The Internet and Jurisdiction Project, an NGO working on Internet and Jurisdiction issues, summed up the basic governance dilemma posed by the Internet. On the one hand, policymakers must 'preserve the global nature of cyberspace while respecting national laws.' On the other hand, they must 'fight misuses and abuses of the Internet, while ensuring the protection of human rights. (De la Chapelle and Fehlinger 2016, 1). Trade agreements provide a way to solve this governance dilemma, but they are not without flaws. Herein, I examine four chapters of the TPP—the Services Chapter, which delineates what kind of services are covered; the E-commerce Chapter, which governs cross-border information flows; the Transparency Chapter, which regulates how governments provide information to their citizens; and the Exceptions Chapter, which sets rules governing how and when nations may breach their obligations. I show that these chapters may help Internet users and policymakers advance Internet openness and make it harder for officials to restrict information flows –in those cases where doing so would have a trade impact. Moreover, citizens can more easily share information as to what their government is doing. TPP also contains transparency requirements that could bring much needed sunshine, due process, and increased political participation to trade (and Internet related) policymaking in countries, such as Malaysia. However, TPP's ability to limit censorship and filtering is limited. First, not all information flows are cross-border and hence subject to trade rules. Therefore, policymakers cannot always rely on trade agreements to defend Internet openness in countries, such as Malaysia. Second, these agreements provide clear exceptions that allow governments to restrict information flows when they deem necessary to achieve important domestic policy goals. Government officials can use national security, privacy, or public morals rationales to restrict information flows as long as they do so in a non-trade distorting manner. Thus, repressive states could use the exceptions to block information flows and other states might be reluctant to challenge these exceptions as discriminatory because trade diplomats recognize that they could also be challenged later if they took similar actions. Third, many Internet activists do not take kindly to the idea that trade agreements should become the main venue to regulate cross-border information flows. Meanwhile, proponents of using trade agreements to govern cross-border information flows have not developed clear and compelling arguments as to how these agreements will benefit Internet users, improve Internet governance and enhance human welfare. Until they do, Internet users are unlikely to support efforts to regulate the global Internet with trade agreements.