Invariance, Symmetries and Structural Realism

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2018

The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental-especially in quantum physics-are best understood not in terms of physical relations being fundamental, but rather in terms of 'metaphysical coherentism'-the view according to which object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The coherentist perspective is developed in some detail and contrasted with extant varieties of structuralism and holism.

Philosophy, 2005

Scientific Structuralism, 2011

The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism (OSR). We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental physical objects exist. Physical structures thus consist in objects for whom it is essential that they are related in certain ways. There hence are objects, but they do not possess an intrinsic identity. This view can also admit intrinsic properties as ways in which objects exist provided that these do not amount to identity conditions for the objects. Finally, we indicate how this view can take objective modality into account.

Contemporary Polish Ontology, 2019

The main goal of the paper is to revisit the concept of a symmetry for relational structures in the light of the ontological position dubbed “essentialist structuralism”. It is argued that the standard definition of this concept commits us to the existence of non-qualitative, haecceitistic differences between possible worlds. An alternative notion of symmetry is developed, based on the distinction between essential and contingent structures. It is claimed that this new concept is better suited for the doctrine of structuralism, and moreover it offers a new perspective on some well-known problems in the foundation of physical theories, such as the problem of permutation invariance in quantum mechanics and diffeomorphism invariance in general relativity.

2016

2021

Symmetry fundamentalism claims that symmetries should be taken metaphysically seriously as part of the fundamental ontology. The main aim of this paper is to bring some novel objections against this view. I make two points. The first places symmetry fundamentalism within a broader network of philosophical commitments. I claim that symmetry fundamentalism entails idealization realism which, in turn, entails the reification of further theoretical structures. This might lead to an overloaded ontology as well as open the way to criticisms from metaphysical frameworks that reject such reifications. The second point contrasts symmetry fundamentalism with the now common view that regards symmetries as stipulations guiding empirical research and theory construction. I claim that both views clash each other and cannot be held together. I finish the paper with a more positive prospect that will be developed in future work-symmetry deflationism.

Ontic Structural Realism is a version of realism about science according to which by positing the existence of structures, understood as basic components of reality, one can resolve central difficulties faced by standard versions of scientific realism. Structures are invoked to respond to two important challenges: one posed by the pessimist meta-induction and the other by the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics, which arises in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We argue that difficulties in the proper understanding of what a structure is undermines the realist component of the view. Given the difficulties, either realism should be dropped or additional metaphysical components not fully endorsed by science should be incorporated.

arXiv (Cornell University), 2015

Information, 2016

Attempts to answer questions regarding the ontological status of information are frequently based on the assumption that information should be placed within an already existing framework of concepts of established ontological statuses related to science, in particular to physics. However, many concepts of physics have undetermined or questionable ontological foundations. We can look for a solution in the recognition of the fundamental role of invariance with respect to a change of reference frame and to other transformations as a criterion for objective existence. The importance of invariance (symmetry) as a criterion for a primary ontological status can be identified in the methodology of physics from its beginnings in the work of Galileo, to modern classifications of elementary particles. Thus, the study of the invariance of the theoretical description of information is proposed as the first step towards ontology of information. With the exception of only a few works among publications which set the paradigm of information studies, the issues of invariance were neglected. Orthodox analysis of information lacks conceptual framework for the study of invariance. The present paper shows how invariance can be formalized for the definition of information and, accompanying it, mathematical formalism proposed by the author in his earlier publications.