Embodied Cognitive Science

The purpose of this paper is to analyse in how far the new field of embodied cognitive science is compatible with the traditional cognitive science program, with a side view on possible differences in the explanatory power between the two different programs. Two conclusions are drawn. First, the various approaches in embodied cognitive science should be classified into two versions ‐ one of which is compatible with traditional approaches, the second of which is not. In particular, weak embodied theories are still compatible with the core of the traditional program because they still share the latterʹs computational strategies. By contrast, radical embodied theories are not compatible with the traditional program since they completely abandon the computational approach in favour of the complex interactions between the system, its body and the world. Second, weak and radical embodiment have different status. Weak embodied cognitive science seems likely to exceed the traditional program in explanatory power, because it can extend the pool of traditional concepts in interesting ways. By contrast, radical embodiment at current seems to be a theoretical position rather than a mature experimental research program, because it is in a process of conceptual and methodological clarification that predates substantial empirical research.

Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent's body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing. In general, dominant views in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science have considered the body as peripheral to understanding the nature of mind and cognition. Proponents of embodied cognitive science view this as a serious mistake. Sometimes the nature of the dependence of cognition on the body is quite unexpected, and suggests new ways of conceptualizing and exploring the mechanics of cognitive processing. Embodied cognitive science encompasses a loose-knit family of research programs in the cognitive sciences that often share a commitment to critiquing and even replacing traditional approaches to cognition and cognitive processing. Empirical research on embodied cognition has exploded in the past 10 years. As the bibliography for this article attests, the various bodies of work that will be discussed represent a serious alternative to the investigation of cognitive phenomena. Relatively recent work on the embodiment of cognition provides much food for thought for empirically-informed philosophers of mind. This is in part because of the rich range of phenomena that embodied cognitive science has studied. But it is also in part because those phenomena are often thought to challenge dominant views of the mind, such as the computational and representational theories of mind, at the heart of traditional cognitive science. And they have sometimes been taken to undermine standard positions in the philosophy of mind, such as the idea that the mind is identical to, or even realized in, the brain.

World Journal of Neuroscience , 2023

not isolated from the body but intimately tied to it. This perspective provides a fresh approach to the mind-body problem, emphasizing the role of the environment and perceptual experiences in shaping cognition. We invite further research into the practical applications of embodied cognition in fields like artificial intelligence, robotics, and psychology, and encourage investigations into the intersections between cognitive science and various branches of philosophy, offering valuable insights into the nature of consciousness and cognition. In essence, this study provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution and implications of embodied cognition, laying the groundwork for further research and fostering a deeper appreciation of the profound shifts in perspective that this theory brings to our understanding of the human mind.

There is a movement afoot in cognitive science to grant the body a central role in shaping the mind. Proponents of embodied cognition take as their theoretical starting point not a mind working on abstract problems, but a body that requires a mind to make it function. These opening lines by Clark (1998) are typical: " Biological brains are first and foremost the control systems for biological bodies. Biological bodies move and act in rich real-world surroundings " (p. 506). Traditionally, the various branches of cognitive science have viewed the mind as an abstract information processor , whose connections to the outside world were of little theoretical importance. Perceptual and motor systems, though reasonable objects of inquiry in their own right, were not considered relevant to understanding " central " cognitive processes. Instead, they were thought to serve merely as peripheral input and output devices. This stance was evident in the early decades of cognitive psychology, when most theories of human thinking dealt in proposi-tional forms of knowledge. During the same time period, artificial intelligence was dominated by computer models of abstract symbol processing. Philosophy of mind, too, made its contribution to this zeitgeist, most notably in Fodor's (1983) modularity hypothesis. According to Fodor, central cognition is not modular, but its connections to the world are. Perceptual and motor processing are done by informationally encapsulated plug-ins providing sharply limited forms of input and output. However, there is a radically different stance that also has roots in diverse branches of cognitive science. This stance has emphasized sensory and motor functions, as well as their importance for successful interaction with the environment. Early sources include the view of 19th century psychologists that there was no such thing as " imageless thought " (Good-win, 1999); motor theories of perception such as those suggested by William James and others (see Prinz, 1987, for a review); the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget, which emphasized the emergence of cognitive abilities out of a groundwork of sensorimotor abilities; and the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson, which viewed perception in terms of affordances— potential interactions with the environment. In the 1980s, linguists began exploring how abstract concepts may be based on metaphors for bodily, physical concepts (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). At the same time, within the field of artificial intelligence, behavior-based robotics began to emphasize routines for interacting with the environment rather than internal representations used for abstract thought (see, e.g., Brooks, 1986). This kind of approach has recently attained high visibility , under the banner of embodied cognition. There is a growing commitment to the idea that the mind must be understood in the context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with the world. It is argued that we have evolved from creatures whose neural resources were devoted primarily to perceptual and motoric processing, and whose cognitive activity consisted largely of immediate, on-line interaction with the environment. Hence human cog-nition, rather than being centralized, abstract, and sharply distinct from peripheral input and output modules, may instead have deep roots in sensorimotor processing. Although this general approach is enjoying increasingly broad support, there is in fact a great deal of diversity in the claims involved and the degree of controversy they attract. If the term embodied cognition is to retain meaning-625 The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body's interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) off-line cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

Hybris, 2017

The body is a highly complex, coordinated system engaged in coping with many environmental problems. It can be considered as some sort of opportunity or obstacle, with which internal processing must deal. Internal processing must take into account the possibilities and limitations of the particular body. In other words, even if the body is not involved in the realization of some cognitive explicit task, it is not a neutral factor of our understanding of why a system solves a task in one way or another. Therefore, when conducting research on embodiment and the body’s cognitive system we should not neglect internal, cognitive processing. I appeal to Goldman’s research on embodied cognition to sketch the broader framework for internal processing in embodied cognition. I believe that even if we don’t accept Goldman’s approach as the viable proposal for embodied cognition in general, it’s a quite natural starting point for our analysis. Goldman (2012; 2014, and with de Vignemont 2009) argue for the essential role of the bodily formats or bodily codes (respectively: B-formats and B-codes) in embodied cognition. B-codes are here described as the processing of regions or sub-regions of the central nervous system. They are primarily employed for body control or monitoring, and reused for cognitive tasks. Beyond doubt, this conception provides an excellent starting point for analyzing the internal (mostly neural) processing in cases of embodied cognition. At the end of this paper, I will argue that the embodiment of cognition needs a conceptual twist. Following Keijzer’s (2015) interest in the evolution of the nervous system, and the minimal forms of cognition, I argue that in investigating embodied cognition, we should investigate the role played by cognitive processing for specific kinds of organisms, meaning organisms with a body of a particular morphology (size, shape, kinds, and distribution of sensors and effectors). Doing that, I refer to some conceptual and empirical considerations. I will also try to show that research on embodied cognition is still not sufficiently anchored in evolutionary and comparative studies on cognition, nor on the nervous system and body morphology. Bigger reliance on these kinds of studies, will make it make possible to gain a deeper understanding of internal processing in embodied cognition.

International Journal of Language and Linguistics, 2014

This paper aimed at providing an overview on the post-cognitivist approach of embodiment theory. In the first section, a summary of the main tenets of the traditional cognitive theory are provided. Following the pros and cons of traditional cognitive theory, section two introduces the new trend in the field of cognitive science, i.e. the embodied cognitive approach. Then the main features and claims of embodiment theory are presented in section three. In sections four and five the confusions over the issue of embodiment and different types of embodiment are presented correspondingly, following a final conclusion section.

Cognitive Systems Research , 2013

Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional “embodied cognitive science”, which focuses predominantly on the body’s gross morphology, but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive systems.

Frontiers in human neuroscience, 2015

In this programmatic paper we explain why a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience is needed. We argue for such a claim based on problems that have arisen in cognitive neuroscience for the project of localizing function to specific brain structures. The problems come from research concerned with functional and structural connectivity that strongly suggests that the function a brain region serves is dynamic, and changes over time. We argue that in order to determine the function of a specific brain area, neuroscientists need to zoom out and look at the larger organism-environment system. We therefore argue that instead of looking to cognitive psychology for an analysis of psychological functions, cognitive neuroscience should look to an ecological dynamical psychology. A second aim of our paper is to develop an account of embodied cognition based on the inseparability of cognitive and emotional processing in the brain. We argue that emotions are best understood in terms of action re...

KOSMOS, Philosophical Society, St. Stephen's College, Delhi, 2023

In this essay, I would like to discuss a few topics on the notion of Embodied Cognition(thereafter as EC) or widely also known as Embodied mind. What is meant by the term Embodied Cognition?What exactly do we mean by embodiment of cognition? What is the need and purpose of such type of a cognitive theory? The constitution of body in cognition formation and the process of cognition. Can abstract ideas be embodied? Lastly, what is the scope of this theory to be applied in practical life? These are the few topics I would elaborate upon. I would do so by summarising some of the works on the topic and related topics that I have referred to for writing this paper along with my interpretations and takes of them.