Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program
Emanuela Galasso1999, Policy Research Working Papers
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Abstract
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This research investigates the distributional outcomes of decentralized welfare programs, focusing on local targeting mechanisms. While decentralized programs potentially benefit from better local knowledge, they may also suffer from issues of local elite capture, especially in heterogeneous communities. The paper emphasizes the need for systematic evidence on targeting performance and highlights the trade-offs between efficiency and accountability in the design of community-based welfare initiatives.
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