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Foucault, Feminism, and the Self

In recent years, the feminist literature on the self has grown considerably. 2 The expansion of this literature might well lead one to wonder why the self has become such a hot topic for feminist theory. Initially, at least, the answer to this question seems obvious: how we conceptualize the self is closely related to our views about reason, critique, autonomy, and agency, all of which are concepts that lie at the heart of law, moral theory, political theory, and social science. As feminists have subjected existing work in these domains to critique and have developed feminist perspectives on legal, moral, political and social theory, they have had to confront the assumptions about the self that underpin inquiry in these areas. Thus it makes perfect sense that feminists have been so concerned with critiquing mainstream philosophical conceptions of the self and with offering their own reconceptualizations. Now, one might wonder, why bring Foucault into this conversation about feminist theory and the self? One reason to attempt this is that there are features of his account of the self that seem quite attractive from a feminist perspective. For example, in his genealogies of power, Foucault envisions the self as embodied, embedded in a social and cultural milieu, constituted by power relations, in short, thoroughly contextualized. This account not only dovetails with feminist critiques of the abstract individualism of mainstream philosophical conceptions of the self, it also offers feminists extremely useful resources for thinking about the role that oppressive socialization plays in the formation of gendered selves. 3 Critics, of course, have complained that the account of the self in Foucault's genealogical works is too contextualized; social relations imbued with power that render bodies docile threaten to obliterate the agency and autonomy of the self. In response to this line of criticism, one might look to Foucault's late work (Foucault 1985, 1986, and 1997a), with its account of practices of the self. From these texts, one might argue, a conception of the self that is useful for feminist theory and politics can be reconstructed,