Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 2017

According to David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.

Philosophical Studies http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1

Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies on the idea of 'quoting' sensory qualities, so is dubbed the 'quotational higher-order thought theory'. I argue that it can capture something of the idea that we are 'acquainted' with our conscious states without slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mismatch. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for mental intentionality, in favour of one based on 'embedding'.

Transformação Revista de Filosofia, 2018

Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness. In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal’s theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section. ( in Transformação special issue on theories of consciousness edited by A. Pereira)

Only a few decades ago, the topic of consciousness was taboo in psychology and neuroscience, and relatively neglected even in philosophy. That all changed in the 1990s, when the focus of philosophical attention switched from intentionality to consciousness, and cognitive neuroscience began yielding exciting results that bear directly on the topic. The ensuing debates made clear the need to distinguish consciousness from a wide range of related phenomena, such as sensation, awakedness, attention, and rational cognition, all of which are now known to occur in the absence of what Rosenthal (2005) calls state consciousness-i.e., the phenomenon of a mental state's being present in a creature's subjective, first-person point of view.

2013

The guiding thought of this dissertation is that phenomenally conscious mental states consist in an appropriate pair of first-order and higher-order representations that are uniquely bound together by mental quotation. In slogan form: to be conscious is to be mentally quoted.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2013

Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

2018

This is the material for my presentation at the Graduate Center of City University New York (CUNY) in October 2019 as part of Cognitive Science Speaker Series. David Rosenthal’s classical Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory explains phenomenal consciousness of a mental state as the result a representational mechanism between two mental states. In this talk I will define the theory as follows: “A mental state is conscious only if it is represented by a higher-order thought in an appropriate manner”. Among other points, this account is criticized on the notions of ‘extrinsicness’ and ‘appropriate manner’. 1) How can an extrinsic relation explain an intrinsic quality like consciousness? Does ‘extrinsicness’ of the HOT to the first-order mental state imply ‘contingency’ instead of necessity? 2) How should we define the appropriate manner? Carruthers and Block takes it as a representation arrived at ‘non-inferentially’. It should seem immediate and direct. Modified Higher-Order Theories, Self-Representational Approaches and Phenomenological Approaches all attack HOT Theory on these grounds. There is a common understanding that there should be something intrinsic to phenomenal consciousness and some necessity for its emergence, that comes either from the relation between the representing mental states (modified HOT Theories and Self-Representational Theories) or from the experience from the start (Phenomenological Approaches). I will focus on the criticisms on HOT Theory based on these two notions and try to defend the classical HOT theory

The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology? In this paper we will present two arguments that "yes" answers to this question follows from the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, especially the version articulated and defended by David Rosenthal. The first, the general argument, aims to show that on the HOT theory all phenomenology is cognitive. The second, the central argument, aims to show that all conscious thoughts have phenomenology.