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2007
AI
This paper examines the intricate relationship between language and cognition with a focus on spatial semantics. It explores how different linguistic frames of reference, such as relative and absolute systems, affect cognitive processes like navigation and spatial memory in speakers of diverse languages. Through various studies and experiments on communities speaking languages that employ these distinct spatial frames, the author argues for the Whorfian hypothesis, suggesting that linguistic structures can significantly shape cognitive styles and perceptions of space.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993
Fundamental to spatial knowledge in all species are the representations underlying object recognition, object search, and navigation through space. But what sets humans apart from other species is our ability to express spatial experience through language. This target article explores the language of objects and places, asking what geometric properties are preserved in the representations underlying object nouns and spatial prepositions in English. Evidence from these two aspects of language suggests there are significant differences in the geometric richness with which objects and places are encoded. When an object is named (i.e., with count nouns), detailed geometric properties -principally the object's shape (axes, solid and hollow volumes, surfaces, and parts) -are represented. In contrast, when an object plays the role of either "figure" (located object) or "ground" (reference object) in a locational expression, only very coarse geometric object properties are represented, primarily the main axes. In addition, the spatial functions encoded by spatial prepositions tend to be nonmetric and relatively coarse, for example, "containment," "contact," "relative distance," and "relative direction." These properties are representative of other languages as well. The striking differences in the way language encodes objects versus places lead us to suggest two explanations: First, there is a tendency for languages to level out geometric detail from both object and place representations. Second, a nonlinguistic disparity between the representations of "what" and "where" underlies how language represents objects and places. The language of objects and places converges with and enriches our understanding of corresponding spatial representations.
Studies in Language, 2009
There is a large body of research indicating that speakers of (familiar) European languages tend to encode and conceptualize space from an egocentric perspective, but linguistic fieldworkers have shown that speakers of certain other languages (e.g. Tzeltal) often describe the same spatial scenes based on fixed coordinates of the environment. This has led some researcher to challenge long-standing assumptions about semantic universals of space and the uniformity of spatial cognition. Specifically, Levinson and colleagues have questioned the hypothesis that there is a universal preference for egocentric, body-oriented representations of space in language and cognition. It is the purpose of the present paper to reconsider this hypothesis in light of an important class of spatial terms that has been disregarded in this research: demonstratives such as English this and that and here and there. The paper shows that the semantic interpretation of demonstratives presupposes a coordinate system with the same conceptual constituents as body-based expressions such as left and right or up and down. Combining evidence from linguistic typology with psychological research on joint attention, it is argued that demonstratives constitute a universal class of spatial terms that invoke an egocentric, body-anchored frame of reference grounded in basic principles of spatial and social cognition.
Typological Studies in Language, 2006
Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, 2010
There exist several proposals regarding the relation between Cognition and Language with respect to 'Space', our understanding of objects and their changing position in the world. Some earlier approaches assume that Language conveys a radically impoverished amount of information than that processed at a visual level (Landau & Jackendoff, 1993). More recent approaches instead argue that 'spatial language' is closer in richness to 'spatial cognition', but do so by positing a blurrier boundary between the two levels of comprehension (Coventry & Garrod, 2004). In this paper I will offer an argument for a novel synthesis of these two positions, based on what counts as 'spatial cognition' and 'spatial language', and what core properties can be found across these two levels of information-processing. I will also propose that there is also a crucial difference between these two levels: that of fine-grainedness, namely the amount of information we wish to convey and to omit when we produce a sentence regarding objects and their position.
This paper, which is a synthesis of several previous publications, analyzes some of the principles according to which it is possible to build an analogy, or even a continuity, between language and perception. Several misleading options are identified, arising from erroneous models of perception, and the non-taking into account of polysemy as a fundamental property of language. The key question of the relation between spatial and less- or non spatial uses of words will lead us to come back to the Gestalt and phenomenological theories of perception and action, which more than ever offer irreplaceable insights for semantics. We then sketch a radically dynamical theoretical framework, which gives a fundamental role to the mathematical concepts of instability. On this basis, the microgenesis of what we call Semantic Forms can be distributed between three layers of meaning, or ‘stabilization and development phases’, named motifs, profiles, and themes.
Language, 2003
Most approaches to spatial language have assumed that the simplest spatial notions are (after Piaget) topological and universal (containment, contiguity, proximity, support, represented as semantic primitives such as IN, ON, UNDER, etc.). These concepts would be coded directly in language, above all in small closed classes such as adpositions--thus providing a striking example of semantic categories as language-specific projections of universal conceptual notions. This idea, if correct, should have as a consequence that the semantic categories instantiated in spatial adpositions should be essentially uniform crosslinguistically. This article attempts to verify this possibility by comparing the semantics of spatial adpositions in nine unrelated languages, with the help of a standard elicitation procedure, thus producing a preliminary semantic typology of spatial adpositional systems. The differences between the languages turn out to be so significant as to be incompatible with stronger versions of the UNIVERSAL CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES hypothesis. Rather, the language-specific spatial adposition meanings seem to emerge as compact subsets of an underlying semantic space, with certain areas being statistical ATTRACTORS or FOCI. Moreover, a comparison of systems with different degrees of complexity suggests the possibility of positing implicational hierarchies for spatial adpositions. But such hierarchies need to be treated as successive divisions of semantic space, as in recent treatments of basic color terms. This type of analysis appears to be a promising approach for future work in semantic typology.* A DISTILLATION OF HUMAN SPATIAL COGNITION. In studies of spatial language, a standard line or set of orthodox assumptions has arisen, along the following lines: 1. The simplest spatial notions are topological-concepts of proximity, contiguity, containment (Piaget & Inhelder 1956). 2. Such notions can be taken to be either primitive, so that we have conceptual primes like IN, ON, UNDER (Jackendoff 1983), or near-primitive, so that, for example, IN is decomposed in terms of at least partial INCLUSION (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976). 3. These concepts are more or less directly coded in spatial language, above all in the closed-class spatial relators like prepositions and postpositions, which have (comparatively) simple semantics (Talmy 1983), largely universal in nature since they correspond to elements of our neurocognition (Landau & Jackendoff 1993). Consequently, 'we can develop a fairly comprehensive idea of the spatial relations expressed in language by focusing on spatial prepositions' (Landau & Jackendoff 1993:223). 4. Hence, the topological adpositions are among the earliest linguistic concepts learned by children (Johnston & Slobin 1979), and in learning them children map * Colleagues in the Language and Cognition Group who provided crucial data are: Jtirgen Bohnemeyer,
Language, 1998
This project collected linguistic data for spatial relations across a typologically and genetically varied set of languages. In the linguistic analysis, we focus on the ways in which propositions may be functionally equivalent across the linguistic communities while nonetheless representing semantically quite distinctive frames of reference. Running nonlinguistic experiments on subjects from these language communities, we find that a population's cognitive frame of reference correlates with the linguistic frame of reference within the same referential domain.* INTRODUCTION. This study examines the relationship between language and cognition through a crosslinguistic and crosscultural study of spatial reference. Beginning with a crosslinguistic survey of spatial reference in language use, we find systematic variation that contradicts usual assumptions about what must be universal. However, the available number of general spatial systems for describing spatial arrays can be sorted into a few distinctive frames of reference. We focus on two frames of reference: the ABSOLUTE, based on fixed bearings such as north and south, and the RELATIVE, based on projections from the human body such as 'in front (of me)', 'to the left'. In assessing language use, it is not enough to rely on descriptions of languages that are based on conventional elicitation techniques as these may not fully reflect actual socially anchored conventions. We have developed and used director/matcher language games which facilitate interactive discourse between native speakers about spatial relations in tabletop space. The standardized nature of these games allows more exact comparison across languages than is usually possible with conventionally collected discourse. Having observed the variation of language use across communities, we further ask whether there is corresponding conceptual variation-the question of the linguistic relativity of thought. For this, we developed nonlinguistic experiments to determine the speaker's cognitive representations independently of the linguistic data collection. The findings from these experiments clearly demonstrate that a community's use of linguistic coding reliably correlates with the way the individual conceptualizes and memorizes spatial distinctions for nonlinguistic purposes. Because we find linguistic relativity effects in a domain that seems basic to human experience and is directly linked to universally shared perceptual mechanisms, it seems likely that similar correlations between language and thought will be found in other domains as well. 1. A CROSSLINGUISTIC AND CROSSCULTURAL STUDY OF SPATIAL REFERENCE. The primary goal of our project is to test, refine, and reformulate hypotheses about language and human cognition drawing on in-depth information from a broad sample of non-* This article developed from a presentation entitled 'Cultural variation in spatial conceptualization' at
2003
The involutive algebra A corresponds to a given space M like in the classical duality Space Algebra in algebraic geometry' (Alain Connes (1998) 'Noncommutative Geometry and Space-Time'. Ch. 4 in S. A. Huggett, et al., eds.
2002
This paper is concerned with spatial Frames of Reference as they are expressed in language. Frames of Reference (FoR) may be regarded as spatial coordinate systems. In effect they are strategies for locating a referent (or figure) in relation to a relatum (or ground), on the basis of a search domain projected off the relatum. In the car is in front of/north of the church the car is located in relation to the church, with in front of and north of representing alternative strategies for projecting a search domain off the church. In front of and north of therefore operate in different FoR. Until the 1990s linguistic spatial reference was generally held to be fundamentally egocentric and anthropomorphic. Referents were understood to be located in relation to relata on the basis of a deictic viewpoint or on the basis of a human-like asymmetry assigned to the relatum and treated as intrinsic to it. The fundamental distinction was thus held to be between deictic and intrinsic. Research ove...
Biolinguistics 5(3), 170-225. , 2011
""The relation between spatial Vision and spatial Language has always been a source of controversy. Three problems can be identified as in need of a solution. A first problem pertains the nature of the minimal information units that make up spatial Vision and Language. A second problem pertains the “dynamic” aspects of Vision and Language, or what visual information “to” and similar adpositions correspond to. A third problem pertains how these different types of information are related one another, and what is the status of this “interface”, especially within a broader theory of Cognition and Language. The solution proposed here consists in a formal (modeltheoretic) treatment of visual and linguistic information, both static and dynamic, and is couched on (a simplified form of) Discourse Representation Theory. It is shown that this solution is consistent with general theories of Cognition, and may shed some (novel) light on the nature of the FLN/FLB distinction.""
2011
The relation between spatial vision and spatial language has always been a source of controversy. Three problems can be identified as in need of a solution. A first problem pertains to the nature of the minimal information units that make up spatial vision and language. A second problem pertains to the ‘dynamic’ aspects of vision and language, or what visual information to and similar adpositions correspond to. A third problem pertains to how these different types of information are related one another, and what is the status of this ‘interface’, especially within a broader theory of language and cognition. The solution proposed here consists in a formal (model-theoretic) treatment of visual and linguistic information, both static and dynamic, that is couched within (a simplified form of) Discourse Representation Theory. It is shown that this solution is consistent with general theories of cognition and may shed some (novel) light on the nature of the FLN/FLB distinction.
Perception, 2012
David Marr's metatheory emphasized the importance of what he called the computational level of description--an analysis of the task the visual system performs. In the present article I argue that this task should be conceived of not just as object recognition but as spatial understanding, and that the mental representations responsible for spatial understanding are not exclusively visual in nature. In particular, a theory of the visual system must interact with a theory of the language faculty to explain how we talk about what we see--and how we see all the things we talk about as though they are part of the perceived world. An examination of spatial language both raises the bar for theories of vision and provides important hints for how spatial understanding is structured.
The idea that spatial cognition provides the foundation of linguistic meanings, even highly abstract meanings, has been put forward by a number of linguists in recent years. This book takes this proposal into new dimensions and develops a theoretical framework based on simple geometric principles. All speakers are conceptualisers who have a point of view both in a literal and in an abstract sense, choosing their perspective in space, time and the real world. The book examines the conceptualising properties of verbs, including tense, aspect, modality and transitivity, as well as the conceptual workings of grammatical constructions associated with counterfactuality, other minds and the expression of moral force. It makes links to the cognitive sciences throughout and concludes with a discussion of the relationship between language, brain and mind.
Cognitive Processing, 2009
1989
Development of a comprehensive model of spatial relations is important to improved geographic information and analysis systems, and also to cognitive science and behavioral geography. This paper first reviews concepts of space. A critical distinction is between small-scale spaces, whose geometry can be directly perceived through vision and other senses, and large-scale space, which can be perceived only in relatively small parts. Fundamental terms for spatial relations often are based on concepts from small-scale space, and are metaphorically extended to large-scale (geographic) space. Reference frames, which form an important basis both for spatial language and for spatial reasoning, are discussed. Lastly, we set as a short term but important goal a search for geometries of spatial language.
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