The Politics of Communitarianism (1994)

"Now written as a chapter in Rational Freedom vol 4 The Good Life This paper argues that communitarian critics are not - with the exception of MacIntyre - opposed to liberalism but attempt a synthesis in which individuality and communality are combined in a community which reconciles the individual and the social self. The paper pursues a synthesis which develops a concept of self that combines individual and collective identity within a community. This synthesis transcends the public-private dualism so as to achieve a polity which unifies participation (autonomy) and community (sociality). Though similar, the aims of the communitarian critics of liberalism are betrayed by the fundamentally liberal premises of their arguments. Such, attempts are predicated upon the classic liberal dualism between the individual and community; none get to the roots of this dualism in order to remove it. Communitarianism, no less than liberalism, is predicated on the modernist antithesis between the individual and society. Communitarian conclusions cannot be derived from individualist premises without having recourse to an ideal and abstract form of community independent of the individuals subject to it. As with any dualism, the two elements - individual and community - are interdependent; neither can exist without the other. This paper therefore argues the need to get to the roots of this antithesis in the division of social space into public and private spheres, the public world as an impersonal-rational sphere, the private world as a personal sphere."

Now written as a chapter in Rational Freedom vol 4 The Good Life by Dr Peter Critchley This paper argues the case for communitarianism as an embodiment of the theory of the good immanent in liberal theory but latent within liberal practice. The works of communitarian/ethical liberals relevant here include Galston, Finnis, Taylor and Raz. For these communitarians, the conditions for individual autonomy are not attained merely as a result of protecting the individual against the interference of others. Repudiating the rights-based approach to justice, this paper argues for freedom as a flourishing, an expression of a certain quality of life for a whole community. Rights are therefore shown to be fundamental components in a communal modus vivendi, a way of life which is committed to certain forms of human flourishing for all individuals within community. This is shown to involve a conception of the good life. The primary bond of society is shown to rest on the understanding that the good for individuals and the good of community rests on a shared conception based on the human ontology. The Aristotelian influence is evident as these goods are defined according to a set of characteristics held to be distinctive of the human species. These demand a form of life which enables the full expression of the potentialities specific to human beings. Whilst the communitarians are aware that human desires and interests do not all necessarily point to an all-inclusive way of life, as Aristotle seemed to assume, they do imply a certain moral order in the universe so that the diversity of goods may be compatible.

It has become evident that, rather than being entirely opposed to one another, contemporary liberalism and communitarianism share many goals. For all their criticisms of the individualism of liberal polities, most communitarians are firm supporters of civil liberties and rights. And, for all their warnings about the dangers of citizen involvement and communal sentiments in politics, most liberals would welcome a revival of civic virtue and a renewed sense of common purpose in America. But while a modicum of peace has come to the liberal—communitarian debate, important questions, of both a theoretical and practical nature, remain about how to reconcile liberal and communitarian ideals. Part of the reason that these questions arise is due to uncertainty about the fundamental aims of both liberalism and communitarianism. What, for liberalism, is the basis of our right to civil liberty? Is civil liberty merely a means to our ends? Or is it necessary for deeper reasons? And what, for communitarianism, is the ultimate basis for civic virtue? Does communitarianism seek to support any or all conceptions of civic virtue and the common good? Or is communitarianism best seen as a defense of a more or less Aristotelian conception of moral virtue, one that, in our time, can best be realized by the revival of civic virtue and communal life of certain kind? By answering these questions, this paper attempts to show how liberalism and communitarianism can be reconciled. Rather than start with abstruse theoretical conflicts between liberalism and communitarianism, the first part of this paper addresses the most pressing practical problem, the proper extent of civil liberty and state action. Most contemporary liberals defend a broad right to freedom on the grounds that a liberal state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the human good. And, on these same grounds, they argue that government must not use its powers to tax, subsidize, and regulate our activities in order to help people pursue one view of the human good rather than another. Communitarians, however, explicitly defend a non-neutral state. And they seem willing to limit human freedom in order to form citizens of a certain kind. My suggested resolution to this debate is that communitarians accept the most extensive civil liberty while liberals accept government action in support of one or another conception of the human good, so long as (1) that action is taken in as decentralized a manner as possible and (2) freedom remains unrestricted. On my view, the state may not set any limits on what we think, say, and, in the privacy of our homes, do. But, at the same time, the state can encourage, honor, and subsidize particular ways of life. In doing so, however, it must adopt the principle of subsidiarity: government endorsement of a particular conception of the good must be undertaken in as local a form of government as is consistent with the good in question. I apply this general principle—which I call the principle of freedom—to a number of contemporary debates concerning such matters as abortion, schooling, and sexual orientation. While my proposal cuts the knot of conflict between liberalism and communitarianism, it needs some defense. The second part of the paper argues that the principle of freedom rests on the notion that human beings have the capacity, in both our political and individual lives, to pursue a reasoned account of human nature, the human good, and our own good here and now. I suggest that we think of reasoning about the human good as a fallible, empirical activity. There are no guarantees that any features of human nature are broad enough and widely enough shared to sustain an account of the human good. Nor are their any guarantees that we will reach consensus about the human good. But we do not need such guarantees in order to explore questions of our own nature and our good. Nor do we need consensus in order for reasoning about the human good to be productive of individual and political and social enlightenment. Moreover, the mere possibility of reasoning about the human good mandates that we have the freedom, in both our individual and collective lives, to examine and test different conceptions of a good life. This freedom is most likely to be found, I argue, when we protect the most extensive civil liberty to express our ideas and to do as we please in our private lives and when local and regional governments can support a particular conception of the good life. In the third part of my paper, I examine two important consequence of my proposed reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism. I argue, first, that communitarians should not see community and civic virtue as ends in themselves. Liberals, I argue, are quite right to think that civic virtue and a communal spirit can lead to trouble. Trouble can arise, as liberals have pointed out, when the pursuit of civic virtue and community takes illiberal forms or leads to the kinds of conflicts that cannot easily be constrained in a liberal polity. It can also arise, however, when community and a civic spirit make it more rather than less difficult for human beings to lead a fulfilling life. Community and civic virtue are only defensible ideals when they take a form that helps human beings live a good life. If they accept the principle of freedom, communitarians will be pluralists, who value a wide range of experiments in community. But while, as a matter of principle, communitarians should allow for the greatest variety of conceptions of civic virtue and communal solidarity, they should not be reluctant to express their preferences for one idea of virtue and community over another. They should, in other words, encourage free people to choose well and wisely. There is no principled way to accomplish that task, however. If reasoning about the human good is a fallible, empirical activity, then we cannot know in advance what kinds of troubles will result from our pursuit of civic virtue and community. Nor is there any algorithm than can tell us when even attractive forms of communitarianism—those that might help people sustain a fulfilling way of life—can threaten the central ideals of liberalism. For, we should not kid ourselves: there are likely to be tensions between individual and collective freedom, and thus between civil liberty and the pursuit of a good polity and society. In the principle of freedom, I propose a clear line between what we might call the communitarian good and the liberal right. But, while helpful, no such line can solve all our problems. It cannot warn us when political and social institutions and practices meant to realize a good life are likely to set off a movement that threaten our freedoms. Nor can it tell us what kinds of communitarianism are likely to help us live better lives. So, the second consequence of my reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism is the recognition that, in any sound political theory, principles must be supplemented by prudence or practical wisdom. Finally, if we are to defend an account of reasoning about the human good that supports the principle of freedom and makes room for prudence, and we need a sound philosophical psychology or anthropology. Thus I agree with Michael Sandel in holding that some view of human action and of human desires underlies our conception of the task of politics. But, in the fourth part of this paper, I sketch a philosophical psychology that transcends the difference between the two views he presents in Democracy’s Discontent. The self, I argue, is neither entirely prior to its ends nor entirely defined by its ends. Rather I see the self as capable of both the discovery of our deepest ends and the invention of new ways of life that best enable us to satisfy those ends. The self is, in other words, a product of an intertwining of nature and culture. As we seek our own good, we also search for the best way to understand how our ends are the product of both nature and culture. Precisely because we can do this, however, we can stand apart from our ends and evaluate them from a distance. We are not so constituted by our ends that distance from them is impossible. Nor are we capable of a standing so far from our ends that they lose all importance. It is the tension between what we are by nature and by culture that creates the occasions for and the possibility of distance. And it is the congruence between what we are by nature and by culture that makes our way of life inescapably important to us.

İnsan ve Toplum - The Journal of Humanity and Society, 2024

Abstract: Communitarian thought could be a noteworthy alternative to the prevailing moral-political realities established by liberal assumptions and presuppositions, as its interpretations on issues it broaches in the realms of being, knowledge, and value indicate. However, it is not entirely accurate to say that communitarianism is examined as an alternative to liberal thought in the literature. The role assigned to it is more so to serve as a corrective that moderates the extremes of liberal thought. This article aims to reinterpret communitarianism not as a corrective of liberalism, but as an alternative thought system to it. The main contention of the article is that, just like liberalism, communitarianism can indeed be read as a standalone political philosophy. This claim is sought to be grounded in the article by the existence of a unique philosophical foundation from which the criticisms of communitarian thinkers toward liberalism also emerge and are nourished - in other words, the fundamental premises and assumptions that make the communitarian critique “communitarian”. In this context, rather than focusing on the critiques of communitarians against liberalism, the article offers an examination that reveals the ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations of communitarian thought. Keywords: Political philosophy, Communitarianism, Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology Öz: Varlık, bilgi ve değer düzlemlerinde tartışmaya açtığı meselelere ilişkin yorumları; komüniteryan düşüncenin, cari ahlaki-siyasi gerçekliğimizi tesis eden liberal kabul ve faraziyelerin kayda değer bir alternatifi olabileceğini göstermektedir. Fakat literatürde komüniteryanizmin liberal düşüncenin bir alternatifi olarak incelendiği söylemek pek de mümkün değildir. Ona biçilen rol, daha ziyade, liberal düşüncenin aşırılıklarını törpüleyecek bir düzelticisi olmasıdır. Bu makale, komüniteryanizmi liberalizmin bir düzelticisi değil, ona alternatif bir düşünce sistemi olarak yeniden yorumlamayı amaçlar. Makalenin temel iddiası, tıpkı liberalizm gibi komüniteryanizmin de müstakil bir siyaset felsefesi olarak okunabileceğidir. Bu iddia, makalede, komüniteryan düşünürlerin liberalizme yönelik eleştirilerini de doğurup besleyen özgün bir felsefi zeminin-bir diğer ifadeyle komüniteryan eleştiriyi "komüniteryan" kılan birtakım temel kabul ve varsayımların-mevcudiyetiyle temellendirilmeye çalışılır. Bu bağlamda makale, komüniteryanların liberalizm eleştirilerine odaklanmak yerine; komüniteryan düşüncenin ontolojik, epistemolojik ve aksiyolojik temellerini açığa çıkaran bir inceleme vaat etmektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyaset felsefesi, Komüniteryanizm, Ontoloji, Epistemoloji, Aksiyoloji Source: https://www.insanvetoplum.org/sayilar/14cilt-3-sayi/m0740

2023

Amidst the crisis of ideologies and traditional conceptions about the state, liberal communitarianism develops an original political approach. Its central proposition is that a good society requires a balance between State, community, and market, rejecting both the minimal State and state-centrism. In the work of sociologist Amitai Etzioni, we find the most systematic political formulation of communitarian thought. Some aspects distinguish this formulation: (i) the empirical analysis of the State has as its ethical-political reference the concept of the good society; (ii) democracy requires a responsive State, sensitive to the voice of communities; (iii) conversely to the politics of neutrality, the State is committed to a limited set of core values; (iv) the State fulfills fundamental functions, but, either strong or weak, its functions are always limited; (v) the fulfillment of collective needs and the common good requires a balance between State, community and market; (vi) to ensure peace in international relations requires the perspective of basic security, with the global political community as a horizon. The communitarian theory, which presents itself politically as a third way, brings relevant contributions to understanding current State dilemmas and examining future perspectives.

History of European Ideas, 1994

UGC E-Pathshala, 2015

Contemporary Sociology, 1999

proposes a policy agenda for citizens to work for the common good. First, he endeavors to bring together the diverse strands of communitarian ideas developed by various thinkers in Europe and America, and, then, through a synthesis of these ideas, attempts to formulate a critical theory of social and political reforms necessary for building inclusive communities. Reading more like a manifesto than an academic treatise, the book makes a plausible argument for reconstituting some of the major institutions of democratic societies. Tam begins by proposing that the communitarian agenda for realizing an inclusive community-a space where common interests are developed (and pursued) with the participation of alI citizens as equals-consider three factors: (I) the principles of cooperative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation; (2) an application of these principles to matters concerning the education, work opportunities, and protection of alI citizens; and (3) what colIective actions those involved with the state sector, the business sector, and the third sector of voluntary and community groups can take in order to bring about the necessary reforms. The principles of cooperative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation, Tam posits, have been formulated on the basis of communitarian thinking that has evolved through the ages. Unfortunately, he does not say which sources he surveyed in inventorying these principles. Nor does Tam mention how he arrived at their formulation. Through logical deduction? Through empirical investigation of objective data? And aside from some passing references to Plato, John Stuart Mill, and a few others, it is difficult to get a sense for exactly which communitarian thinkers and what ages Tam has in mind. As a method for resolving social and political differences, the principle of cooperative inquiry requires that any knowledge-claim about the kinds of common values needed to build inclusive communities be judged as valid only if informed citizens deliberating together in open communication accept that claim. The second communitarian principle, that of mutual responsibility, requires alI members ofa community to take responsibility for helping each other pursue those common values that have stood the test of time across diverse cultures. According to Tam, these include the values of love, wisdom, justice, and selffulfillment. Again, Tam does not say how he arrived at these particular values. Few would deny that love, wisdom, and justice are universals that have been prized in most civil societies throughout human history, but so also have been the notions of civility, sacrifice, and faith, to name just a few others. And as for Tam's value of self-fulfillment, which is rights-based not duty-based, it can hardly be said to

Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, 2009