PHILOSOPHY AND POWER IN AVERROES

"My paper presents a view of the Aristotelic reading which in the Comentary on the Republic Averroes forms of this work by Plato. In this reading the transformation of the Platonic philosopher-king into the Aristotelian phrónimos becomes evident. Our interpretation is based on the Latin version of this work by Averroes, accomplished in the XVth century by Elia del Medigo. In Book II of this treatise, there is a passage in which he says that the sovereign should be “wise according to practical science, and with this, have the merit of cogitative virtue”. We note, in this phrase, Aristotle’s ethics as practical science and the cogitative virtue (phrónesis) which is essential for the sovereign’s virtuous fulfillment. This corroborates what Averroes affirms in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachea that “prudence and the art of governing cities are a unique area of investigation (subiecto)”. Thus, the art of governing has two sides, the theoretical and the practical, or, the ethical and the political. My analysis covers the study of “cogitative virtue”, and identifies it with prudence or practical knowledge, the Aristotelian phrónesis. By reason of the methodology adopted by Averroes, and of the crititiques that he makes about the society of his time, this treatise is shaped more like an original work than a commentary on the traditional examples of his commentaries on Aristotelic works. KEY-WORDS: Arabic-Islamic Philosophy; Aristotle; Averroes; Al-Fārābī; Aristotelic Reading of Plato’s Republic; Art of Governing; Ethics; Politics; Cogitative Virtue (Phrónesis). "

Al-Farabi

The article examines the problem of managing society according to the principle of «the power of the best» in the system of socio-philosophical views of Plato and Aristotle. The main definitions of this concept in the political theories of prominent thinkers of antiquity are shown. The purpose of this article is to analyze the views of ancient philosophers on the problem of the social avant-garde. This problem in ancient philosophy is represented, first of all, by the works of two of its most prominent representatives: Plato and Aristotle. Both thinkers did not use the concept of «social avant-garde», and the advanced part of society, which played a leading role in its development, was designated by them by the term "the best people". Understanding the role of the best people in the structure of the state and power occupies one of the central places in Plato's philosophical system. Plato calls the best people philosophers. It is the philosophers, according to Plato, wh...

2018

Paper presented to the SAGP at its 2005 meeting with the Central Division o f the APA Socrates and Plato do not speak or write in one voice about wisdom, yet their altogether unique theorizing about it represents the focal point of the West's first philosophy, philosophia as the "love of wisdom." Significantly, then, Plato's differing notions and wordings for wisdom throughout his dialogues must be continually revisited and reexamined. Tentatively, I adopt Gilbert Owen's wording and senses of "univocal" and "equivocal," which he used in relation to Aristotle's philosophy, only as a heuristic guide, to inquire into Plato's own 'equivocal' senses of wisdom.1 Because Plato has no 'univocal' or single-minded sense of wisdom, it is critical to revisit certain claims and assumptions about his contrasting and complementary usage of terms, their meanings, and importance for his overall theory of wisdom. By so doing, his philosophy emerges in clearer sight. By this analysis, some of these claims are re-evaluated and overturned. Of particular interest are those views that have been formerly accepted as developing or changing from Plato's Republic to the Laws regarding the kind of wisdom, hence also the philosophy necessary to guide the State. My interpretation diverges at key junctures from some of the standard interpretations of the meaning and significance of these changes. First, we can agree that clear differences are to be found between Plato's depiction of philosophical wisdom and the philosopher rulers in the Republic and in the Laws. By way of preliminary background for these changes, Plato's depiction of the kind of philosophic wisdom necessary for political leadership, at the same time, also reflects the underlying nature, constitution, and values of their different forms of political society and government. As a result of these Platonic interconnections, Plato's description of the nature of political society, and his characterization of philosophers as political leaders contain further reason and evidence for his making novel developments in the theory of wisdom between the Republic and the Laws. Instead of dividing and breaking away from theories in earlier dialogues, Plato's final views actually serve to advance, broaden, and perhaps unify his overall conception of wisdom and philosophy.

2004

Vedova, Aikatherini Vousoura and U go Zilioli for being such wonderful friends to me, and for their support, despite of physical distance. Many thanks also to Valentina Asciutti, Jonathan Battye, Xanthippe Bourloyanni, Alessandra Ferlesch and Georgios Kampalios for making the last year of my PhD worth remembering. I am deeply indebted to Xanthippe for her precious friendship and also for the stimulating discussions we have had on Plato and Aristotle. A special thank you to Jonathan for IIoAAqJ-ro rppolleill ev6azJ1ollia~ 1CPW-rOll mapxez Sophocles Chapter I Choosing One's Own Life. Individual Eudaimonia and Political Expertise.

I provide a new interpretation of a relatively neglected passage in Plato's Statesman (258b-261a) dealing with the distinction between theory and practice and the "theoretical" character of political science (identified with "statesmanship" in the dialogue). Through a close reading of the text, I argue that the Platonic distinction between theory and practice emerges from Plato's reflection on the distinction between soul and body, and in particular from his reflection on the ways in which knowledge may be embodied or disembodied. This understanding leads to a conception of the relationship between theory and practice that emphasizes the fragility of their connection and the necessity for mediation between them, as well as the ultimate interdependence of theoretical and practical knowledge in political life.

NOTOMI, N.; BRISSON, L. (Eds.). Dialogues on Plato's Politeia (Republic), 2013

20-minute presentation in a "parallel" session

2005

Paper presented to the SAGP at its 2005 meeting with the Central Division o f the APA Socrates and Plato do not speak or write in one voice about wisdom, yet their altogether unique theorizing about it represents the focal point of the West's first philosophy, philosophia as the "love of wisdom." Significantly, then, Plato's differing notions and wordings for wisdom throughout his dialogues must be continually revisited and reexamined. Tentatively, I adopt Gilbert Owen's wording and senses of "univocal" and "equivocal," which he used in relation to Aristotle's philosophy, only as a heuristic guide, to inquire into Plato's own 'equivocal' senses of wisdom.1 Because Plato has no 'univocal' or single-minded sense of wisdom, it is critical to revisit certain claims and assumptions about his contrasting and complementary usage of terms, their meanings, and importance for his overall theory of wisdom. By so doing, his philosophy emerges in clearer sight. By this analysis, some of these claims are re-evaluated and overturned. Of particular interest are those views that have been formerly accepted as developing or changing from Plato's Republic to the Laws regarding the kind of wisdom, hence also the philosophy necessary to guide the State. My interpretation diverges at key junctures from some of the standard interpretations of the meaning and significance of these changes. First, we can agree that clear differences are to be found between Plato's depiction of philosophical wisdom and the philosopher rulers in the Republic and in the Laws. By way of preliminary background for these changes, Plato's depiction of the kind of philosophic wisdom necessary for political leadership, at the same time, also reflects the underlying nature, constitution, and values of their different forms of political society and government. As a result of these Platonic interconnections, Plato's description of the nature of political society, and his characterization of philosophers as political leaders contain further reason and evidence for his making novel developments in the theory of wisdom between the Republic and the Laws. Instead of dividing and breaking away from theories in earlier dialogues, Plato's final views actually serve to advance, broaden, and perhaps unify his overall conception of wisdom and philosophy.

Eirene: Graeca et Latina, 2021

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Essays in …, 2011