Realism and Relativity

An extensive review of Einstein's theory of special relativity and his writings from today's scientific and philosophical perspectives found that at the turn of the 20th century, the scientific and philosophical views were not sufficiently developed to understand the problems that physicists faced and that Einstein tried to solve with his theory. Regardless how brilliant a scientist he was, in his pursuit, Einstein was guided by incorrect philosophical views; views prevalent at that time. These views misled him into an incorrect method and unrealistic theory with circular definitions, inconsistencies in the explanations and principles that contradict those developed from the empirical evidence. In particular, this study found that neither Einstein nor Poincaré expressed sufficiently the " inertial frames of reference " (coordinate systems) in their respective relativity principles. They expressed them in terms of the uniform movement of translation instead of absence of external forces. Because of that they both overlooked that fields generated in one frame of reference cause forces at a distance in the other frames of reference turning them into noninertial ones. Thus, their respective principles of relativity cannot be valid for field-based processes when field is generated outside of the frame of reference. Einstein's use of his relativity principle for conditions when it cannot be valid, in combination with an incorrect idealistic ontological view of the term " Law of Nature " and insufficient rationalistic understanding of the term " time, " misled him into an incorrect method of developing his theory and to incorrect inferences of the other principles and concepts of this theory. Thus, the foundations of Einstein's theory of special relativity, his two postulates (principle of relativity and the invariance of velocity of light) as well as the relativity of simultaneity cannot be any longer justified. With that, Einstein's attempt to unify light and electro-magnetism with mechanics, his concept of light, space, time and the whole theory of relativity with its other consequences cannot correctly represent the realities of the physical world. Apart from the philosophical, conceptual and logical problems of this theory, the invariance of velocity of light is in serious need for the experimental verification or refutation. Although the technology of Einstein's time was insufficient to carry out such test, it is technologically feasible to do so today. Therefore, it is recommended, and it should be of the utmost importance, for physicists to carry out such a test today. V C 2014 Physics Essays Publication. [http://dx. Résumé: Un examen approfondi de la théorie de la relativité restreinte d'Einstein et de ses e ´crits, réalisé au travers des connaissances scientifiques et philosophiques actuelles, montre qu'a ` l'orée du 20 ième siècle, les visions scientifiques et philosophiques n'e ´taient pas suffisamment développées pour comprendre les problèmes auxquels les physiciens faisaient face alors quand Einstein essayait de les résoudre avec sa théorie. Quand bien même il fut un brillant scientifique, Einstein e ´tait guidé par une approche philosophique incorrecte, approche qui e ´tait courante a ` l'e ´poque. L'environnement philosophique d'alors l'a amené a ` développer une méthode incorrecte et une théorie irréaliste basée sur des assertions, des explications inconsistantes et des principes qui contredisent ceux développés a ` partir de l'e ´vidence empirique. Cette e ´tude montre, en particulier que ni Albert Einstein ni Henri Poincaré n'ont suffisamment approfondi les " référentiels inertiels " dans leurs respectifs principes de la relativité. Ils les ont définis par le mouvement de translation uniforme au lieu de les définir par l'absence de forces extérieures. Pour cette raison, ils ont tous les deux négligé le fait que des champs générés dans un cadre de référence provoquent des forces a ` distance dans les autres cadres de référence les transformant en noninertiels. Ainsi leurs respectifs principes de la relativité ne peuvent e ˆtre valides pour des processus basés sur le champ quand le champ est généré en dehors du cadre de référence. L'utilisation par Einstein de ses principes de la relativité dans des conditions qui ne peuvent e ˆtre validées, en combinaison avec une vision ontologique incorrecte et idéaliste du terme " Loi de la Nature " et une compréhension rationnelle a) [email protected] 0836-1398/2014/27(3)/411/37/$25.00 V C 2014 Physics Essays Publication 411 PHYSICS ESSAYS 27, 3 (2014) insuffisante du terme " Temps " , l'amenèrent a ` développer sa théorie au moyen d'une méthode incorrecte et tirer des conclusions erronées sur les autres principes et concepts de sa théorie. Ainsi, les bases de la théorie d'Einstein sur la relativité restreinte, ses deux postulats (principe de la relativité et l'invariabilité de la vitesse de la lumière) ainsi que la relativité de la simultanéité ne peuvent plus e ˆtre justifiés. Avec cela, la tentative d'Einstein d'unifier lumière et e ´lectromagnétisme avec la mécanique, son concept sur la lumière, l'espace, le temps et toute la théorie sur la relativité y compris ses autres conséquences ne peuvent pas représenter les réalités du monde physique. Mis a ` part les problèmes philosophique, conceptuel et logique de sa théorie, l'invariabilité de la vitesse de la lumière a un sérieux besoin d'une vérification ou réfutation expérimentale. Mais si la technologie au temps d'Einstein e ´tait insuffisante pour mener a ` bien un tel test, c'est techniquement faisable de nos jours. C'est pourquoi, il est conseillé aux physiciens, et c'est de la plus haute importance, de procéder a ` ce test aujourd'hui.

2015

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of con-straints in the theory of relativity and, in particular, what philosophical work they do for Einstein's views on the laws of physics. Einstein presents a view of local structure laws which he characterizes as the most appropriate form of physical laws. Einstein was committed to a view of science, which presents a synthesis be-tween rational and empirical elements as its hallmark. If scientific constructs are free inventions of the human mind, as Einstein, held, the question arises how such rational constructs, including the symbolic formulation of the laws of physics, can represent physical reality. Representation in turn raises the question of realism. Einstein uses a number of constraints in the theory of relativity to show that by imposing constraints on the rational elements a certain fit between theory and reality can be achieved. Fit is to be understood as satisfaction of constraint. His emphasis on...

Polish Journal of Philosophy IV:1, pp.45-64., 2010

Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’s theory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for various resonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political context account for his reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probably had a formative influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1990

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 2016

This text is the author's English version of the work published in Spanish in Contextos (Universidad de León) lV/7, 1986, pp. 161-174, on the occasion of the bicentennial of the publication of Kant's book discussed herein. I have back-translated the literal quotations in Spanish in the original publication, so there may be slight differences between them.]

Polish Journal of Philosophy, V.1 (Spring 2011), pp.97-116.

Part I in this two-part series employed a perspectival interpretation to argue that Kant’s epistemology serves as the philosophical grounding for modern revolutions in science. Although Einstein read Kant at an early age and immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy throughout his early adulthood, he was reluctant to admit Kant’s influence, possibly due to personal factors relating to his cultural-political situation. This sequel argues that Einstein’s early Kant-studies would have brought to his attention the problem of simultaneity and the method of solving it that eventually led to the theory of relativity. Despite Einstein’s reluctance to acknowledge his Kantian grounding, a perspectival understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science shows it is profoundly consistent with Einstein’s views on both synthetic apriority and the nature of scientific theory. Moreover, Kant and Einstein share quasi-mystical religious tendencies, relying on an unknowable absolute as the ultimate boundary of our scientific understanding of nature.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2013

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2013

Kant's transcendental method, as applied to natural philosophy, considers the laws of physics as conditions of the possibility of experience. A more modest transcendental project is to show how the laws of motion explicate the concepts of motion, force, and causal interaction, as conditions of the possibility of an objective account of nature. This paper argues that such a project is central to the natural philosophy of Newton, and explains some central aspects of the development of his thinking as he wrote the Principia. One guiding scientific aim was the dynamical analysis of any system of interacting bodies, and in particular our solar system; the transcendental question was, what are the conceptual prerequisites for such an analysis? More specifically, what are the conditions for determining ''true motions'' within such a system-for posing the question of ''the frame of the system of the world'' as an empirical question? A study of the development of Newton's approach to these questions reveals surprising connections with his developing conceptions of force, causality, and the relativity of motion. It also illuminates the comparison between his use of the transcendental method and that of Euler and Kant.

This paper is a summary of my doctoral dissertation on philosophical interpretations of Einstein's special and general theories of relativity, submitted to the Dept. for History of Science, Univ. of Hamburg, in 1989, which was recently published in the Series Science Networks at Birkauser.i After a brief overview of its content I will focus on a discussion of the method employed to analyse philosophical interpretations of a physical theory.

Philosophia Scientiae, 2009

Cet article a pour objectif de présenter un compte-rendu accessible de l'immense héritage philosophique de l'oeuvre scientifique d'Einstein. Einstein n'était pas un philosophe de métier, mais son raisonnement en sciences physiques portait en soi des conséquences philosophiques qu'il était prêt à explorer. En explorant les conséquences philosophiques de ses travaux scientifiques Einstein s'inscrit dans la démarche de physiciens tels que Newton, Mach, Planck et Poincaré. Einstein déduisait les conséquences philosophiques de la problématique que son travail de physicien faisait surgir. Ces conséquences philosophiques vont de la métaphysique à la philosophie de la physique. Dans une certaine mesure, ces conséquences philosophiques peuvent être considérées comme étant des réponses à des questions philosophiques. On peut noter en particulier, ses vues sur l'aspect représentationnel des théories scientifiques et son insistance, à leur sujet, sur la notion de contraintes. Les travaux sur Einstein ont souvent négligé l'étude des contraintes en philosophie des sciences.

At the beginning of the modern age, mathematics had a great importance for the study of Nature. Galileo claimed that 'the book of nature was written in a kind of mathematical code, and that if we could only crack that code, we could uncover her ultimate secrets'. But, how can mathematics, consisting of necessary tautological truths that are infallible and non-informative, be regarded as the language of natural sciences, while the knowledge of natural sciences is informative, empirical and fallible? Or, is there another alternative: as Hume claimed, modern sciences only depend on empirical data deriving from our perceptions, rather than having the necessity of mathematics. Many philosophers have tried to find an adequate answer for the problem of the relationship between mathematical necessity and contingent perceptions, but the difficulty remained unsolved until Kant's construction of his original philosophy of the nature as well as the limits of human reason. The main purpose of this study is to show how Kant overcomes this difficulty by making use of the examples of Euclidean geometry and of arithmetic: there are synthetic a priori (a priori, universal, necessary, but at the same time informative) judgments, and indeed mathematical propositions are of this kind.

The paper aims to bring out Kant’s perspective on space and time, elucidate its ramifications in the field of Mathematics and Science, especially Euclidean geometry and throw light on the challenges it faced with the emergence of non-Euclidean conceptions of space and time. The paper also submits a defence of Kant against those challenges. The fundamental attempt here is elaborate Kant’s contributions to classical Physics and Mathematics as well as to carve out a niche for and establish relevance of his ideas on space and time amidst the modern theories of Physics and Mathematics.