The Tension in Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Scepticism

This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. Indeed, it is argued that on a reading of On Certainty which has Wittgenstein advancing a primarily epistemological thesis, there is in fact strong evidence to suggest that Wittgenstein thought that no epistemic response to the sceptic was available—at best, it seems, only a pragmatic anti- sceptical thesis is on offer. Such a conclusion is not without import to the present debate regarding radical scepticism, however, since it poses a general challenge for how the sceptical argument is conceived in the contemporary literature.

Tattva - Journal of Philosophy, 2015

2005

Does Wittgenstein’s On Certainty point to a sustained treatment of philosophical problems about knowledge and justification of the kind that Philosophical Investigations supplies for matters of mind, language and their relation to the world? Some of the reasons for pessimism are systematic. Casting about for why Moore’s pronouncements about the external world and his knowledge thereof, as well as sceptical doubts concerning them, are prone to strike him at one time as nonsense, at another as perfectly intelligible, Wittgenstein acknowledges that ‘it is…difficult to find the beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning’ (OC 471). A little earlier, struggling with the idea that ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts’ (OC 401), he dismisses this way of talking as ‘thoroughly bad’ (OC 402) and complains, ‘I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say’ (OC 400).

2011

The paper defends Wittgenstein's claim to be an opponent of scepticism, by way of a new analysis of the internal structure of what is known as the Private Language Argument.

We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti- sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view⎯viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account of the meta-sceptical problem which this proposal generates, which we call epistemic vertigo.

The present work discusses some of the main epistemological views of the later Wittgenstein, as developed in the notes written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein’s life and posthumously published in "On Certainty" (1969). Chapter 1 introduces the issues that occupied Wittgenstein in those months. Hence, after presenting a typical radical sceptical argument, I briefly discuss the two articles by G. E. Moore – “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939) – which prompted Wittgenstein’s reflections, as well as Norman Malcolm’s (1949) “Defending Common Sense”. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the discussion of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore and to his grammatical investigation on the use of “know”. Here I engage critically with the "framework reading" of "On Certainty" and more specifically with the thesis according to which Wittgenstein maintained that when Moore claimed to know the truisms of common sense, he ended up producing nonsense. In chapter 3 I take issue with another tenet upheld by some members of the framework reading, namely, the idea that Moore’s common-sense propositions (also known as “hinge propositions”) are (and were held by Wittgenstein to be) grammatical proposition. I point out that this thesis has little textual support and is at odds with Wittgenstein’s overall conception of grammar. In chapter 4 and 5 I engage in two debates concerning the relations between Wittgenstein’s reflections in "On Certainty" and some traditional epistemological positions, namely foundationalism (chapter 4) and relativism (chapter 5). In chapter 4 I argue against the idea that "On Certainty" shows Wittgenstein putting forth a sui generis foundationalist theory of knowledge. In chapter 5 I distinguish between conceptual and epistemic relativism, and I endorse the view that Wittgenstein is correctly described as a conceptual relativist. Then I argue that, although the textual evidence is not decisive and different interpretative lines remain possible, the relevant passages in "On Certainty" do not commit Wittgenstein to epistemic relativism.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), where he offers a sustained and, at least apparently, fragmentary treatment of epistemological issues. Given the ambiguity and obscurity of this work, written under the direct influence of G. E. Moore’s A Defense of Commonsense (1925, henceforth DCS) and Proof of an External World (1939, henceforth PEW), in the recent literature on the subject, we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC; at first, this article presents the uncontentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on skepticism, that is, his criticisms against Moore’s use of the expression “to know” and his reflections on the artificial nature of the skeptical challenge. Then it introduces the elusive concept of “hinges,” central to Wittgenstein’s epistemology and his views on skepticism; and it offers an overview of the dominant “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical strategies along with the main objections raised against these proposals. Finally, it briefly sketches the recent applications of Wittgenstein’s epistemology in the contemporary debate on skepticism.