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MORAL TRUTH: OBSERVATIONAL OR THEORETICAL

Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better. I Introduction. To some empirically-minded philosophers, morality comprises a vast set of human experiences and practices. Some of them are pathological, but none are categorically veridical or illusory , right or wrong. Moral judgements, on this purely anthropologi-cal view, reflect the responses of neurologically diverse and culturally constrained observers but have no epistemic standing. The regulations, penalties and rewards deemed appropriate and imposed by different cultures and subcultures—their moral systems —seem to be extensions, curtailments and embellishments of basic patterns of reactivity. Some moral attitudes and practices change; other seem robust. As there is a range of body types and faces, all of them recognizably human, some of them quite odd, and none of them specially privileged, there is a range of moral sensibilities delivering partially overlapping sets of moral judgements, all of them recognizably human, some of them quite odd, and none of them specially privileged. Of some 'we' approve; of others 'we' disapprove; and other people and other cultures and subcultures classify and describe