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1997
AI
The paper critically assesses the higher education policy in Australia, arguing against the trend of reducing financial support while branding it as 'efficiency gains.' It posits that the belief in the self-funding of education is flawed and emphasizes that education, having historically driven civilization, warrants substantial public investment. The decline in educational spending is deemed detrimental to Australia's economic prospects and necessitates urgent attention to avoid adverse long-term effects.
Economic Affairs, 2004
Government schools cannot provide quality education for all. If the goal of education for all is to be achieved, the private sector must be encouraged and not squeezed out. Development agencies need to wake up to this because large-scale government education leads to failure on a large scale that can cause serious harm to the poor. James Tooley is Professor of Education Policy at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
The Economic Journal, 1997
. '… Higher Education has a vital role to play in raising the levels of the nation's skills and competitiveness and thus enhancing our capacity to generate wealth and improve our quality of life. The National Committee of Inquiry will make recommendations on how the purposes, shape, structure, size and funding of higher education should develop to meet the needs of the UK over the next twenty years …'.
The Australian Universities' review, 2007
The Commonwealth Government's Learning and Teaching Performance Fund (LTPF) is not about improving the quality of teaching and learning in Australian universities, it is about creating winners and losers in the higher education market. This article critiques the LTPF on two levels. First, it argues that it is conceptually and methodologically flawed and cannot succeed in its own terms. The measures used are not valid or reliable. Second, the paper argues that the primary purpose of the LTPF is to further differentiate the higher education market through the creation of winners and losers, generate market information for consumers, contribute to the culture of audit and accountability within universities, and foster market subjectivities in which academics feel the need to 'add value' to themselves (Ball 2003: 217). The measures used by the LTPF and the processes used to implement them are suited for these purposes. The first section of the paper outlines the aims of the LTPF, and the way in which it is implemented. The next section explains why it is conceptually and methodologically flawed in its own terms. The third section situates the LTPF as part of broader processes of neo-liberal reform. The putative aims of the LTPF The Learning and Teaching Performance Fund was announced in 2003 as part of then Commonwealth Education Minister Brendan Nelson's suite of 'Backing Australia's Future' reforms. The putative purpose of the Fund was 'to reward those institutions that best demonstrate excellence in learning and teaching' (Nelson 2003: 29
In recent years, private tuition has emerged as a major force as results of both demand and market mechanisms. In terms of its nature, extent, and importance, it is in fact, comparable to the formal system. It is like a shadow of the formal system (Bray, 1999). I believe private tuition, which is running parallel to the main education system undoubtedly is playing an important yet unnoticed role, thus impacting the education market immensely. The essence of private tuition(PT) lies in helping a child who is lagging behind in the class by providing support in terms of more attention and additional hours. However, teachers are using it as an additional source of income even if it violates the rule of RTE. Drawing from a nationally representative data of ASER 2007 in addition to a qualitative field-based study in Bangalore, I have attempted to document the possible effects of private tuitions in High literacy and Low literacy states. Private tuitions in Low literacy states have a greater significant positive impact on learning outcomes of a child than in High literacy states. This study aims to propose a policy framework which will enable all the students who are lagging behind irrespective of their socio- economic status to access additional quality support. The paper also suggests a way to recruit more trained teachers in the education system in order to enhance students’ learning outcomes.
American Association of University Professors (AAUP), 2013
The Private and the Public in Education Can we address the changing roles of our educational systems in society? By Joseph Galasso Once, when the sun was unassuming, the sky was silent, and only birds flew high, the air was of a slightly different shade of blue. Down on earth was found a breed of men who openly spoke about being their brothers' keepers. Such are the thoughts that come to us as we wander around our current political landscape: "There once was a time when long-term 'public' investment was held in high esteem as a means of maintaining the future of 'private' democratic values." This is the kind of language used today by writers like Louis Menand. For Menand, the landscape was populated by righteous men, private-sector types who answered a call to public service-for instance, liberal-minded Republican men of the Nelson Rockefeller type. Then a catastrophic event took place. Ronald Reagan's presidency was a meteorite that wiped out an entire breed. For Reagan, public denoted government, and government was to be dismantled at all costs. Before Reagan, an even leveling of economic growth secured the middle-class family for generations. The final demise of this prosperity is the legacy of George W. Bush.
The issue concerning who should pay the costs for Higher Education (HE) is a continuing global debate. Unsurprisingly, the increasing demand for HE has also raised its costs; this raises questions of efficiency and equity, in particular addressing credit market failures and debt aversion (Lockheed & Hanushek, 1990). In fact, a large factor influencing this concerns the returns to education and who benefits from it. For example, consumers who are unsatisfied by the private market benefits of education, will be less likely to uptake the cost of it (McMahon, 2004). However, problems such as risk and uncertainty associated with borrowing money for HE will increase if the government does not intervene (McMahon, 2004). Therefore, there is no simple and straightforward answer to the question of who should pay for HE; it can either be entirely the state, the consumer or a combination of both which is known as cost-share (Biffl & Isaac, 2002; Johnstone, 2003; Goodman & Kaplan, 2003). Hence, the aim of this paper is to provide an insight to the much-debated issue at hand, by justifying the arguments presented using a case study.
Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 2020
British Journal of Sociology of Education, 2019
is an American academic economist and libertarian. The arguments The Case Against Education seeks to construct can be distilled from the following quotation: Almost every politician vows to spend more on education. As an insider, I can't help gasping, 'Why? You want us to waste even more?' … Typical students burn thousands of hours studying material that neither raises their productivity nor enriches their lives … Schools obviously teach some broadly useful skill-especially literacy and numeracy. High schools often include a few vocational electives-auto shop, computer programming, woodworking. Most colleges offer some career-oriented majors-engineering, computer science, premed. But what about all the other courses? All the other majors? Think of all the classes you ever took. How many failed to teach you any useful skills? … If education really fails to raise worker productivity, why do employers bid so lavishly for educated labor? … The answer is a single word I seek to burn into your mind: signaling. Even if what a student learned in school is utterly useless, employers will happily pay extra if their scholastic achievements provide information about their productivity … Lest I be misinterpreted, I emphatically affirm that some education teaches useful skills … when this book defends the signalling theory of education, similarly it does not claim that all education is signaling. It claims that a significant fraction of education is signalling … at least one-third of students' time in school is signaling … at least one-third of the financial rewards students enjoy is signaling … we would be better off if education were less affordable. If subsidies for education were drastically reduced, many could no longer afford the education they now plan to get. If I am correct, however, there is no cause for alarm. It is precisely because education is so affordable that the labor market expects us to possess so much. Without subsidies, you would no longer need the education you can no longer afford … Ultimately, I believe the best education policy is no education policy at all: the separation of school and state. (pp. 1-6, original emphasis)
Australian Universities Review, 1998
2005
While the Constitution arrogates responsibility for educational matters to the States of Australia, the Commonwealth has been dominant in the area of university policy since the 1970s. In the creation of 'superministries' (Pusey 1991) in the early nineteen eighties the Department of Education was clustered with the portfolios of Employment and Training (DEET). In the 1990s Youth Affairs was added (DEETYA), then it became Education training and Youth Affairs (DETYA) when employment was relocated. Since 2002 it has been located with Science and Training (DEST). These classifications, while of sociological interest in illustrating the priorities of governments of the day through decisions as to bureaucratic architecture, will be subsumed in text under the 'Department of Education', or 'The Department'. 8 See Foss &Foss (2002) for a summary of the concept of distributed knowledge as taken up by theorists of information technology and organisational theory and as considered in terms of the hypothesis that distributed knowledge causes authority (as traditional hierarchical organisational structures) to fail.
In a series ofpapers, I have tried to provide a consistent explanation for the puzzle of why all the countries in the world have adopted public provision ofschooling despite what appears to be its relatively high costs. My hypothesis proposed that public provision of education, like public provision ofthe media and even the use ofcoercion, is just another device that governments have to reduce the effective level ofopposition arising from wealth transfers. People's views were assumed to be a function of the information that they receive. If governments can raise the costs of citizens receiving anti-transfer information and lower the costs oftheir receiving pro-transfer information, views more sympathetic to these transfers will be produced and the marginal opposition arising from an additional dollar oftransfers will be reduced. This simple hypothesis was shown to explain a variety of observable phenomena (Lott 1990c): (1) why higher government transfers and higher levels of totalitarianism are associated with increased expenditures on schooling, (2) how government expenditures on schooling vary in the same systematic way as government ownership oftelevision and radio stations, (3) why exclusive territories are used for public schooling but not for other publicly provided goods, and (4) why increased opposition to government is associated with higher rents to educators.' The systematic nature ofthese features of public schooling across countries seems to argue against an approach where
Policy Futures in Education, 2010
Journal of College Student Development, 2010
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