable state estimation error. In addition, as a result of independent interest, we give a coding theoretic interpretation for prior work on secure state estimation against sensor attacks in a noiseless dynamical system. arXiv:1504.05566v2 [math.OC]
Automatica, 2019
This paper investigates the state estimation problem for multi-sensor systems under undetectable attacks. The system outputs are transmitted to the estimator via a non-secure network in the presence of adversary. A necessary and sufficient condition is established for the scenario that the attacks are undetectable by the detector of the multi-sensor system. The attack parameters can be obtained by solving an optimization problem such that the attack can not only circumvent detection but also degrade the estimation performance. By considering the estimation error dynamics with uncertainties, an estimator redesign method is derived for the case that the estimator believes there may exist undetectable attacks in the communication network. An illustrative example is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness and potential of the proposed attacker design and estimator redesign techniques.
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 2021
We address the problem of distributed state estimation of a linear dynamical process in an attack-prone environment. Recent attempts to solve this problem impose stringent redundancy requirements on the measurement and communication resources of the network. In this paper, we take a step towards alleviating such strict requirements by exploring two complementary directions: (i) making a small subset of the nodes immune to attacks, or "trusted", and (ii) incorporating diversity into the network. We define graph-theoretic constructs that formally capture the notions of redundancy, diversity, and trust. Based on these constructs, we develop a resilient estimation algorithm and demonstrate that even relatively sparse networks that either exhibit node-diversity, or contain a small subset of trusted nodes, can be just as resilient to adversarial attacks as more dense networks. Finally, given a finite budget for network design, we focus on characterizing the complexity of (i) selecting a set of trusted nodes, and (ii) allocating diversity, so as to achieve a desired level of robustness. We establish that, unfortunately, each of these problems is NP-complete.
2014 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, 2014
In this paper we present a methodology to control ground robots under malicious attack on sensors. Within the term attack we intend any malicious disturbance injection on sensors, actuators, and controller that would compromise the safety of a robot. In order to guarantee resilience against attacks, we use a control-level technique implemented within a recursive algorithm that takes advantage of redundancy in the information received by the controller. We use the case study of a vehicle cruise-control, however, the strategy we present in this work is general for several applications. Our methodology relays on redundancy in the sensor measurements: specifically we consider N velocity measurements and use a recursive filtering technique that estimates the state of the system while being resilient against sensor attacks by acting on the variance of the measurements noise. Finally, we move our focus on hardware validation demonstrating our algorithm through extensive outdoor experiments conducted on two unmanned ground robots.
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2021
This paper proposes a class of resilient state estimators for LTV discrete-time systems. The dynamic equation of the system is assumed to be affected by a bounded process noise. As to the available measurements, they are potentially corrupted by a noise of both dense and impulsive natures. The latter in addition to being arbitrary in its form, need not be strictly bounded. In this setting, we construct the estimator as the set-valued map which associates to the measurements, the minimizing set of some appropriate performance functions. We consider a family of such performance functions each of which yielding a specific instance of the general estimator. It is then shown that the proposed class of estimators enjoys the property of resilience, that is, it induces an estimation error which, under certain conditions, is independent of the extreme values of the (impulsive) measurement noise. Hence the estimation error may be bounded while the measurement noise is virtually unbounded. Moreover, we provide several error bounds (in different configurations) whose expressions depend explicitly on the degree of observability of the system being observed and on the considered performance function. Finally, a few simulation results are provided to illustrate the resilience property.
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