Introspection as Attention and Action

Comments on Barry Dainton, Stream of Consciousness, in Psyche, 2003

2015

This article is addressed to the problem of the psychological constitution of self-knowledge, considered in the light of its perceptual model. The starting point is the hypothesis that attention, understood here as a psychological element of the mental ability that is self-knowledge, plays an important role in the process of gaining self-knowledge. According to this assumption, we need to build a model of self-knowledge that can adequately explain the path that leads from attention to self-knowledge. Thus the second claim made here is that the perceptual model of self-knowledge can help us with this task. While this model has been criticized in philosophy, the metaphor of the mind's eye has been successfully used in psychology to define a special kind of attention. The perceptual model should explain how it happens that inner mental states to which attention is paid appear in the field of consciousness due to the special kind of self-reflection that stems from the intentional character of consciousness. Paying attention to one's own mental states is understood here as a type of introspection, whereas paying attention to higher-level mental states involves creating compositions from mental and phenomenal components to develop a self-representation of the subject of these states. Observations of one's own mental states constitute the subject of these states, i.e. the self. Introspection is, therefore, a psychological method for exploring self-consciousness that leads to self-knowledge, which is, however, described in philosophical terms. The former is an object of psychological - hence empirical - research; the latter is an object of philosophical consideration. But the question of introspection - and consciousness itself as a basis for gaining self-knowledge - determines the psychological account of self-knowledge. Thus the aim of this paper is to argue that, first, attention is the most important component of inner perception, and second, that attention plays a crucial role in gaining self-knowledge.

2017

My dissertation proposes a new model of introspection by examining those aspects of the nature of introspection that have been neglected in the contemporary literature, such as the ones determining variables or mental phenomena in accordance with specific cases of introspection. I assert that these neglected aspects are the very ones which provide a precise account of the way we are aware of our mental life and help us arrive at self-attributions. I begin by raising issues already extant in the epistemology of introspection, and not only argue against skeptical doubts about the reliability of introspection but also provide empirical evidence for its accuracy. I then discuss leading models of introspection, such as the inner-sense view and the acquaintance view, and show that both of these views fail to provide an explanation of the exact nature of introspection and to distinguish between different modes of introspective awareness. I finally offer a new model according to which introspection operates as what I call a cognitive superposition of mental phenomena-namely, a particular function of combining and integrating variables. It is by introspection that we become aware of the character and contents of our mental states as well as the changes, transitions, and boundaries among them. Yet while my own model of introspection builds on specific pluralist approaches which contend that introspection involves several cognitive processes, my model also shows that the operation of introspection remains distinct from the operation of other cognitive processes such as perception, attention, or inference, and thus cannot be reducible to them. v Acknowledgments Among many debts I wish to acknowledge, let me begin with those to the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT) for their three-year fellowship in support of my Ph.D. studies at The Graduate Center, City University of New York, and to The Graduate Center for its one-year Dissertation Fellowship. It is a special pleasure to thank my principal advisor, Jesse Prinz, for his support, guidance, and encouragement at all stages of my research. From his initial belief in my project to the commitment and attention he devoted to its many stages, I greatly appreciate his patience, respect, and responsiveness, unfailingly reflected in challenges and comments of the highest caliber. He has helped me to develop my own ideas and immeasurably improved my work, teaching me along the way to be a better philosopher and better person. I am particularly grateful for the support of my professors and dissertation committee Saul Kripke, Eric Mandelbaum, Susanna Siegel, and Iakovos Vasiliou, as well as for their insightful feedback and constructive questions. The guidance that Susanna Siegel and Iakovos Vasiliou have provided during my Ph.D. studies has inspired me to pay attention to what is important, and they have been ideal interlocutors. As my project has drawn to a close, their support has been essential as well.

2012

Visual phenomenology is highly illusive. One attempt to operationalize or to measure it is to use ‘cognitive accessibility’ to track its degrees. However, if Ned Block is right about the overflow phenomenon, then this way of operationalizing visual phenomenology is bound to fail. This thesis does not directly challenge Block’s view; rather it motivates a notion of cognitive accessibility different from Block’s one, and argues that given this notion, degrees of visual phenomenology can be tracked by degrees of cognitive accessibility. Block points out that in the psychology literature, ‘cognitive accessibility’ is often regarded as either all or nothing. However, the notion motivated in the thesis captures the important fact that accessibility comes in degrees (consider the visual field from fovea the periphery). Different legitimate notions of accessibility might be adopted for different purposes. The notion of accessibility motivated here is weaker than Block’s ‘identification’ (2007) but is stronger than Tye’s ‘demonstration’ (2007). The moral drawn from the discussion of Block can be applied to the debate between Dretske and Tye on the speckled-hen style examples. Dretske’s view is even stronger than Block’s, but his arguments from various figures he provides do not support his conclusion since he does not have right ideas about fixation and attention. Tye’s picture is more plausible but his notion of accessibility is so weak that he reaches the excessive conclusion that accessibility overflows phenomenology. Three ramifications might be considered in the final part of the thesis. The first is the relation between this debate and the one concerning higher-order/same-order theories of consciousness. The second is about John McDowell’s early proposal about demonstrative concepts in visual experiences. The third is the relation between the interpretation of the Sperling case proposed here and McDowell new view of experiential contents, i.e., his story about how we carve out conceptual contents out of intuitional contents without falling pray to the Myth of the Given.

The Meaning Of Introspection, 2022

This paper examines the meaning and evidential role of reports of introspection in cognitive psychology. A theory of scientific introspection aims to detail the nature, scope and limits of reports of subjective experience in science. Introspective reports best function as experimental data when combined with objective methods of stimulus control and the more recent, developing methods of brain scanning and brain imaging—which are having a invigorating effect on both theory and experimental practice. Introspection has been controversial and variously conceived in the history of psychology: sometimes endorsed as central and crucial to scientific psychology and sometimes rejected outright as subjective. Introspective methods were very prominent in the structuralist origins of experimental psychology, and also important in the origins of functional psychology; but it was subsequently rejected or minimized by the dominant behaviorism of the twentieth century. In common usage, “introspective” often means “reflective,” and related practices may take on broad significance in personal life. This popular (or philosophical) meaning occasionally intrudes problematically into scientific discourse. In particular it tends to license undue confidence in stand-alone introspection. In Wilhelm Wundt’s experimental psychology, emphasis was placed on “stimulus control.” Reports of introspection were regarded as scientifically useful only if the experimentalist could control the sensory stimulus. This effectively limited experimental introspection to situations corresponding to ordinary reports of perceptual observation (though it is reasonably, if carefully extended in particular experimental designs). On the other hand, competing conceptions of introspection extended it to include unchecked, unfalsifiable and poorly replicated results. There has been a modest return of introspection in recent cognitive psychology—chiefly supplemented by techniques of brain imaging and brain scanning. As will be argued, this combination with objective methods is needed; and it will be briefly argued that some account will also be needed of the semantics of the descriptions of conscious contents.

Consciousness and cognition, 2006

The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition, 2025

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology.

Philosophy Compass, 2006

Forthcoming in Appearance, Reality, and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert M.