Ideas and Animals: The Hard Problem in Leibnizian Metaphysics

Metafísica y persona

According to Robert M. Adams’ interpretation, Leibniz holds that an aggregate of substances exists in the mind that perceives them as one being. For Leibniz, an aggregate is dependent upon a mind since its being is realized by a mental action. Since Leibniz states that being and unity are convertible, and the unity of an aggregate is completely dependent upon mind, Adams takes Leibniz to hold that an aggregate exists in the mind. In this paper, I argue against Adams that an aggregate of substances is an external object. I show that there are passages that support this interpretation. I further make clear that substances in an aggregate have a remarkable feature in common, and it is possible that an aggregate exists in relation to a mind as an external object.

Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia, 2001

RESUMO A concepção leibniziana dos corpos parece ser uma teoria enigmática. Corpos são vistos como agregados de mônadas e como fenômenos bem fundados. Isso deu origem a controvérsias ea discussões intermináveis. Este artigo tenta resolver as ...

2010

A Nita ed. Leibniz's metaphysics and adoption of substantial forms (Springer)., 2015

This paper is a critical discussion of the claims of Donald Rutherford and Brandon Look in their introduction to the Leibniz-Des Bosses correspondence. It offers a defence of the claim that, at least for a period, Leibniz regarded corporeal substances as entities comprised monads. The central claim is that, unlike aggregates of monads, the pluralities of monads that comprise corporeal substances can be said to have a kind of per se unity based on the relational structure that they realise.

2011

Leibniz Society Review, 1994

Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum

As an idealist, Gottfried Wilhelm leibniz could not recognize anything corporeal as substantial. However, under the influence of Cartesian terminology, he devoted considerable effort to analysing the corporeal world, while not recognizing its real substantiality of course. leibniz took the concept of substance from Plato, Aristotle and the scholastics, but developed it in two ways. it is a well-known fact that leibniz introduced the term 'corporeal substance' in his letter to Antoine Arnauld dated to october 1687. in the letter, leibniz understands an object of nature, like an animal or a plant, as 'corporeal substance'. in the very same letter, leibniz introduces the terms 'indivisibility' and 'phenomenon'. every corporeal substance can be real only as a unity, i.e. by being indivisible. such entity must have a soul or at least an entelechy. in an opposite case, that entity would not be a real unity but just a phenomenon. no corporeal entity is indivisible and therefore not a substance. the paper aims at introducing leibniz's distinction between substances and phenomena and taking a closer look at the historicalphilosophical influences Leibniz experienced while developing his views of the corporeal world. Aristotle and Descartes will receive most of the attention, of course, as the concepts of 'entelechy' and 'hylomorphism' were introduced by the former, and the understanding of corporeal substance as determined by extension alone is part of the latter. the core of the original critique by Leibniz takes off from the properties of the continuum as well as the nature of shape, motion and extension. the case of continuum will receive special attention. it is analysed with the help of the novel approaches by samuel levey and Vassil Vidinsky. leibniz was critical about our poor understanding of the continuum but his own interpretation of it was not fully consistent either. Although the new developments enable us to take a fresh look that has not been possible so far, the issue remains open for further study.

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz's rehahilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained etlort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylnmorphic analysis of corporeal suhstances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz's theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz's metaphysics. P or Leibniz, a simple substance such as a soul or a mind is a "complete being" in the sense that it is the origin of its own actions, and that it represents in a confused way all its previous states.] Indeed, what could be more complete than a simple substance with its causal independence and autonomy in the production of its own states'! Nevel1heless, in the Addition a l' Explication du systeme nouveau (1698), written as a response to an extended review of the first edition of Fran~ois Lamy's De la C0l10iSSallce de soi-mcme," Leibniz embraces the Scholastic view that soul and body, in some sense, are incomplete entities. 3 Although the passages in which Leibniz takes up this thought in subsequent years are not very numerous, Robet1 M. Adams has suggested that it most fully expresses Leibniz's attempt to integrate a Scholastic theory of corporeal substance into his philosophy.4 Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister have proposed interpretations that diverge markedly from Adams'. Rozemond objtcts that Leibniz cannot reproduce basic features of the Scholastic view within the framework of his own metaphysics. According to her interpretation, it is essential for the Scholastic theory that mind and body are related to each other as matter and form, which supplement each other as act and potency -a structure that the relations of mutual representation

Ratio, 1998

There appear to be at least two kinds of compound physical substances: compound pieces of matter, which have their parts essentially, and living organisms, which do not. Examples of the former are carbon atoms, salt molecules, and pieces of gold; and examples of the latter are protozoa, trees, and cats. Given that there are compound entities of these two kinds, and given that they can be created or destroyed by assembly or disassembly, questions naturally arise about the nature of the causal relations which unite their parts. In answer to these questions, we first argue that the parts of a compound piece of matter are connected via a relation of dynamic equilibrium of attractive and repulsive forces. We then argue that the parts of an organic living thing are united in a different way: they are functionally connected in a broadly Aristotelian sense which is compatible with an ultimately nonteleological, naturalistic biology. 1 While Aristotle seems to deny the reality of artifacts, he acknowledges the reality of the underlying pieces of matter. Also note that an artifact's 'existence' is logically dependent upon our beliefs and decisions in a way in which the actual existence of a physical substance belonging to a natural kind is not.