Hume's Inductive Logic

Hume Studies, 31.1, 2005, 21–36, 2005

Hume Studies, 1977

Dialogue, 2009

In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues strongly against our intuitions about induction. In his view, the justification of induction relies upon the principle of the uniformity of nature, a principle that we can only justify by an appeal to induction. Thus, a non-circular justification of induction is impossible. This argument has troubled philosophers ever since, especially philosophers interested in the philosophy of science. One prominent solution to this problem comes from Karl Popper, who posited a deductivist solution to the problem. In this paper, I will briefly summarize Hume's argument as well as Popper's response to it. I will then argue that Popper's account twice fails to solve the problem of induction: first, as A. J. Ayer pointed out, his account appears to contain a built-in inductive assumption, and second, by shifting his discussion from induction to deduction, Popper begs Hume's question, merely shifting from a problem of induction to a problem of deduction.

Philosophia, 1998

Philosophy of Science, 2010

In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's Problem (Schurz, 2008). This paper critically examines the merits of the approach proposed by Schurz. It is shown that for various reasons and despite some interesting and non trivial results of Schurz' article, the meta-inductivist approach cannot claim to offer a solution for Hume's problem. Moreover, it can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With this limitation the meta-inductivist approach is not better suited to solve the problem of induction than existing Baysian approaches. Contents 1 Introduction 2 The Meta-inductivist's strategy 3 Limitations on the technical side 3.

In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's Problem . This paper critically examines the merits of the approach proposed by Schurz. It is shown that for various reasons and despite some interesting and non trivial results of Schurz' article, the meta-inductivist approach cannot claim to offer a solution for Hume's problem. Moreover, it can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With this limitation the meta-inductivist approach is not better suited to solve the problem of induction than existing Baysian approaches.

We give a brief introduction of Hume’s epistemology and his penetrating analysis of causality. It is pointed out that there are some flaws in his epistemology and his theory of causation. Alternative theories of causation are then briefly introduced. Partly inspired by Hume’s analysis of necessary connexion, we present a new argument of causation. We argue that Hume’s removing necessary connexion from causality can help to provide a promising way to unify the law of causality and indeterminism. We then propose a generalized principle of causality, according to which there are two kinds of causes: concrete causes and universal causes, and correspondingly there are two kinds of effects: lawful events and random events. Each actual effect is composed of both lawful element and random element. A detailed analysis of the motion of objects is also given to support the new principle.