The Good and the Right Revisited

Philosophical Perspectives, 2009

I argue that "good" and "right" are gradable adjectives as that is understood in contemporary linguistic theory. In that theory, gradable adjectives do not denote properties but contribute meaning in a different yet cognitive way: they denote degrees, measures or grades, and the sentences incorporating them are typically truth-apt. If "good" and "right" are gradable adjectives, they contribute meaning and provide evaluativity and normativity by denoting degrees, measures or grades rather than denoting properties or expressing attitudes. Significant consequences will follow for metaethics, both because of the lack of properties good and right, and because of the truth-aptness of typical sentences with those words. I outline the theory of "good" and "right" as gradable adjectives, investigate how the theory works, consider whether the treatment might be expanded from non-moral intrinsic and instrumental good to rational and moral good, and explore some of the implications of the new semantics for various metaethical issues including truth conditions, normativity, the supervenience of the deontic on the non-deontic, the relations of "good" and "right" to "ought" and "must," and other metaethical matters.

Ratio 21 (3): 273-285 , 2008

My purpose in the present paper is two-fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision-making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.

But now that these outlines are to be printed and given to the general public, there is an opportunity of explaining points which in lecturing would be commented on orally. Thus the notes are enlarged in order to include cognate or conflicting ideas, further consequences of the theory ...

Philosophical Quarterly, 2024

What is the connection between moral rights and the good? While familiar normative theories give justificatory precedence to one notion over the other, this paper explores a neglected alternative: when properly specified, the notion of moral rights and of the good conceptually depend on each other.

Introduction: My topic is the relation between ideas of the good that a person should use in assessing his or her own life and ideas of the good that figure in moral and political philosophy. Moral Philosophy, as I will understand it, is concerned with principles regulating our conduct toward one another. It is concerned both with the content of these principles-with what morality requires-and with the question of acceptance-why and to what degree we should take them seriously guides to action. Political philosophy, as I will understand it, is concerned with standards for assessing large scale social institutions that we participate in and expect others to participate in. Here again there are questions of content-what justice requires-and questions of acceptance-why we should care about justice. Answers to both questions of content and questions of acceptance seem to depend on claims about individual good, that is to say, claims about what individuals have reason to want. But it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of claims of this kind. Claims of the first kind are claims about what is good from an individual's point of view, that is to say, about what a person has reason to want in general. Claims of the second kind are claims about what a person has reason to want taking into account only 1 This paper was first presented as the Routledge Lecture at the University of Cambridge. I am grateful to members of the audience on that occasion for their comments, and to members of the audiences on subsequent occasions, including the 2014 Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics. I am also grateful to Samuel Freeman, Frances Kamm, Christine Korsgaard, Daniel Star, to two anonymous reviewers for this volume, and especially to Derek Parfit for helpful comments and discussion. 2 effects on his or her life. Claims of the latter kind might be called claims about what is good for a person, and I will sometimes adopt this terminology. 2 The normative standpoint defined by the question of what, in general, an

2016

The aim of this thesis is to defend global consequentialism from its main objection, specifically the objection that it allows evaluative conflict. Global consequentialism differs from traditional forms of consequentialism in that it does not only focus on one type of thing, like acts or rules. Act consequentialism focuses on the right acts directly, and evaluates rules indirectly according to whether they lead to the right acts or not. Rule consequentialism focuses on what the right rules are, and evaluates acts indirectly by appealing to whether they conform to the right rules. Global consequentialism will rather evaluate any evaluand directly in terms of its consequences, whether it is an act, a set of rules, a law, a character trait, etc. But what should we say if having the best motives implies that you cannot do the best act. That is, if your motives are so strong they make it causally impossible for you to do the otherwise best act? This would amount to evaluative conflict, and it can supposedly happen between any set of evaluands. To put it colloquially, evaluative conflict means you are "damned if you do, and damned if you don't". I argue that evaluative conflict cannot occur since the principle 'ought' implies 'can' includes evaluands that are pragmatically impossible in conjunction with each other. If you cannot have the best motives and do the best action, then it will not be the case that you ought to have the best motives and do the best action. Derek Parfit argues that this defense would render wrongness obsolete. If determinism is true then all acts are determined by motives, and so no acts would be wrong. I argue that his solution also fails via a distinction between objective and subjective rightness. For subjective rightness his argument results in the counter-intuitive claim that we ought to do something we know that we cannot do. For objective rightness his argument leads to wrongness becoming obsolete for other theories as well, or it merely shifts wrongness to the level of motives as opposed to acts. I think that the best way of escaping these problems is to reject objective rightness. This in no way means we have to give up on a robust a notion of right and wrong, since subjective and objective rightness relates to our epistemic situation in relation to an objectively true morality, not a rejection of objectively true morality itself. VI VII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Several people have helped me, either by answering questions about their work, or by giving me invaluable feedback. A large gratitude is owed to Ole Martin Moen for being my excellent supervisor. Many of the ideas that I explore in this thesis were developed during my time at Rutgers University, especially during conversations with Holly Smith, but also during my classes with Derek Parfit. Both of them have also been so gracious as to respond to my subsequent queries about their work via e-mail, as has Elinor Mason, and Shelly Kagan. A great gratitude is also owed to Ainar Petersen Miyata, Conrad Bakka, and Mariona Eiren Bohlin Sturm for giving me feedback on the finished thesis. And, thank you to all of the great philosophers who have written so insightfully about the subjects that I discuss. VIII

Moral philosophy has long been marked by systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, I argue that in order to reliably arrive at moral truth, moral philosophy must be based upon seven scientific principles of theory-selection. I then argue that our best empirical evidence reveals morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. I show that this agreement—Rightness as Fairness—requires us to be fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile a variety of traditionally opposed moral and political frameworks. Finally, Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method for resolving applied moral and political issues: a method of ‘principled fair negotiation’ that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.

Natur und Freiheit, 2018

In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral worth must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to some interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant's conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in Groundwork I, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative.