A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
Michael Tye
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Abstract
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This paper presents a theory of phenomenal concepts, arguing for the necessity of such concepts in defending physicalism about consciousness against anti-physicalist objections. It differentiates phenomenal thought types from non-phenomenal types, emphasizing their functional role and the way they contribute to our understanding of conscious experiences. Furthermore, it explores the implications of phenomenal concepts in relation to knowledge and discovery, while addressing potential challenges and alternative views.
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I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression 'phenomenal consciousness' that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term 'consciousness'. It is also possible to fail to distinguish between statements that are true about conscious states in virtue of their phenomenality, and statements that are true in virtue of other properties of conscious states. I review empirically informed arguments by scientists Bernard Balleine and Anthony Dickinson, Stevan Harnad, and Jeffrey Alan Gray, arguing that each of them makes errors based on the ambiguity. I conclude with some tentative suggestions for avoiding further confusion about the ambiguity.
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The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This 'phenomenal' aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.
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ABSTRACT (first two sentences added for 2013 upload) This paper focuses on the ontology and intentionality of conscious states (what conscious states are and what they represent). It also gives a critique of reductive physicalism. Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the “physical world”, it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem.
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Nonconceptual Content and Phenomenal Consciousness 비개념적 내용과 현상적 의식
The Journal of the Korean Soceity for Philosophy, 2009
N. Block criticizes that functionalists ignore the conceptual distinction between Access-Consciousness, which reflects the functional aspect of consciousness, and Phenomenal Consciousness, which reflects its phenomenal aspect. To support the distinction, he raises examples such as blindsighters, who react to what appeared in the visual field of which they cannot have any phenomenal experience, and G. Sperling’s test about the existence of iconic memories. This paper aims to argue that defining phenomenal consciousness by nonconceptual content has theoretical advantages and explains Block’s examples better than his definition. Nonconceptual content is found in informational states before cognitive, conceptual, or rational judgment. I define phenomenal consciousness as an informational state with nonconceptual content before our rational inferences, verbal reports, or behaviors. My definition agrees with the explanation of the mental by informational process, and keeps the conceptual autonomy of phenomenal consciousness. My suggestion can solve the problems that are entailed by Block’s or functionalists’ notion of consciousness. It also helps effectively defuse the zombie argument that, if a duplicate of me only without qualia is conceivable, it is possible.
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