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Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better. I Introduction. To some empirically-minded philosophers, morality comprises a vast set of human experiences and practices. Some of them are pathological, but none are categorically veridical or illusory , right or wrong. Moral judgements, on this purely anthropologi-cal view, reflect the responses of neurologically diverse and culturally constrained observers but have no epistemic standing. The regulations, penalties and rewards deemed appropriate and imposed by different cultures and subcultures—their moral systems —seem to be extensions, curtailments and embellishments of basic patterns of reactivity. Some moral attitudes and practices change; other seem robust. As there is a range of body types and faces, all of them recognizably human, some of them quite odd, and none of them specially privileged, there is a range of moral sensibilities delivering partially overlapping sets of moral judgements, all of them recognizably human, some of them quite odd, and none of them specially privileged. Of some 'we' approve; of others 'we' disapprove; and other people and other cultures and subcultures classify and describe
Frontiers in Psychology, 2021
Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist “moralities” thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each soc...
1990
In tro d u c tio n 1 1 Consistency and U n iv e r s a liz a b i1i t y 12 2 U n iv e r s a liz a b i1i t y and Impersonal 65 Reasons 3 U n iv e r s a liz a b i1i t y as a Formal 103 and a M a te ria l P r in c ip le Needs and Moral Reasons 139 Psychological Needs 197 Moral B e lie fs and Psychological 265 Needs U n ive rs alizab le-N e ed s Theory 321 C r itic is m and Conclusion 383 Endnotes 437 B ibliog raphy 462 ABSTRACT Can th e re be an answer to the question 'Which moral judgements ought anyone to make?' th a t does not depend upon c o n te s ta b le value assumptions? My essay brings to g e th e r two h ith e r to unconnected ways of responding to t h is problem to be found in recent m eta-ethics; the claim th a t our p a r t ic u la r moral judgements must be u n iv e r s a liz a b le and the c laim th a t our commonsense moral b e lie fs are grounded in human needs. 'G r a titu d e ' , E th ic s , v o l. 85, p p .298-309. C r it ic a l Thinking, 2nd e d. , New York: Prentice Hall Inc. Problems of A n a ly s is , Cornell U n iv e rs ity Press. 'The Golden Rule: A Defense' , Southern Journal of Philosophy W inter, p p .172-177. 'R elativism , Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge' , in M .H o llis & S.Lukes R a tio n a lity and R e la tiv is m. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ethical S tu d ies, 2nd ed .
2020
Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of particularism by rebutting several powerful generalist arguments. It is hoped particularism can thus be made more attractive as a theory of moral perception. Positive arguments for particularism will also be provided along the way
Philosophy, 2008
I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and 'queerness'. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L.Mackie (about motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
Addresses debates in anthropology about morality, and argues that such studies must take the problem of evil into account insofar as without evil morality would be moot.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014
This book, through its essays, captures this interdisciplinary nature of research into morality, treated both as a social fact, as well as man's individual disposition. The Slovak philosopher and ethicist Vasil Gluchman, as the book's scientific editor, divided the book into two parts, the first, entitled Different Concepts of Morality presents, in accordance with its title, various and sometimes even controversial stances related to the understanding of key issues of morality. The second part of the book titled New Trends in Understanding Morality consists primarily of the author's attempts to explain the sources of morality formulated not only by ethics, but also by the biological sciences. In this short presentation it is clear that both the scientific editor as well as the individual authors, did not set themselves the objective of writing another book on moral philosophy, but instead focused themselves on the key issues which determine the status and direction of contemporary research into morality. In the introduction, Vasil Gluchman stressed, that no ethical theories can be formulated which can be applied eternally. Each age is characterized by its particular morality, and hence ethics must constantly adapt to existing realities. The first chapter of the book is Jeremy Bendik-Keymer's essay titled The Moral and the Ethical: What Conscience Teaches us about Morality. The problem of conscience, by reference to individually molded sensitivity, is placed within the psychology of morality. The author tries to prove that only molded conscience allows us to establish and maintain social relationships. The author carries out his reasoning using human rights as an example. History has shaped human conscience and thus, after the Holocaust, following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, human conscience has been completely reshaped. Thus conscience becomes a fundamental category of humanism, because it was shaped in interpersonal relations, and therefore morality must also be relational (p. 17). Therefore, a person functioning in society becomes a moral being, and consequently the author answers the question of whether morality is innate, or is the result of the influence of society. Such a solution adopted by the author is heralded by the motto "Even though you are far from my eyes, you are in my heart" which constitutes an introduction to his article. Howard M. Ducharme from the University of Akron in his article A Critical Evaluation of a Classic Moral Scientist: Are there any Moral Facts to Discover? compares ethical tradition
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Encultured individuals see the behavioral rules of cultural systems of moral norms as objective. In addition to prescriptive regulation of behavior, moral norms provide templates, scripts, and scenarios regulating the expression of feelings and triggered emotions arising from perceptions of norm violation. These allow regulated defensive responses that may arise as moral idea systems co-opt emotionally associated biological survival instincts.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Major routes to identifying individual differences (in diverse species) include studies of behaviour patterns as represented in language and neurophysiology. But results from these approaches appear not to converge on some major dimensions. Identifying dimensions of human variation least applicable to non-human species may help to partition human-specific individual differences of recent evolutionary origin from those shared across species. Human culture includes learned, enforced social-norm systems that are symbolically reinforced and referenced in displays signalling adherence. At a key juncture in human evolution bullying aggression and deception-based cheating apparently became censured in the language of a moral community, enabling mutual observation coordinated in gossip, associated with external sanctions. That still-conserved cultural paradigm moralistically regulates selfish advantage-taking, with shared semantics and explicit rules. Ethics and moral codes remain critical ...
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